Mass mobilization in Nepal forces: king to yield
2006Wayne S. Rossi 2006-06The page as the paper published it (Wayback Machine) →
From the paper's own web edition, recovered from the Internet Archive: the text as the paper put it online, not machine-read. The printed issue of June 2006 is not held.
by Wayne S. Rossi / June 2006 issue Socialist Action
The people of Nepal won a major victory on April 24, when King Gyanendra was forced to bow to popular mobilization in the streets of Kathmandu and reinstate the civil government. The government had been dissolved in February 2005 on the pretext of fighting the Maoist rebellion that has taken over a substantial part of the countryside since 1996.
This victory was made tangible in May, as parliament stripped the king of most of his powers, including control of the Royal Nepalese Army. It has now begun peace talks with the Maoists and is preparing for a popularly elected constituent assembly.
Nepal's major parliamentary parties called for the mass movement in early April. Through intense cooperation with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), they began a general strike and protest movement that grew far beyond the cadres of either the parties or the Maoists. The strike in early April lasted a total of 19 days, with much of Nepalese society shutting down. Main roads were blockaded, and every major industry faced stoppages.
The public was supportive of the shutdown despite the hardships that accompanied it. The king, whose heavy-handed methods had prevailed over the previous 14 months, had no ability to put down the movement. A large number of civil servants (the government is the major employer in many areas) went on strike, and numerous government ministers went missing.
The move was possible because the Seven-Party Alliance entered negotiations and made a tentative alliance with the Maoists in autumn 2005. The agreement might include an end to the protracted People's War declared in 1996 by the CPN (Maoist).
Nepal is marked by desperate poverty. Outside of the central districts, there are often no sources of employment other than the civil service, which becomes the fodder for a variety of patronage schemes. A substantial part of the Nepalese workforce is either seasonally or continuously moving in a search for subsistence.
Land reform has been attempted in minor spurts, but has failed to keep up with a growing population. Foreign aid has been largely squandered by local elites. All this created an opening in which the Maoists, despite the contradictions of their basically Stalinist program, have been able to thrive.
When the current system of parliamentary democracy was established in 1990-1991, a wave of enthusiasm swept the country. However, the parties in parliament proved unable to provide any kind of economic well being for the vast majority of the Nepalese people, and the country's fortunes remained tied up with India and China.
After the Maoist rebellion broke out, the government did not take it seriously for several years, considering it a police action and allowing the guerrilla force to achieve a number of early victories. Violence escalated in 2000, and in 2001 the Maoists controlled several rural districts.
Talks began that year, but King Birendra was killed in a palace massacre by his own son, putting Gyanendra on the throne. All negotiations shut down shortly thereafter, and the king declared a state of emergency.
The war deepened, killing an estimated 12,500, but it has been interrupted by two unilateral ceasefires by the Maoists, one in October-December 2005 and one that is still ongoing.
The main parliamentary parties, the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist), as well as the various smaller groups in the Seven-Party Alliance, up until this April consistently failed to make any moves that would put them on risky footing with the king.
Even though party leaders were frequently jailed during the recent state of emergency, efforts to oppose the king's absolute power were limited at best. Their past support for the monarchy and repression by the king have essentially cut the parties off in significant ways from the masses.
The CPN (Maoist) has remained a left critic during the mass movement, initially dismissing the king's restitution of parliament and calling for the creation of a republic, with a constituent assembly. This abandonment of revolutionary struggle reflects the Stalinist roots of the CPN (Maoist), which remains tied to much of the same old ideology of Mao's Chinese Communist Party.
Following Stalin's theory that the struggle for socialism can only be undertaken later, as part of a long-delayed “stage” of the revolution, the Maoists now turn to what they perceive as the bourgeois-democratic stage; they have even openly discussed the possibility of acting as a parliamentary party.
Armed only with their discredited stagist theory, the Maoists are not capable of leading the radicalized masses of Nepal to socialist revolution and the resolution of the national problems. The aim of their People's War has never been a social revolution but a political one, overthrowing the king but not changing the economic basis of the country.
There are two wild cards among the forces. The first is the king. There is no question that Gyanendra is ambitious, and he may be looking for ways to regain his lost authority. The second is the Nepalese people themselves. Normally reticent to take part in mass political action, Nepalis in and out of Kathmandu joined April's actions in tremendous numbers, and moved more quickly than the parties or the Maoists had expected. Indeed, some consider the king's surrender on April 24 to be the main reason he is still alive.
The masses deserve credit for a valiant stand against the king, but history shows that without a complete transformation of Nepalese society, it will not be enough to lift them out of poverty and capitalist underdevelopment.