A critical assessment of the

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Sandinista Revolution John Weeks, Professor of International Economics, Middlebury College:

"For those who look for new thinking on Nicaragua, 'Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolution' is necessary reading. Alan Benjamin offers a well-argued answer to the question, where does the revolution go from • Joe Ricciardi, Economist, academic visitor, Central Bank of Nicaragua:

Professor James Rhodes, Luther College (Library Journal):

"Benjamin provides a tightly argued and carefully documented case for u he terms 'an incomplete revolution. This book is unique in that it assesses impact of U.S. policy within the Nicaraguan political system."

"Nicaragua: Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolution"

researchers at Managua's ITZTANI Institute, 186 pp. Introduction by Rod and Jeff Mackler. To order, send $8.95 (includes $1 postage) to:

Walnut Publishing Co., 3435 Army St., Rm. 308, San Francisco, CA 94110.

SOCIALIST ACTION APRIL1990 11 istS.

"At receptions at foreign embassies shortly before the election," Samper said, "COSEP leaders openly boasted of this pact, which, they said, included a Sandinista pledge to abolish the draft, include opposition leaders in top cabinet posts, nominate an independent magistrate, and reprivatize sectors of industrial and agricultural production.

"Less ideological" campaign

Another illustration of the FSLN's "less ideological" approach during the elections was the character of the campaign itself.

Rather than rely on the Sandinista Defense Committees and mass organizations to mobilize support for the Sandinistas on the basis of a program calling for the defense and the deepening of the revolution, the FSLN leadership separated itself from the masses and their aspirations.

A parallel structure involving 70,000 paid staff members was established throughout the country to promote the main Sandinista slogan-"Everything will get better." Estimated to have cost close to $40 million, the Sandinistas' campaign had all the markings of a typical U.S. election campaign. There were T-shirts galore, photo opportunities with the candidates, even a new macho image for Ortega, who was renamed El Gallo (The Rooster). It was vintage Madison Avenue.

But, as MUR leader Rodrigo Ibarra explained to Socialist Action, "The Sandinista rank and file and the people in general resented this waste of money at a time when most Nicaraguans have to get by with one meal a day. Under their breaths, everyone was saying that if the commanders knew what it felt to go hungry, they would not throw away the people's money."

Ibarra continued: "The break with the revolutionary image and traditions of the FSLN was so sharp that even the Sandinista hymn was barred from all election rallies and events. After all, you can't tell people that a longer concerned about the need to pose as a neutral and independent statesman, Arias lavished praise on Chamorro and the contras. He insisted that he was one of the few who hadn't lost confidence in the UNO coalition's ability to win the elections, all opinion polls notwithstanding.

This is the same Oscar Arias who was repeatedly hailed by the Sandinista leadership (and by many in the U.S. anti-intervention movement) for his alleged support to peace and democracy in the region!

Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, as well as Spain's Felipe Gonzalez and France's François Mitterand, also tried to outdo one another in heaping praise upon Chamorro. All of them had feigned friendship for the Sandinistas while actually stabbing the revolution in the back.

"The first large payoff"

But the political force which outdid them all in jumping to Chamorro's support was the Soviet bureaucracy led by Mikhail Gorbachev.

On Feb. 26, the day after the election, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ion Bourlai said that Moscow was willing to provide large sums of economic aid-and even military aid—to the Chamorro government. "We are willing to discuss the question of cooperation in the military field with the new government if the necessity arises," Bourlai stated. (Washington Post, Feb. 27)

It wasn't long ago that Reagan and Bush were justifying the need for aid to the contras on the never-proven grounds that Nicaragua was becoming a Soviet military beachhead in the Americas. But now with the Sandinistas driven from office, the truth about the Soviet bureaucracy's real counterrevolutionary role could finally be told. No longer was it necessary to whip up support for the contras by pushing the "Communist bogey-man" propaganda blitz.

An editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle (March 8) told it the best:

"But why, actually, did Ortega and the Nicaragua mics ned' ITHATby Alan Benjamın "A useful treatment of Nicaragua's mixed economy. Moisés Hassan (former Sandinista leader and ex-mayor of Managua):

"In a short space, Alan Benjamin has selected the essential issues facing the Nicaraguan Revolution and presented a coherent analysis of the social forces in contention over the past decade.

"Foreign observers who support the revolution lend to uncritically echo the policy positions of the Sandinista leadership, thereby doing a disservice to the revolution itself. Benjamin has avoide this pitfall. He is not afraid to approach the problems confronting the revolution and to offer an alternative solution to the crisis facing Nicaragua."

Thai the with Holt

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... Threat to Cuba (continued from page 9: “Now-more than ever-Cuba needs defense of its revolution”) make the country organically stronger.

But if Castro believes that he can "build socialism in one country"— isolated from the world market and based on scarcity—he must know that this would only amount to a caricature of "barracks socialism."

The result would be increasing social discontent and the inevitable formation of a crystallized Stalinist caste whose interests are inimical to the interests of the Cuban people.

It would only be a matter of time before the social infrastructure would break down and hostile class social forces would rear their ugly heads. This is when the U.S. imperialists would strike-just like they did in Grenada.

Extend socialist revolution

The key to Cuba's survival, therefore, is on the political front. The precondition for this is the extension of the socialist revolution to Latin America. But unfortunately, Castro's approach here will continue to be fatally flawed if he doesn't settle accounts with Stalinism.

While the Cubans have consciously prevented the rise of a Stalinist bureaucratic caste in Cuba, in the process of defending their national independence and refusing to become a "bargaining chip" for Gorbachev, their pragmatic approach to politics has left them in a contradictory position.

The Cubans have had to depend for their survival on the "good will" of the Moscow Stalinists. The Stalinists, on the other hand, benefited politically from this relationship because they looked "revolutionary" when they aided the heroic and besieged revolutionary island.

This situation has forced Castro to walk a political tightrope, which is perfectly permissible for a revolution trying to survive.

But Castro's mistaken opposition to the nascent political revolution in Eastern Europe has put him in a situation where the Gorbachevites now portray him in the Soviet press as an "old-line Stalinist" of the Ligachev type.

This portrayal dovetails quite well with he U.S. propaganda slander that Castro is a "despot" with no popular support.

Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. Unlike the hated Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, whose rule was associated with po... Nicaragua (continued from page 11: “The Essential Lessons of the Nicaraguan Revolution”) an attempt to gain their support: Over 60 percent of the economy remained in private hands, and the government provided millions of dollars yearly in subsidies, incentives, and tax breaks to the capitalists.

This also meant providing political support to so-called anti-imperialist and social-democratic regimes throughout the world.

The FSLN leadership, for example, consistently gave political support to the pro-imperialist ruling PRI party in Mexico, praising Mexico as a "model of true socialist democracy."

But the Mexican regime cut off oil to Nicaragua under pressure from the U.S. State Department and vehemently supported the contras' demand for "democratization." Friends like this the Nicaraguan Revolution did not need. It would have found much more reliable allies among Mexico's workers and peasants.

No easy solution Obviously, there was no easy solution to the plight of the weak and distorted Nicaraguan economy. But deepening the revolution by proceeding on international revolutionary-socialist course-based on the mobilization of the workers and peasants against the capitalists and big landlords— was a vital necessity for defending the revolution.

To prevent the dynamism of the revolution from being continually eroded, the Nicaraguan Revolution had to break out of the bonds of the "mixed economy" and take the path the Cuban Revolution took in 1961. Such a decision would have been enthusiastically supported by the majority of Nicaraguan workers and peasants, a large proportion of whom deeply resented the large handouts given to the capitalists as well as 12 SOCIALIST ACTION litical repression and economic mismanagement, the Castro leadership enjoys more popular support than any other government in the world.

But Cuba has to link up with—not oppose—the workers' and farmers' movement for democratic rights in Eastern Europe. They are not the ones responsible for late grain shipments to Cuba. The Stalinist leaderships in these countries are the ones who want to restore "market capitalism" and strike a deal with U.S. imperialism.

Castro drew some similar conclusions while speaking to the Federation of Cuban Women's fifth congress in Havana, on March 7. He denounced the fact that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria supported and voted for a U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolution which accused Cuba of human rights violations.

Speaking about the danger of a U.S. invasion, Castro said: "If one day that takes place, the responsibility for the bloodshed will also fall on those countries, those governments of countries that until yesterday were part of the socialist camp.

"The blood will also be on Poland, on Czechoslovakia.... They will be responsible to a great extent for any crime that is committed against Cuba, and responsibility will fall equally on Hungary and on Bulgaria. I will not say it will fall on confused peoples, but on the leaders, on the governments that have dared to write such an infamous page in the unequal share of the hardships imposed on them by the contra war.

In order to move in this direction, an extensive system of workers' control had to be instituted in order to both prevent capitalist destabilization and to begin to involve the masses themselves in democratic decision-making. Sandinista "participatory" democracy was a poor substitute for actively organizing and training the masses to govern themselves. Participation of the masses was also stifled by the vertical and bureaucratic control over the mass organizations exercised by the Sandinista leadership.

Many of the burning tasks of the revolution, such as the distribution of land to the peasants, remained unresolved. Distributing the land to the tens of thousands peasant families who had not benefited from the agrarian reform program was essential. It required making deep inroads into the property rights of the agro-export capitalists.

This would have ensured the support of the land-hungry peasants for the revolution and cemented their alliance with the workers, who would have become the new ruling class.

But even if the Sandinistas had broken with the mixed capitalist economy, the dependent and backward character of the Nicaraguan economy underscores the fact that, by itself, Nicaragua could not break out of the straitjacket of underdevelopment imposed on it by the international capitalist system.

Extending the revolution throughout Central America was both necessary and possible. The fate of the Nicaraguan Revolution was inextricably tied to the outcome of the struggles in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Instead, however, the Sandinistas gave political support to the pro-capitalist "program of broad participation" adopted in the early APRIL1990 history."

For Castro to successfully defeat this political and economic blackmail he has to reach out to the workers and farmers of those countries, support their struggle for socialist democracy, and attract them with an alternative revolutionary program.

Build parties in Latin America Similarly, extending the socialist revolution to Latin America is crucial for Cuba's survival. In the past, however, Castro has subordinated the building of independent revolutionary movements to political alliances with the so-called progressive native capitalist classes in these countries. This is the result of tail-ending the Stalinist communist parties in Latin America, who are not in the least interested in making socialist revolution.

Furthermore, because of pressure from the Soviet Union, these parties will now play a treacherous role in relation to Cuba. The Castro leadership is on a collision course with Stalinism in Latin America.

The necessity of organizing and building revolutionary Marxist parties, which will genuinely defend the interests of the workers and peasants in Latin America, is a vital prerequisite for breaking Cuba out of its current isolation.

Cuba's "fair-weather" friends in Latin America, like President Collor de Mello in Brazil or President Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, will be the first to abandon the besieged island. These native capitalists fear their own workers and peasants a thousand times more than they fear the arrogance of a triumphant U.S. imperialism should Cuba succumb.

Cuba's only reliable allies in Latin America are the millions of workers and peasants who see the Cuban Revolution as one of their conquests.

Institute workers' democracy Most importantly, Castro needs to institute direct forms of workers' rule in Cuba based on soviets (councils) of workers and peasants.

The current absence of institutionalized forms of workers' democratic control over all aspects of economic, political, and social life in Cuba will, in the long term, pose a fatal danger to the Cuban Revolution.

Soviets of workers and peasants would exclude capitalist parties. They would be made up of delegates from various soviet parties elected by the masses themselves and subject to immediate recall. Direct democratic control of Cuban society by the 1980s by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. And later, under the pressure of the Arias plan, the Sandinista Front even turned its back on the Salvadoran struggle itself.

In December 1989, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega signed the San Isidro Accords, which legitimized the Salvadoran death-squad regime of Alfredo Cristiani and urged the demobilization of the FMLN combatants. The FMLN itself strongly denounced the declaration of the five Central American presidents, stating:

"This declaration unconditionally supports the principal violator of human rights of the region: a government which has assassinated and persecuted the religious community and bombed its civilian population.

"This support only encourages those who have unleashed this irrational violence, and permits the slaughter that is now taking place in El Salvador to worsen....

"The FMLN cannot be demobilized by virtue of agreements among governments because the FMLN constitutes a legitimate force, rooted in the population all over the country."

The situation today The Central American revolution is at its most difficult point in decades. Following the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, prospects for revolutionary victories are dim in the immediate future.

It is not just imperialist wishful thinking when the New York Times (Feb. 27) writes: "In Central America, the Sandinista defeat anchors the ideological balance of power firmly on the right. That promises to deal a sharp political and military blow to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala."

Less than one month after the Nicaraguan elections, top leaders of the Salvadoran FMLN guerrilla forces were reported by the New York Times (March 22) to have agreed "to make more concessions and were close to workers and peasants would put the revolution in the strongest position to defend itself.

Undoubtedly, the Castro leadership, based on the 30-year mandate they've already enjoyed would prevail in these soviets.

Most importantly, this example of soviet democracy would undercut Gorbachev's demagogic call for "parliamentary democracy."

Unfortunately, in his Jan. 28 speech to trade-union delegates, Castro indicated that, if anything, there should be a tightening up of the Cuban Communist Party. He indicated that genuine discussion, participation, and debate is a "luxury" the revolution cannot afford; that the Cuban Communist Party must have monolithic unity in the face of adversity.

But despite Castro's well-intentioned desire to maintain equilibrium, such measures will not suppress Glasnost-type pressures or debates. On the contrary, a Gorbachev wing will develop inside the Cuban CP behind the back of Castro-and behind the backs of the masses-if these discussions are not in the open with full democratic participation by the workers. An approach of open, demecratic discussion will, furthermore, deny Gorbachev the "high ground" of "democracymongering."

Worker and peasant soviets are the only institutions that will effectively combat the Stalinist virus that is incubating and poised to undermine and weaken the Cuban Revolution.

Such an example of full-fledged workers' democracy would be an inspiration to the workers and farmers of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Central and South America and, most importantly, the United States. Such an approach would immediately propel the Cuban Revolution into the leadership of the world's workers and farmers.

In the United States, the task of solidarity, peace, antiwar, civil rights, and trade-union activists is to unconditionally defend Revolutionary Cuba from U.S. aggression, irrespective of what measures the Castro leadership may take. A defeat of Cuba would be an historic blow to working people everywhere.

Demonstrations, rallies, and teach-ins need to be organized to make it perfectly clear to Washington that the U.S. warmakers will pay as much a domestic political price as they will a military price should they escalate their war moves against Cuba.

No U.S. Intervention in Cuba!

U.S. Hands Off Cuba!

U.S. Out of Guantanamo Naval Base!

completing arrangements for negotiations.

The Times reported that the FMILN and the Cristiani government had agreed to negotiate a treaty whereby "the rebels [would] put down their arms and agree to take part in municipal and legislative elections next March."

In Nicaragua, while there is widespread anger and frustration among wide layers of the population who want to fight to defend the gains of the revolution, the majority who voted for Chamorro is bound to give her a "honeymoon" period to improve their desperate economic situation.

Without revolutionary leadership from the Sandinista Front—which has embarked on the path of becoming a loyal opposition to Chamorro-demoralization is bound to set in.

Still, Chamorro's political alliance is quite fragile, and, moreover, it does not appear that the imperialists are in a position to provide the kind of economic aid Chamorro needs to forestall new class conflicts in the period ahead.

"Look at Panama," MUR leader Rodrigo Ibarra told Socialist Action. "So little U.S. economic aid has been sent there that even the puppet president, Guillermo Endara, has had to wage a hunger strike to demand more aid. And in El Salvador, where the U.S. government has pumped in billions of dollars, the economy is still about to collapse."

Ibarra continued, "Despite the grave setback suffered with the FSLN's electoral defeat, there is an urgent sense that it is necessary to mobilize to defend the gains of the revolution. People aren't ready to sit back and say the revolution is over."

"But it will take a new leadership to lead this fight," Ibarrra concluded, "and that is what we in the MUR are hoping to build alongside all those Sandinistas and revolutionary minded people who are looking for a class-struggle perspective."