The Essential Lessons of the Nicaraguan Revolution

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were for exampl n the ing parties that and Venezi andi- The Secr over to the ain st side of U.S ship's deci revoit be- party is pe rould break with ıbled Newswe ries, Sandinista seek- lished just } and "The rev ion. no matter deep win-and g the more than cisco Ortega is li f the United Stat UR), "The Sar create a ne s are sures, inter. spec- and the in hip," years in p icing much like cam- sought to tr ¡eral. Hail ssion Even Followir enemies o1 Irot- joiced that ward Nicaraguapen- upsurge of resi- ants had be :ader Democri ; (or praised eac 1 the the contra seat forcing the Central Am Costa R vehement! 'and after whom 'ring '... the rich remained as rich as they were under major organization of the Nicaraguan capital- the first to hilip ists. SLN "At receptions at foreign embassies longer cons Lip. : for Somoza while the poor, who sacrificed the most for "COSEP leaders openly boasted of this pact, shortly before the election," Samper said, ished prais neutral and He insisted I the the revolution, got poorer' which, they said, included a Sandinista hadn't lost ‹ nary pledge to abolish the draft, include opposi- ability to tion leaders in top cabinet posts, nominate polls notwi an independent magistrate, and reprivatize Jost- —Patricia López, leader, Sandinista Youth sectors of industrial and agricultural produc- This is th ders. was tion. peatedly ha (and by mi days "Less ideological" campaign love Another illustration of the FSLN's "less and democr ong, Chamorro government attempted to privatize told the press, moreover, that the Sandinistas "real alliances with different social political ideological" approach during the elections Mexican awd, businesses nationalized by the Sandinistas. had now agreed to place the Sandinista army sectors of the country and is determined to was the character of the campaign itself. Gortari, as their Accepting a "smooth" transition and police under the control of the Chamorro give these alliances a strategic character and France' ome. government. Ramírez's pledge was confirmed aimed at contributing to a national consen- Rather than rely on the Sandinista Defense outdo one In the wake of their electoral defeat, sus." (quoted in The Militant, Feb. 2) Committees and mass organizations to moChamorro.

ricia Cha- ed a the gains of the revolution by "governing from below," as Daniel Ortega put it. Sandinista leaders publicly pledged to defend chief negotiator with the Sandinistas. (New York Times, March 22) By acquiescing to this transfer of power, preted as a pledge to include capitalist repre- sentatives in a new post-election govern- Ramírez's statement was universally inter- bilize support for the Sandinistas on the ba- sis of a program calling for the defense and the deepening of the revolution, the FSLN ship for the bing the ret i we Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, re- the leadership of the Sandinista Front sig- ment. This was the condition the Nicaraguan leadership separated itself from the masses Lu peating a pre-election promise, said he would naled its willingness to become a loyal op- capitalists had long demanded as the basis for and their aspirations. But the p ndi- never accept placing the army and police un- position to Chamorro. Along this path, it is accepting the FSLN leadership's social pact A parallel structure involving 70,000 paid all in jump they der the authority of the new Chamorro gov- impossible to prevent Chamorro and her known as concertación (or collaboration). staff members was established throughout the Soviet who ernment. Other Sandinista leaders said they U.S. backers from dismantling, little by lit- The Nicaraguan capitalists explained that the country to promote the main Sandinista Gorbachev. got would wage a relentless fight to ensure that tle, every gain of the Nicaraguan Revo- as long as the FSLN retained its monopoly slogan-"Everything will get better." On Feb.

eds. lost and the agrarian reform law and other social pro- grams enacted over the past 10 years would be "irreversible." lution. Along the concessionary path ter how many dollar subsidies and other in- vest productively in the economy—no mat- on political power, they would refuse to in- ings of a typical U.S. election campaign. the Sandinistas' campaign had all the mark- Estimated to have cost close to $40 million, provide lar Bourlai sai Soviet Fort • by Within a few weeks, however, top San- The course followed by the Sandinista centives were provided by the Sandinistas' There were T-shirts galore, photo opportuni- even milita they dinista leaders began to change their tune. leadership is not altogether surprising. policy of concertación. ties with the candidates, even a new macho emment. her At a meeting with U.S. Vice President During the FSLN election campaign, Ortega image for Ortega, who was renamed El Gallo question of Dan Quayle in Santiago, Chile, on March and other top government officials clearly [None of the 11 cattle producers and agro- (The Rooster). It was vintage Madison with the ne , but dropped all pre-conditions for a "smooth" 13, Daniel Ortega said the Sandinistas had revealed their willingness to make substan- tial political concessions to U.S. imperial- candidates elected to the National Assembly, export capitalists was among the 39 FSLN Avenue. arises," Bo Feb. 27)

) CO- gry, and Interior Minister Tomás Borge had ear- transfer of power. This was a retreat. Ortega ism and its local puppets in Nicaragua. Nicaraguan Vice President Sergio having been ranked relatively low on the FSLN's 94-person list of candidates. Dozens plained to Socialist Action, "The Sandinista But, as MUR leader Rodrigo Ibarra ex- were justify It wasn't Flier threatened to arm the entire population if Ramírez, in an interview with the weekly La of capitalists were elected to local office on rank and file and the people in general re- on the neve = not the contra army was not dismantled before Crónica in late January, said that the FSLN the FSLN slate, however.] sented this waste of money at a time when was becom was the new government took office on April 25. had adopted an approach that is "more politi- The U.S. State Department had also in- most Nicaraguans have to get by with one in the Ami fited In addition, Ortega, undermining the cal and less ideological" than in the past. sisted that power-sharing be instituted before meal a day. Under their breaths, everyone dinistas dri was saying that if the commanders knew reas- sovereignty of the Sandinista army and revo- One aspect of this approach, he said, was the the United States would lift economic sanc- the Soviet rem- lution, gave his support to United Nations tions and normalize relations with Nica- revolutiona "peacekeeping" troops to ensure the transfer on its slates for the National Assembly and ragua. throw away the people's money." longer was kers of power. These UN troops would have the for municipal posts. MUR Vice Presidential candidate Fran- Ibarra continued: "The break with the revo- for the cont ›ling authority, among other things, to put down 'These people have access to specific so- cisco Samper told Socialist Action that the lutionary image and traditions of the FSLN bogey-man" im- protests of Sandinista supporters against the cial sectors that the Sandinista Front as a Sandinista leadership had in fact, agreed to a was so sharp that even the Sandinista hymn An edit lays. new government. party in the strict sense" cannot reach. The "secret 9-point pact" with the COSEP was barred from all election rallies and Chronicle ( : the Nicaraguan Vice President FSLN, Ramírez continued, is now making (Superior Council of Private Enterprise), the events. After all, you can't tell people that a "But wh!

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sons of volution Marvin Collins Impact Visuals major organization of the Nicaraguan capitaldeal with the U.S. government is what's required to make everything better while at the same time denouncing the United States as the enemy of humanity."

[The Sandinista hymn states in part, "We fight against the Yankee, enemy of humanity."] One week before the elections, in fact, the Sandinista Front formally applied for membership in the Second (or Socialist) International. This is the loose alliance of parties that includes the European social democratic parties (French and Spanish SPs for example) and the populist capitalist ruling parties in Mexico (PRI), Peru (APRA), and Venezuela (AP), among others.

The Second International long ago went over to the side of counterrevolution, to the side of U.S. imperialism. The FSLN leadership's decision to join this international party is perhaps the best indication of its break with its revolutionary past.

Newsweek magazine noted the shift in Sandinista policy in its Feb. 26 issue, published just prior to the elections:

"The revolution in Nicaragua may be over no matter who wins.... If the Sandinistas win-and the election is certified by the more than 600 international observers— Ortega is likely to seck peace with both the United States and his internal opposition....

"The Sandinistas took power promising to create a new society. Now, external pressures, internal resistance, their own blunders and the inevitable accommodations of 10 years in power have left them behaving much like the traditional pols they once sought to transcend."

Hailing Chamorro's victory

Following the Feb. 25 elections, all the enemies of the Nicaraguan Revolution rejoiced that "democracy" had triumphed in Nicaragua-that is, that the revolutionary upsurge of the Nicaraguan workers and peasants had been dealt a devastating blow.

Democrats and Republicans mutually praised each other for keeping the pressure of the contra war on the Sandinistas and for forcing them to comply with the so-called Central American peace plan.

Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, the vehemently anti-Sandinista Nobel laureate after whom the "peace" plan was named, was the first to salute the Chamorro victory. No other Sandinista comandantes finally consent to the elections in compliance with a fivenation peace plan?

"It seems certain now that Soviet President Gorbachev pressured him hard to hold the fair elections the plan called for, implicitly using the leverage of continued Soviet aid to help Ortega make up his mind. And Gorbachev had been pressured hard by President Bush to bring Moscow's influence to bear on the Sandinistas in just this way. The Sandinistas perceive in any case that Moscow's aid to revolutions may be drying up under Gorbachev's policies.

"And so we see here, almost certainly, the first large payoff in this hemisphere from the warming , in U.S.-Soviet relations.... The new tone comes through stunningly in a remark by a high Soviet Foreign Ministry official the other day, "The Third World suffers not so much from capitalism as from a lack of it."

Two days after the Nicaraguan elections, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker contacted Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to thank him and the Soviet leadership for their help in getting the Sandinistas to accept a peace process whose terms were close to those that Washington had long sought.

And on Feb. 28, George Bush held a 40minute phone conversation with Gorbachev during which he praised the Soviet leader's "constructive role" in Nicaragua and appealed to him again "to use his influence to get the Sandinistas to agree to cooperate with the incoming government and not to resist it." (Los Angeles Times, March 1)

Was there another course?

One of the central questions currently discussed in Nicaragua and among the international supporters of the Nicaraguan Revolution is whether the Sandinistas could have followed a different course that would not have led to their handing over power to the contra-led opposition.

This question gets at the heart of the strategy of "mixed economy and political pluralism" pursued by the Sandinistas throughout the course of the revolution.

The Sandinista leadership has always prided itself on the unique and original —in a word "Sandinista"-character of their revolutionary strategy. Tomás Borge summarized this view in a Sept. 24, 1989, speech launching the FSLN's 1990 election campaign. He said:

"We are original. We have charted our own course.... Without shunning other experiences, we have chosen a singular path, which through its creativity and independence is a hope for other peoples." (The Militant, Oct. 20, 1989)

There can be no doubt that the Sandinistas waged a relentless battle for freedom against the most powerful imperialist colossus the world has ever known-enduring a protracted contra war and economic embargo. The agrarian reform, albeit incomplete; the nationalization of certain sectors of the economy, and the arming of the masses represent important gains for the Nicaraguan people; gains that must be defended against the Chamorro government and all its supporters.

But the Sandinista revolution went only half way; it failed to follow the example of the Cuban Revolution, which showed that to achieve genuine national independence it was necessary to go all the way-that is, to combine the revolution of national liberation against imperialism with the social revolution against capitalism.

The Cuban Revolution had shown that (1) it was impossible to satisfy the demands of the workers and peasants and those of the capitalists at the same time, and (2) it was impossible to develop the economy in any meaningful way within the framework of capitalist property relations.

Subordinated class struggle

The Sandinistas maintained a policy of "national unity" with the capitalists of Nicaragua (the "strategy of the mixed economy") and an alliance with the so-called anti-imperialist capitalists in Latin America and Western Europe. This policy dictated subordinating the class conflict inside Nicaragua to the needs of national defense against the U.S.-backed contras.

Concretely, this meant giving the Nicaraguan capitalists major concessions in (continued on page 12,

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what it felt to go hungry, they would not FSLN's decision to include capitalist farmers