Bush’s claims of progress in Iraq prove to be hollow

By Gerry Foley / July 2007 issue of Socialist Action newspaper

In recent weeks, the U.S. big press has been decorated with reports from U.S. commanders in Iraq claiming that their forces and their local auxiliaries are making progress in pacifying the country. These are the first evidence offered that Bush’s “surge” is having some effect and as such they are crucial to the U.S. administration’s defense of its policy in Iraq.

The optimistic statements turn basically around two axes: (1) in Anbar province, previously a hotbed of attacks on the U.S. forces, local tribal sheikhs have allied themselves with the occupying around against al-Qaeda and groups linked to it, and this can be a model for an uprising of the Sunni population against the ruthless Islamist organization; (2) the U.S. forces are rooting out the bases of al-Qaeda around Baghdad and getting the support of the local population.

The second argument is based on fragmentary and anecdotal evidence, and there is no way of assessing the overall picture. The U.S. conquest of the Sunni city of Baqubah is supposed to be the showcase of the campaign by occupation forces. But the reports are mixed. Some quote statements by local people saying that the al-Qaeda-dominated coalition, The Islamic State of Iraq, had imposed a regime of terror and theocratic rule similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and that they saw the U.S. and Iraqi government forces as liberators.

Other accounts note the destruction of the city and the fear of its inhabitants. For example, a report in the June 16 Washington Post cited the testimony of Brigadier General Dana J.H. Pittard, commander of the Iraq assistance group: “Pittard, who early yesterday went on patrol with the Iraqi army in Diyala's violent capital, Baqubah, spoke emotionally about the deterioration of the city, where he spent a year as a brigade commander in 2004.

“‘I nearly shed a tear when I saw Baqubah today, that the markets aren't up, the projects that we'd spent so much time on together with the Iraqi government are now in many places in shambles,’ he said.”

Moreover, most of the commanders interviewed stress that guerrillas melted away in the face of the U.S. attack, even though this time they claim to have trapped more of them, and will soon return if the Iraqi security forces cannot consolidate their control.

A report in the June 26 Washington Post quoted a U.S. commander in Diyala province, a former commander in Baqubah: “‘Usually in about two weeks they start coming back,’ said Sutherland, who now directs his forces elsewhere in Diyala province, of which Baqubah is the capital.

“[Col. Steve] Townsend [commander of U.S. forces in Baqubah] agreed that the insurgents have ‘largely tried to melt away after putting up initial resistance. So yes, I expect the enemy will come back. The enemy's not gone forever.’”

Most of the U.S. officers interviewed agreed that the campaign would have no lasting effects unless Iraqi security forces could hold the ground. In fact, the decisive question is whether the U.S. has any reliable allies in Iraq. Some U.S. commanders were openly skeptical about the Iraqi forces.

The Washington Post of June 26 cited statements by Brigadier General Pittard: “Iraqi forces will not be ready to assume full responsibility for their nation's security for years, and the U.S. military should be cautious in planning to reduce its 157,000-strong force in Iraq given past setbacks, the American general in charge of the teams that advise Iraqi forces warned yesterday.”

He also stated that the country could not be stable until the Iraqi police assured security: “‘Our ultimate goal is not for the Iraqi army to be in the streets of the cities of Iraq’ but ‘for the Iraqi police to do that, and that will take some time,’ Pittard said.”

But the Iraqi police have been notoriously unreliable, being heavily infiltrated by Shiite sectarian forces and therefore feared and hated by Sunnis. “Overall, Iraqi security forces are making tentative progress, Pittard said, as some units, particularly in the army, prove highly capable, while others, especially in the police, are swayed by sectarian agendas.

“For example, he said that since October 2006 most of the top leaders of Iraq's overwhelmingly Shiite national police have been fired, including seven of the nine brigade commanders, five of whom were ‘removed because they had sectarian biases.’”

Thus, the results of the “root-out” campaign by the U.S. forces and their clients around Baghdad are still unclear, although the example of the many hollow boosts of kills by the U.S. military during the Vietnam war should counsel skepticism in this regard.

As for the second axis, reports have already begun to appear that contradict the U.S. claims that the sheikhs who have allied themselves with the occupation forces have done so strictly because of their aversion to al-Qaeda. A study of the “Anbar model” in the June 26 Christian Science Monitor cited Bruce Riedel, “a career-long expert in the Middle East and counterterrorism with the Central Intelligence Agency and other federal agencies.”

“‘Most of these Sunnis who were formerly targeting US and coalition forces and are now willing to fight on our side aren't doing it as a result of some deep ideological transformation,’ says Riedel, now at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington. ‘They are doing it for reasons of financing, to make money, and to control turf in the Sunni parts of the country. It's unlikely they will be reliable allies in the long term.’

“As an example, Riedel points to one Anbar sheikh among the leaders of the front against foreign fighters ‘who essentially is a highwayman,’ having worked with Al Qaeda to rob travelers on the Baghdad-Amman highway and divide the ‘take.’

“‘At some point such “allies” can be bought back by the opposing side,’ he adds, ‘and then it becomes a bidding war.’”

The British imperialists, who were old hands at bribing tribal chiefs, had a saying, for example, that Afghan tribes could be rented but not bought, meaning that they could be bought but did not stay bought. It is a lesson the U.S. commanders need to learn.

An article in the June 11 Washington Post reported: “In an interview in his Baghdad office, Ali Hatem Ali Suleiman, 35, a leader of the Dulaim confederation, the largest tribal organization in Anbar, said that the Anbar Salvation Council would be dissolved because of growing internal dissatisfaction over its cooperation with U.S. soldiers and the behavior of the council's most prominent member, Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. Suleiman called Abu Risha a ‘traitor’ who ‘sells his beliefs, his religion and his people for money.’”

The same article cited a U.S. military official confirming the above account: “Lt. Col. Richard D. Welch, a U.S. military official who works closely with the tribal leaders in Iraq, said that relations inside the group were strained and that he expected a complete overhaul of the coalition in coming days.” It also noted: “Suleiman and Welch alleged that Abu Risha runs an oil smuggling ring and that his followers have worked as highway bandits on Anbar's roads, activities in which many tribal groups engage.

“Abu Risha ‘made his living running a band of thieves who kidnapped and stopped and robbed people on the road between Baghdad and Jordan. That's how he made his fortune,’ Welch said. Tribesmen accuse Abu Risha of passing false information to U.S. forces about other tribal leaders in order to eliminate business rivals, Welch said.”

Moreover, tribal leaders who did agree to cooperate with U.S. troops out of a reaction against al-Qaeda’s ruthless tactics are not necessarily committed to an alliance with the occupation forces, the Washington Post article noted, citing a a follower of a local sheikh:

“‘We hate al-Qaeda, but at the same time we don't like the Americans,’ said Emad Jasem, 23, from the Soufiya district, north of Ramadi. Although they were cooperating with U.S. troops because of ‘overlapping interests,’ he said, ‘no one should jump to the conclusion that we are on the side of the Americans and support them. Our loyalty is to our community and our city.’”

Al-Qaeda has responded to the sheikhs’ collaboration with the U.S. by assassinations. A suicide bomber killed six of them in the Mansour hotel in Baghdad on June 25. It remains to be seen what effect this tactic will have. Those sheikhs who essentially have been bought by U.S. money may rethink their decision if the risks to them become great enough.

There is not much honor among thieves. But in general it appears that al-Qaeda’s ruthless actions are having a more and more divisive effect among the Sunni resistance fighters. However, this may prove to be a passing problem as the resistance reorganizes itself and finds new political programs.

More fundamentally, the U.S. government’s buying off the tribal sheikhs is another example of the reactionary role of imperialism. The experience of the Iraq occupation shows that, despite its claims, the U.S. is not bringing modern civilization to the country but reinforcing its most backward institutions.

It is notable that despite the U.S. commanders’ claims of progress in their war against the Iraqi resistance more and more right-wing stalwarts of Bush’s policy are giving up on the “surge” and calling for some sort of disengagement of U.S. forces (without, of course, giving up the project of dominating the country and its oil).

When Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared on June 25 that Bush’s policy in Iraq was not working, the political pundits began talking about a political earthquake.

It is in fact a sign that the ground is crumbling under Bush’s feet. And it is unlikely that any claims of progress based on claims of kills of insurgents or alliances with desert bandits and tribalists are going to stop that.