'yes' on contract offer

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Steelworkers in Lorain, Ohio are confronted by police while trying to 8 SOCIALIST ACTION MARCH 1987 By a vote of 19,621 to 4045, the steelworkers who had been locked out since Aug. 1 by US, the nation's largest steel company, voted to accept a new four-year contract.

On Feb. 4, just three days after workers began returning to the job, USX Corporation Chairman David M. Roderick announced the indefinite idling of four mills, throwing 3700 steelworkers out of work.

Wall Street analyst Charles Bradford joyfully proclaimed that these plant closings, coupled with the 1374 jobs eliminated in the contract, "clearly shows the union got destroyed in the strike."

In announcing the settlement, USWA International President Lynn Williams proudly asserted, "This was a major victory, and the credit for the victory goes to our members."

Fortunately for the workers at USX, although Williams' declaration of an unprecedented victory rings hollow, Bradford's report of the union's demise is greatly exaggerated.

Instead, most US steelworkers agree with the USWA contract summary, which states: "Because of your unity, sacrifices and unswerving support of your negotiating committee, we have emerged stronger, more dedicated and better equipped to face a challenging future."

These steelworkers recognize that it was their determination on the picketline, coupled with the active solidarity of other working people, which forced US to back down from its most onerous demands. Yet, they also recognize that this contract, despite the earlier promises of top USWA officials, contains serious wage and benefit concessions.

Contracting-out improvement The most significant gain of the new contract is greatly improved language on contracting out (use of non-steelworkers to perform bargaining unit work).

Not only had USX blatantly violated the contracting-out language of the previous contract, it had also demanded that any new labor agreement codify the company's right to contract out all previously contracted-out work-even those jobs which an arbitrator Steelworkers Press Service Steelworker being beaten by cops USX steel. keep USX from shipping steel during lockout.

ruled had been done in violation of the contract.

Throughout negotiations, the company insisted it would never consider adopting the language agreed to by LTV and Bethlehem that "work capable of being performed by bargaining-unit employees shall be performed by such employees." A Dec. 2 USX letter mailed to all locked-out steelworkers cynically stated the company had offered to accept 85 percent of the union's contracting-out language.

Although improved contracting-out language brought hundreds of steelworkers back to work at LTV and Bethlehem, outside contractors remain a problem. USX steelworkers are well aware that it will be up to them to force the company to live up to its new commitment.

Roderick provided a hint of the battle ahead when he described the union's estimate, based on an internal company memo, that 2000 to 4000 steelworkers would be brought back to work under this contract provision as "greatly exaggerated."

Job eliminations

The 1374 jobs to be eliminated are less than the company's original demand. The union achieved a commitment that two special early retirements will be given for each job eliminated, thus assuring the recall of several hundred laid-off steelworkers.

However, many of those eligible for such early retirements must have second thoughts about taking advantage of this offer as they observe what's happening to LTV retirees. There, the company deliberately failed to make the contractually required pension contributions.

After filing bankruptcy (Chapter 11), LTV convinced the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to take over its pension plans-thus depriving those who had accepted special early-retirement offers, similar to the one described above, of their negotiated monthly supplements.

This contract declares a number of facilities which have been idled for some time to be permanent shutdowns. This will make approximately 4000 steelworkers eligible for shutdown benefits. (The company has avoided paying these benefits in the past by refusing to admit that these facilities were permanently shut down.)

Steel-plant modernization Like previous concessionary contracts, this one includes a company commitment to invest in steel-plant modernization. It promises a $1-billion capital investment program for modernization in the Mon Valley and Fairfield Works.

Steelworkers who remember the way previous contract savings were used to purchase Marathon Oil, rather than invest in steel-plant modernization, will Steelworkers Press Service Less undoubtedly wait to see the results before putting too much trust in these promises.

The company was unsuccessful in winning the right to reopen the contract whenever a competitor filed bankruptcy or discontinued its pension plan.

USWA officials pointed out that such a provision would allow the company to bring people back to work long enough to replenish its stockpiles; then immediately lock them out again, demanding further cuts based on LTV's termination of its pension plan.

When the lockout began, USWA negotiators stated that US, because of its profitability, was not a candidate for wage and benefit concessions. Yet, although the final agreement does not contain the extensive wage and benefit cuts initially demanded, it does include serious con -cessions.

These wage and benefit cuts, estimated to average $1.96 per hour, are closely modeled on the Bethlehem Steel pact. Wage rates are reduced by 8.09 percent (or an average of $1.12 per hour).

Other cuts include suspending C.O.L.A. (cost of living adjustments), reducing Sunday premium and vacation pay, and eliminating three paid holidays. All those entitled to three or more weeks vacation lose one week during the first y ear of the agreement. During the first two years, an additional holiday is eliminated and shift premiums are reduced.

At least $.40 per hour of these cuts will be returned in annual lump-sum "profit sharing" payments. Of course such "payments" aren't considered in calculating vacation or overtime pay.

Despite these serious concessions, most USX steelworkers felt the contract contained sufficient improvements over the company's original demands to justify the overwhelming ratification vote.

Why a better contract wasn't won Several factors explain why a better contract wasn't won. When steel industry officials announced the end of coordinated bargaining in basic steel, the USWA responded that this didn't prevent the union from continuing to coordinate its bargaining.

Unfortunately, this approach was shortlived. Operating on the mistaken premise that what's good for the company is good for its workers, the USWA commissioned economists to examine the financial condition of each of the major steel companies. The USWA then offered concessions to "needy" steel com -panies—putting profitable USX, with its position to demand the same.

This strategy also prevented a nationwide steel strike. The U.S. economy hardly noticed the absence of USX as its 17 percent market share was easily assumed by the other major steel companies which had been operating well below capacity for some time.

Thus, one of the major pressures demanding an early end to the lockout was removed. Since this contract provides for a different expiration date than the agreements reached with the other basic steel companies, this mistaken "one at a time" approach is almost certain to be repeated.

The USWA legal staff succeeded in getting almost all affected state governments to agree the work stoppage was a lockout, making the steelworkers eligible for unemployment compensation.

Approximately $35 million were distributed from the International's strike and defense fund. Thousands of working steelworkers, recognizing the importance of this struggle, also offered financial help. Yet, as the lockout wore on and unemployment benefits ran out, steelworkers questioned whether the continued depressed steel market would allow for a better settlement.

Unity cuts across propaganda US did its best to take advantage of the fact that other major steel companies weren't shut down. A Dec. 2 letter to all employees asked, "Is it not now time to ask yourself, after four months of strike, why the International Union refuses to accept better wages and benefits for you than it accepted from your major competitors?"

This USX letter ended, "The biggest contribution you are making to the strike is your job. It is being donated to steelworkers at competitor plants where the International has already agreed to wages and benefits lower than our offer. Those companies are hoping the International never gives US the cost advantage it gave them. Keeping you out on strike is the best thing that can ever happen to them."

The willingness of other steelworkers to attend rallies and help out financially cut across this company propaganda. After the lockout ended, members of USWA Local 1104 at USX's Lorain, Ohio, facility passed out a letter thanking members of USWA Local 2265 at Cleveland's LTV strip mill for their help throughout the lockout and promising their help if it's ever needed Yet, despite the fine words of ACTWU President Murray Finley, who headed up the AFL-CIO support committee, that "This is not just a lockout of the steelworkers, this is a lockout of the clothing workers, the auto workers, and all workers in this country-perhaps even all decent people in this country," the potential active support of hundreds of thousands of union members was never realized.

As they returned to work, steelworkers expressed their determination to force the company to live up to the new contract language. Rather than feeling defeated, they expressed a sense of unity and deter -mination and an awareness that it was their strong stand which forced the company to finally enter into serious negotiations.

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"Bring the Boys Home" slogan eventually had an effect on American soldiers in Vietnam. For them, "Out Now!" meant surviving.

SOCIALIST ACTION MARCH 1987 9 171.

AR ONIE One of the key political tasks facing the movement against U.S. intervention in Central America is to mobilize the largest possible opposition in the streets.

The anti-intervention movement is a force which restrains—and can ultimately stopthe U.S. war against the people of Central America. It is the only force, outside of Nicaragua itself, that can make the cost of direct military intervention greater than any gains to U.S. imperialism.

Our job is made easier because recent history is still a vivid memory in the minds of millions. The bitter Vietnam War experience has taught the U.S. ruling class grudging respeci for the power of determined resistance by an oppressed nation to imperialist aggression. The Sandinistas' arming of their people to defend their revolution signifies to the American capitalists that a high price will be paid in blood for an attempted crushing of Nicaragua U.S. rulers also painfully learned a parallel lesson from the Vietnam experience. They learned to respect the power of independent mass action by the American people, which forced the U.S. government to withdraw from Vietnam.

The lessons of this period need to be absorbed, as well, by working people. Unfortunately, however, many of the leaders of today's anti-intervention movement have failed to draw the correct lessons of the Vietnam antiwar movement.

For example, almost all of the antiwar, anti-nuclear, and solidarity groups decided to support Walter Mondale and other Democratic Party candidates in the 1984 elections. This was done instead of building mass demonstrations to answer the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the increased war moves against Nicaragua and El Salvador. The movement became totally demobilized during election time.

Today, many of the organizations building the April 25 demonstrations in Washington, D.C., and San Francisco state publicly that they view these actions as an opportunity to "set a broader agenda for the 1988 election campaign." For these groups, April 25 is little more than a springboard to elect a Democratic Party president in the The Guardian newspaper, for example, in an editorial dated Feb. 4 states the following:

"Regardless of how well we mobilize in the immediate period...the struggle over 44010 Reagan's policies and the possibility of the left seriously influencing public opinion will be with us for some time to come....In the longer run, helping build the Rainbow Coalition for the 1988 election is a project that offers progressives a chance to keep alive demands for a radical reform of U.S foreign policy and criticism of the mainstream Democratic Party's continuing commitment to the Cold War."

The Guardian fails to tell its readers, however, that the Rainbow Coalition delivered its supporters to Walter Mondale in 1984—despite the fact that Mondale said he would have invaded Grenada and would quarantine Nicaragua.

Today, Jesse Jackson and the Rainbow Coalition have renewed their pledge to remain a "loyal opposition" inside the Democratic Party.

To avoid the pitfalls of the past—and to SOCiAList ActioN MAK LAUGHE Flax Hermes David Doualas Duncan maintain an increasingly visible in -dependent mass antiwar movement—it is therefore necessary to understand the theoretical underpinning of the correct strategy that so effectively tied the hands of the U.S. warmakers in Vietnam.

Antiwar strategy in the 1960s The most important lesson of the Vietnam experience comes through understanding how the tactic of the workers' united front was applied to mobilize millions of Americans against the Vietnam War. [See box on the principles of the united front.] This tactic serves as a guide to action in the current struggle against American counterrevolutionary intervention in Central America and against the deepening assault on American workers' living standards.

In the beginning, the Vietnam antiwar Socialist Action/Joe Ryan movement had no mass organizational base. The principal mass organizations of the American workers, the trade unions, were absent from this movement.

The unions have been dominated for at least the last 40 years by a conservative labor bureaucracy which has been as servile toward its capitalist "partners" as any in history. The large majority of the labor officials were shameless supporters of the imperialist invasion of Vietnam.

Despite this massive obstacle, the opposition to the Vietnam War grew quickly along with the casualty statistics and the accounts of burned villages and other atrocities.

But the successful unleashing and focusing of this potential force was difficult. The early antiwar movement was made up by small socialist and pacifist groups and by a few somewhat prominent individuals. It had to be built from scratch.

"Negotiations" vs. "Out Now!"

In addition to its small size and narrow base, the antiwar movement was divided from the outset over strategy. This division was most typically expressed in the opposed slogans: "Negotiate Now!" vs. "U.S. Troops Out Now!"

The "negotiations" position was inherently and fatally flawed. It implicitly accepted the "right" of the American capitalist government to limit the right of the Vietnamese people to determine and regulate their own affairs. It had the practical effect of helping to provide-intentionally or not—a screen behind which U.S. imperialism could compel the Vietnamese to give up at least some of their rights.

The right to negotiate, of course, is certainly a right of the victims-just as hold-up victims may be compelled to "negotiate" away their money for their life. But the witnesses to the crime do not have the right to demand, directly or indirectly, that the victim "negotiate" with the robber over terms for ending the robbery. They are obligated only to apply whatever material and moral force they can bring to bear against the robber, and the robber alone.

Starting from the principle upon which our own nation's independence from Britain was won—the right of nations to selfdetermination-there can be no question as to who was robbing whom in Vietnam.

But the "negotiate" slogan dodges this question, holding both sides at least (continued on page 10)

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... Anti-Vietnam War I0 SOCIALIST ACTION MARCH 1987 (continued from page 9) partially at fault. It is an inherent adaptation to capitalist politicians—socalled "peace candidates" —who hide their pro-war voting record in Congress behind advocacy of "a negotiated end to the war."

The reformist advocates of "peace" candidates within the anti-intervention movement, hard put to justify support to such cynical politicians, palmed it off, more than once, as a "referendum against "Peace" candidates In the first place, a vote for a capitalist politician has nothing in common with a referendum in which the issue is more or less clearly posed: for or against the war. A vote for an alleged peace candidate is almost always a grotesque parody of such a referendum.

President Lyndon B. Johnson was such a "peace" candidate in the 1964 election. Johnson, right smack in the middle of his election campaign, issued the "Tonkin Gulf" declaration, which served as the pretext for a major escalation of the war in Vietnam. Sections of the antiwar movement-incredible as this may seem today—altered their slogan from "All the way with LBJ!" to "Part of the way with LBJ!"

A second consequence of the spurious "referendum on war" concept is that it entails registering support for the "peace" candidate's other reactionary political stands—-always a part of the package.

Such a vote is worthless as a means of registering opposition to the war. But the vote of confidence it gives to these thinly disguised pro-war capitalist politicians lulls the masses, dissipating effective opposition to the war. The elected "peace" candidate becomes the best instrument for carrying out imperialist war policy.

"Peace" candidate President Johnson's Phillip Griffith-Jones electoral victory in 1964 over "war" candidate Barry Goldwater is a text-book case. Goldwater couldn't have been as effective in taking the country deeper into the Vietnam bloodbath as was Johnson, who did his dirty work under cover of his 1964 election pledge that "American youth would not be sent to die on Asian battlefields.' When chickens elect foxes to guard the chicken coop against wolves—to para -phrase the militant Black leader Malcolm X-the chickens are in deep trouble.

Even the best-intentioned person can get sucked into the logic of this policy. Truth gives way to rationalizations to justify this false policy. And when truth is abandoned, confusion and demoralization set in.

In contrast to the "negotiate" slogan, the demand for immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam ("Out Now!") was educational, clear, and to the point. It raised consciousness by focusing entirely and exclusively on the U.S. gövernment and its criminal war against the Vietnamese people.

Impact of "Out Now!" on GIs The power of the "Out Now!" slogan to maximize the force of the potential opposition to imperialist intervention goes even deeper.

This slogan, especially in its more popular form, "Bring Our Boys Home Now!," is intimately connected with the deepest-felt interests of the great majority of the American people who don't want their sons to be killed-especially for no good reason!

It strikes a still deeper chord. The vision of millions of Americans marching in the streets demanding that their sons be brought home put the movement squarely behind American youth in uniform and inspired and fostered an oppositional movement by GIs themselves.

It started with GIs symbolically putting flowers in the muzzles of their rifles. Later, GIs began to take part in the demonstrations in. U.S. cities. Opposition soon was expressed in increasing refusals by Gls to obey orders to carry out what they saw as suicidal patrols in pursuit of goals they no longer supported.

Knowing that they had the support of millions marching in the streets, the mood in the ranks of the imperialist army rapidly evolved toward organized open opposition to the war. The specter of future demonstrations by GIs in Vietnam itself, more than anything else, drove home the mortal danger of continued imperialist war to U.S. capitalism.

All of these forms of opposition, first made visible by hundreds of thousands of Americans marching in the streets, were linked together by the strategic slogan of "Out Now!"

The ultra-left strategy Also harmful to an effective opposition to the U.S. invasion of Vietnam was the strategy of misguided leftists inherent in their slogan "Victory Revolution!"

Had this slogan been adopted by the movement as a whole, it would have reduced the potential size of active opposition to the war from millions to thousands. Only those already convinced supporters of the Vietnamese Revolution —a tiny fraction of the potential antiwar movement-would have responded to such a call to action.

This would have short-circuited and blocked the course of development which passed through a stage of ever-increasing numbers of marchers to a stage that included active opposition to the war among the troops themselves.

The mistake is not an uncommon one. It derives from short-sightedness and impatience. It is the result of failing to accurately gauge the existing level of mass consciousness—a pre-requisite for advanc -ing slogans that make sense to masses of people and are designed to lead them, in action, to higher levels of consciousness.

Single issue vs. multi-issue Should the political basis for joint action be the single issue of opposition to the war? Or should it include a commitment to support a range of issues as a condition for participation?

A dispute seemed to arise over this question, too. But, at bottom, it flowed from the basic argument over whether the antiwar coalition should be independent of the political parties of the warmakers or whether it should take an electoral Working people and their families are an absolute majority of society. The capitalists are a tiny minority. If workers were united in struggle for their class interests, they could easily overcome capitalist power and come to rule society.

But in every country the working class tends to be divided into a plurality of parties, unions, factions, and tendencies.

This is an expression, in the last analysis, of the historic division between advocates of reform and revolution. The reformists and labor bureaucrats, commit -ted to a strategy based on a "partnership"

with the capitalist class, are the main obstacle to united, working-class action.

Historically, the revolutionary workers' movement has consistently advanced the proposal for a united front to overcome this division when circumstances cry out for it. The united-front tactic is embodied in the principle: "March separately, but strike together."

The basis of such an agreement to carry out joint action must realistically be limited to one or at most a few compelling issues. A united front cannot encompass the range of issues contained in conflicting programs.

The proposal for joint action is a practical way to advance immediate pres -sing needs without solving in advance all of the programmatic questions in dispute.

The appeal to the reformist leaders to take joint action in defense of working-class interests, thus, tends to gain a favorable response from those they influence. The reformists are put under great pressure to join in a united front to defend class interests. If they refuse, they risk losing influence over their members.

This is the logic upon which the united-front tactic is based.

Examples of the united front The need for working-class unity during a strike, for example, opens the door to united action despite deep-going differences over many important ques -tions. In fact, the most rudimentary form of the united front is the trade union.

In the trade union, workers of all form-that is, voting for candidates.

Given the lack of any working-class political organization in the United States-even of a conservative Labor Party such as exists in England-any electoral expression of opposition to the war would have inevitably found its way into support to the Democratic Party wing of the capitalist political establishment.

In any case, a serious proposal for a united front must of necessity be limited to a narrow range of urgent demands. For the united front to include, at the outset, all the political questions which divide the movement-something that is implicit in an electoral campaign—is a contradiction in terms.

Unity in action

Such a limited agreement for joint action does not, of course, require that the participating groups give up their position on any question. Also retained by all is the right to criticize each other-including the right to march separately, under their own banners, and to carry their own slogans.

This united-front principle allowed advocates of "Negotiate Now!" "Out Now!" and "Victory to the NLF" to march together against the U.S. war in Vietnam. Meanwhile the argument continued, events shed light on opposed positions, and minds were changed. "Out Now!" eventually came to be the dominant position in the antiwar movement. The rest is history.

Under this principle, a united front-type antiwar coalition was formed. (This was 1804 LOCAL BEW BEW BEW OCAL IBEW Solidarity Day, Sept. 19, 1981: 700,000 tra Washington, D.C. to protest against Reaga kind-Blacks, whites, men, women, socialists, Democrats, Republicans, Christians, Moslems, or Jews-are eligi -ble for membership. The single purpose of the trade union is to unite workers in defense of their class interests against the bosses-despite the ideological and political differences which may exist.

The only condition for membership in a trade union is acceptance of majority decisions where the vital interests of the workers are at stake. The only limit to the breadth of decisions the majority imposes on the minority should be at the point where this might destroy an effective united front against the employer.

Another form of the united front was demonstrated on Sept. 19, 1981—"Soli -darity Day"-when the AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers union, the Teamsters union, and the United Mine Workers of America put their differences aside and mobilized 700,000 workers in the streets of Washington, D.C., against the Reagan administration's anti-labor policies.

But the application of the united-front not the unio TI enc( grou org: Lati and own banı thes repr on t ralli It supI CONI actic to th agai coal of th com orga that TI this Fi mea orga weif dozt that som tacti cons In labo front who ecor aren: wou leadi In seve exist for 1 in th agai repre In exan Com to ul unite fasci Tr form

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Veterans appeal to troops at a mass antiwar demonstration on Oct. 1967 in Washington, D.C. As war continued, protests increased. ‹ers' united front:

y, strike together' le le le in in le pi er ts Is le It not a real workers' united front given that the main workers' organizations-the unions-were not involved.)

The mass-action antiwar coalition encouraged progressive, issue-oriented groups to participate in the marches as selforganized contingents. Labor, Black, Latino, women's, gay and lesbian, church and other groups, organized and built their own contingents and carried their own banners and slogans in the marches. All these points of view were further represented by appropriate spokespersons on the platform at the jointly sponsored rallies.

It is important to note, however, that support to these issues was not made a condition for participation in the united action. The only condition was opposition to the war.

Democracy in antiwar coalition Another dispute within the movement against the Vietnam War was over the coalition's organizational structure. Some of the political currents favored a structure composed of one representative from each organization to constitute a leadership body that would be empowered to make policy.

There were basically two problems with this structural form.

First, one delegate per organization meant that the larger and more influential organizations would have the same voting weight as an "organization" with half a dozen members. (Experience showed, too, that where this method was put into effect, some political groups had an inordinate number of its supporters claiming to represent different "organizations.")

Second, in sharp contrast to the traditional united front of mass workers' organizations, all the groups together could not bring out more than a small fraction of the action's organizers and participants.

The delegated structure provided for virtually no representation for the main force of foot-soldiers, among which students were the most numerous. It was they who printed the leaflets, distributed them, made the banners and posters, and otherwise did the nitty-gritty work of building the antiwar actions.

Given this real situation—particularly the absence of the unions from the movement-the best and most democratic organizational structure was based simply on the rule of one person, one vote. This structure was designed to let the people who were crucial for carrying out a successful action make the decisions. This policy facilitated the greatest possible activism directed toward building the largest possible demonstrations.

Most important, it provided the force for keeping the antiwar coalition pointed in the right political direction.

The key role of students Because the labor bureaucracy enjoyed virtually exclusive domination over the unions, they were able to chain the class organizations of the workers to the pro-war policy of the capitalist government. This meant that mass worker participation was not present to keep a united coalition against the Vietnam War on the healthy tracks of class interests.

The force that played this vital role was the largely working-class youth, par -ticularly the student movement. Young people, who were ordained to be among the first victims of Washington's imperialist war and slated to be drafted to kill and be killed in Vietnam, had a vital stake in building a movement that could end the Students formed ad-hoc groups every -where, and they strained for the widest participation in the antiwar struggle. They also listened with the greatest attentiveness to the debates over antiwar policy. Also most acutely interested in an effective policy were the parents and others whose loved ones stood in danger of losing life or limb.

This largely working-class opposition to the war grew exponentially as more and more youth were sent to Vietnam and shipped home in body bags.

Flax Hermes 21, NOW!

assiss NOW!

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