Tactics of a workers' united front: 'March separately, strike together' I.BEW

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Solidarity Day, Sept. 19, 1981: 700,000 trade unionists mobilized in Washington, D.C. to protest against Reagan's economic policies. • Truth ify this doned, ¿an, the of U.S. ") was traised ly and and its lamese GIs ogan to tential on goes s more Home vith the najority it want • for no e vision g in the ions be squarely irm and ¡sitional ' putting s. Later, in the position refusals ut what irsuit of pport of le mood 'rapidly position future n itself, ome the alist war ›n, first sands of 's, were ogan of position was the erent in analysis, of the historic division between advocates of reform and revolution. The reformists and labor bureaucrats, commit -ted to a strategy based on a "partnership" with the capitalist class, are the main obstacle to united, working-class action.

Historically, the revolutionary workers' movement has consistently advanced the proposal for a united front to overcome this division when circumstances cry out for it. The united-front tactic is embodied in the principle: "March separately, but strike together."

The basis of such an agreement to carry out joint action must realistically be limited to one or at most a few compelling issues. A united front cannot encompass the range of issues contained in conflicting programs.

The proposal for joint action is a practical way to advance immediate pres -sing needs without solving in advance all of the programmatic questions in dispute.

The appeal to the reformist leaders to take joint action in defense of working-class interests, thus, tends to gain a favorable response from those they influence. The reformists are put under great pressure to join in a united front to defend class interests. If they refuse, they risk losing influence over their members.

This is the logic upon which the united-front tactic is based.

Examples of the united front The need for working-class unity during a strike, for example, opens the door to united action despite deep-going differences over many important ques -tions. In fact, the most rudimentary form of the united front is the trade union.

In the trade union, workers of all • ANDAADS LOCAL kind-Blacks, whites, men, women, socialists, Democrats, Republicans, Christians, Moslems, or Jews—are eligi -ble for membership. The single purpose of the trade union is to unite workers in defense of their class interests against the bosses-despite the ideological and political differences which may exist.

The only condition for membership in a trade union is acceptance of majority decisions where the vital interests of the workers are at stake. The only limit to the breadth of decisions the majority imposes on the minority should be at the point where this might destroy an effective united front against the employer.

Another form of the united front was demonstrated on Sept. 19, 1981—"Soli -darity Day"-when the AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers union, the Teamsters union, and the United Mine Workers of America put their differences aside and mobilized 700,000 workers in the streets of Washington, D.C., against the Reagan administration's anti-labor policies.

But the application of the united-front

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tactic varies with changes in mass consciousness.

In this country, the formation of a labor party based on the unions would represent a higher form of the united front. A labor party would unite workers who understand the need to take their economic struggles into the political arena. Advocates of reform and revolution would continue to coexist and vie for leadership in such a party.

In Europe and other countries where several mass labor or socialist parties exist, the call for the united front is a call for these parties to unite in action both in the streets and in the electoral arena against the capitalists and their representatives.

In Germany in the early 1930s, for example, revolutionaries called for the Communist Party and the Socialist Party to unite against Hitler. Their failure to unite paved the way for the advent of fascism in that country.

The workers' council is the highest form of the united front. But this form tend to come together into a centralized and representative united front to direct the struggle of the entire class.

Such workers' councils also may evolve, in especially tumultuous periods, toward becoming an organ in the struggle for political power, i.e., a sort of "congress" or "parliament" of the fighting working class that can evolve into a workers' government.

In Russia, "soviets" (Russian for council) developed prior to the October 1917 revolution and became the organs of the new state power.

But in less turbulent times the united front is simply a form for uniting workers for limited action in the face of a clear and present danger.

Democracy in the united front Although pressure for the united front always comes from the ranks, it must begin with an agreement on top-between the leaders of competing workers' organizations. Democracy, at least initially, may be restricted within the bounds of the framework of such an agreement.

But the united front is established for the purpose of carrying out an action involving the mobilization, by each participating group, of their thousands and hundreds of thousands of members.

Practical decisions must be made on many levels in the course of preparing for and carrying out the agreed-on joint actions. This can only be done according to the principle of majority rule. Thus, the inexorable logic of the workers' united front is profoundly democratic. -NAT WEINSTEIN most. policy loved i limb.

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(left) Central America; the next Vietnam. Demonstrations like April 20, 1985 (above) can make the warmakers think twice.

Socialist Action/Joe Ryan (continued from page 11: “'yes' on contract offer”) direct assault by the capitalists, top tradeunion officials felt compelled to take their distance from their previous wholesale endorsement of the government's foreign policy.

In San Francisco, as elsewhere, there was an evolution of consciousness coming from both the Vietnam experience and the sharpening class struggle.

Officials from all six AFL-CIO Central Labor Councils in the San Francisco Bay Area joined in forming the Mobilization for Peace, Jobs and Justice, which sponsored the April 20, 1985, San Francisco protest march and rally around four themes: No U.S. Intervention in Central America; End U.S. Support for South African Apartheid; Freeze and Reverse the Nuclear Arms Race; Jobs and Justice, not War.

This presented a challenge for the antiwar movement to develop new structures, slogans, and activities aimed at involving the unions and all organizations of the oppressed sectors of society.

The commitment of the labor movement to join the antiwar movement was un -precedented. The unions provided office space, donated thousands of dollars, pub -lished articles in union newspapers, and took on other important coalition responsibilities.

It was in the interest of the antiwar movement to increase this participation and to enhance the decision-making role of the unions in the coalition.

But while this commitment by the labor movement pointed toward the possibility of a true workers' united front, the coalition had not yet-and still hasn't-become that. The labor officials were willing to become active in the antiwar coalition, but they Peace were unable or unwilling to bring more than a few of their members to the coalition's general meetings.

The lack of direct rank-and-file involvement, moreover, is a reflection of the fact that workers remain on the defensive as a result of the class-collaborationist policies of the union bureaucrats. The labor movement, which developed into a powerful force in the great battles of the 1930s and '40s, was gradually demobilized by the union misleadership —and remains so to this day.

Absent from the new anti-intervention movement were the legions of student activists and the friends and relatives of the GIs, who had played a crucial role in resolving the debates over policy in the Vietnam coalitions.

This presented a structural problem for this coalition different from that in the days of the Vietnam War. It was necessary to accommodate the needs of democratic participation in this new situation.

In the absence of massive numbers of students or fresh forces from the unions, the antiwar coalition meetings could not consistently attract large numbers of antiwar activists.

Small coalition meetings could easily be dominated by tiny sectarian political currents seeking to impose their own political platform on the coalition—-with no concern for the consequences of their actions.

At one small meeting of the San Francisco coalition, for example, a proposal was narrowly approved which threatened to drive out the representatives of the labor movement.

The meeting voted to recommend including representatives from the Salvadoran FDR/FMLN and from the Nicaraguan FSLN as speakers at the San Francisco rally. With the agreement of the representative of the Salvadoran FDR/FMLN, the coalition coordinating committee wisely rejected the proposal.

There was a general recognition that nothing must be done to make it more difficult for the trade-union officials to take their first steps in aligning with the antiwar movement. These officials were vulnerable to "red-baiting" charges by the top AFL-CIO bureaucracy.

The basis of labor's participation in the antiwar movement was the right of the Central American people to selfdetermination—not support for the revolutionary movements in those countries. The six central labor councils threatened to withdraw from the coalition if a representative of the revolutionary movement from El Salvador was introduced at the rally in his official capacity.

Willing to accommodate the valid concerns that had been raised, the coalition leadership voted instead to invite the representative of the Salvadoran FDR/FMLN to speak-but in his role as an exile trade unionist whose name is on the death list.

This flexible tactical approach satisfied the overwhelming majority of the San Francisco coalition. By making this kind of decision, the coalition was able to retain its unprecedented labor and community support and build a broad mass action.

The Mobilization for Peace, Jobs, and Justice succeeded in bringing out 50,000 people on April 20, 1985. This extremely successful action contributed to the objective process of changing conscious -ness in workers' ranks that will ultimately transform the unions into instruments for class struggle.

April 25, 1987 The current planned actions for April 25, 1987, will be on a national scale. Events like the contragate scandal will no doubt contribute to make these the biggest demonstrations yet against U.S. inter -vention in Central America and U.S. support to apartheid in South Africa.

The endorsement of this demonstration by 24 international union presidents is historic. It reflects pressures from the rank TRAJANIZA and file against the war and austerity policies of the government and the necessity for unions to search for allies against the employers' anti-labor offensive.

The labor bureaucracy has been responsible for the decades-long series of setbacks to the powerful American labor movement. The top labor officialdom has traditionally put the interests of American capitalism above those of its members.

But the importance of current efforts to reestablish the working-class tradition of united action against a common enemy cannot be overestimated. It is part and parcel of the education of workers, who will be impelled to overcome division in their ranks in the big labor-capital confrontations looming on the horizon.

So far the U.S. capitalist class still proceeds with great caution against the workers, just as they must proceed carefully to carry out their imperialist agenda. They grudgingly show their great respect for the explosive power of American workers by testing the ground carefully at each step of their anti-labor offensive.

But the developing world capitalist economic crisis forces the American ruling class to pursue their anti-working class agenda at home and abroad with ever-greater ferocity and intensity. In this context, an upsurge in labor combativity can be triggered at any time. A massive outpouring of people against the outrageous disregard of legality and public opposition to U.S. foreign policy revealed by the contragate scandal will help ripen political consciousness.

Whatever the course of events, one thing is certain: Big struggles are not far down the road. The workers' united front will be an important tool for overcoming the obstacle of bureaucratic misleadership.

The upcoming antiwar mass actions in Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, made possible by an intelligent application of the united-front tactic, provide another lesson for workers in the coming struggle for political power against capitalist injustice.

Socialist Action/Joe Ryan

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Da Together Socialist Action/Joe Ryan

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