Socialist Action (US)

The monthly paper of Socialist Action, San Francisco, 1983–2010

Morales Undermines Radicalization as Bolivia Prepares for Referendum

Socialist Action, November 2008 (web edition) · Gerry Foley · 1,280 words

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From the paper's own web edition, recovered from the Internet Archive: the text as the paper put it online, not machine-read. The printed issue of November 2008 is not held.

by Gerry Foley / November 2008

It is clear that the radicalization that lifted Evo Morales into the presidency of Bolivia is continuing and expanding. But the material conditions are increasingly difficult.

The world price of oil, the country's most profitable natural resource has dropped by more than half since its peak. The price of natural gas, of which Bolivia has the second largest reserves on the continent, has also been falling, even if not as precipitously as the price of oil. The price of zinc, the major export from the country’s declining highland mines, has dropped in the last month by 30 percent and is already 70 percent below the peak it reached two years ago.

The price of silver, another highland mine product, has also been falling. Morales has imposed a subsidy on zinc in an attempt to maintain employment in the mines. But the general decline of raw materials' prices can be expected to reduce his margins for maneuver.

As the world recession deepens, raw materials prices can be expected to fall, affecting mainly third world economies. Moreover, the political conditions also have been becoming more difficult: Despite the broadening of political support for reform in Bolivia, Morales has given way step by step to the basic demands of the right.

In an Aug. 10 referendum to confirm his mandate, Morales did significantly increase his electoral mandate, in particular in the eastern provinces controlled by the rightists. Nationally, he won two thirds of the votes.

He achieved a majority in one of the eastern provinces and large minority votes in others, where previously his party, the MAS, had been virtually forced underground. But a series of illegal referenda in the eastern provinces (prefecturas) also provided an apparent confirmation of the provincial right-wing provincial governments' mandate to operate largely independently of the national government.

Bolivia's oil and natural gas, as well as its huge new iron and magnesium deposits, are located in the eastern provinces, in which the dominant population is of European origin, in contrast to the highlands, the site of Bolivia's older mining resources, where the population is mainly indigenous.

Morales presents his government as a vindication of the historically oppressed indigenous peoples and promises to change the legal structure of the country to better serve their interests.

Morales had originally intended to hold a referendum to approve the constitution on Dec. 7. But he pulled back after a wave of violent rightist mobilizations in the eastern provinces in early September. The September mobilizations became a large-scale confrontation between the pro-reform and anti-reform forces.

Even in the eastern provinces, supporters of Morales' promises organized strong enough mobilizations to threaten the rightist control. Morales, moreover, achieved some victories. He was able to impose martial law on the province of Pando, where the rightist authorities had organized the massacre of peasant marchers. Government forces under orders from Morales managed to arrest the governor of Pando.

But instead of pressing the mobilizations, Morales ordered them called off, and he proposed "dialogue" with the right, which meant essentially capitulation to its demands. The "dialogue" essentially took the form of negotiations in parliament over the new constitution, which the right had sufficient votes to block.

On Oct. 13, a mass march backed by social organizations started out for the capital, La Paz, to demand that the parliament submit the constitution to a popular vote. The march arrived on Oct. 20, and on the following day the parliament did approve the call for a referendum on the constitution on Jan. 25. However, by that time, even the modest reforms included in the proposed constitution had been gutted in the parliamentary machine.

The Bolivian radical website, Econoticias, reported: "The new constitution, 150 of whose 400 articles have been reformulated, leaves untouched the immense latifundia, preserves big private property and foreign investment, and maintains almost all the privileges of the landowners and oligarchs who are able to exploit our natural resources without any limit.

"The text of the constitution calls for the deepening and development of Andean capitalism and the rule of formal democracy, opening up possibilities for the regional autonomies to be recognized outside of national unity.

"The new constitution does recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples and opens the possibility for Morales to be reelected once but not indefinitely, as the rightists had feared."

In an Oct. 31 article, Econoticias cited key provisions that had been inserted into the draft constitution: "Article 8 of ‘Transitional Arrangements,’ included in the final version of the text, says that the Bolivian state guarantees the transnationals and native as well as foreign business all the rights that they have acquired until now regardless of whether they were granted by neoliberal governments or military dictatorships that sold off the country's natural resources—or whether or not these benefits were granted legally or illegally.

"The article in question says literally: ‘in the space of a year after the election of the new executive and legislature, the concessions on the natural resources, electricity, telecommunications, and basic services, must be brought in line with the new juridical order. The shifting of these concessions to a new juridical order can in no case mean disavowing rights previously acquired.‘“

Ruben Costas, the governor of Santa Cruz, the keystone of the provinces dominated by the right, responded to the new text, the article noted, by saying, "We have won. There is no such obstacle."

The right-wing deputies in parliament have said that they will campaign for a vote in favor of the new draft. But the right remains divided on what attitude to take. Now the essential sticking point for them is that the proposal opens the way for Morales to run for another term as president in 2010, even though that would be the last term he could run for.

One of the right wing’s main leaders, Branko Marinkovic, has been in Washington trying to find out what course of action the U.S. government favors. Morales has irritated the U.S. rulers by his friendship with the Cuban and Venezuelan governments and his reluctance to cooperate with the operations the U.S. wants to carry out in his country in the name of fighting the drug trade.

But it remains to be seen whether the irritants have been sufficient for the U.S. to take the risk of supporting his overthrow. In fact, he has acted as an essential shock absorber for the radicalization in Bolivia, which has gone to the brink of social revolution more than once. Moreover, Morales’ concessions have removed any immediate threat to the Bolivian oligarchy.

Nonetheless, his election and his reform projects did frighten them, and the mobilizations of his followers have undoubtedly frightened them even more. It may be that the right wing will not accept the continuation of Morales’ government under any conditions.

In that case, and pursuant to that, they will campaign to defeat the draft constitution or at least to put its mandate in question.

The Jan. referendum could become another decisive confrontation between the radicalized forces and the right. But that is not yet certain. In any case, the right could lose its willingness to continue to play electoral games.

The reality on the ground is that they control half of the country and most of its important resources. No electoral contest is going to get them to give that up. Only an active mobilization of the national majority can take that away from them.

So far it has seemed that that is the last thing Morales wants. If he continues to retreat, he will be left with nothing but his formal position. But in the long run, he is unlikely to preserve even that.

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