Iraqi Resistance Continues After Saddam's Capture

By GERRY FOLEY

By now it is obvious that the capture of Saddam Hussein has not ended the resistance to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. U.S. military authorities claim that the number of attacks by the resistance has diminished. But only they could know the figures. However, the number of deaths among U.S. forces and their allies from resistance actions, which are public events, has not declined.

On Jan. 7, Iraqi guerrillas downed another U.S. helicopter, killing 9 GIs. On the same day, 35 U.S. soldiers were wounded when insurgents fired mortars at a U.S. base. One died. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the U.S. rulers are finding it difficult to persuade soldiers to reenlist.

To try to ease the pressure on its military, the U.S. government announced that it is offering a $10,000 bonus for reenlisting. The Associated Press reported Jan. 7, “At a checkpoint on the barren plain east of Baqouba, word of a new U.S. Army plan to pay soldiers up to $10,000 to re-enlist evoked laughter from a few bored-looking troopers.

“‘Man, they can't pay me enough to stay here,’ said a 23-year-old specialist from the Army's 4th Infantry Division as he manned the checkpoint with Iraqi police outside this city 35 miles northeast of Baghdad.”

The overextension of U.S. military forces, owing to Bush’s aggressive policies, is also leading to the calling up of large numbers of reservists.

AP reported Jan. 7: “Guard and Reserve troops will play a larger role in the new force, representing nearly 40 percent of the total of 110,000 troops, compared with about 20 to 25 percent of the force there now. They have been told they will spend up to 12 months in Iraq, meaning many will be on active duty for about 18 months, including a pre-deployment training period and a demobilization.”

Such call-ups of reservists, who are not prepared to serve long periods of active duty, are causing serious hardships on those affected, and probably cannot be maintained for very long. The U.S. rulers are testing the waters for a return to the draft, but they probably still do not dare risk it. So, the deadly high-tech U.S. military machine, which proved so effective against the demoralized third-word army of Saddam Hussein is beginning to show strains.

The Iraqi resistance is also straining Washington’s ties with its meager allies. Coordinated attacks in the southern Shiite holy city of Kerbala on Dec. 27 claimed the lives of four Bulgarian and two Thai soldiers, as well as six Iraqi policemen and six Iraqi civilians. The attacks had the look of an Islamist operation, having been carried out by four suicide bombers. The Kerbala car bombings fit what appears to be a new pattern to the resistance attacks, one that likely represents political planning. They are directed now largely toward forces sent in by Washington’s relatively few allies and against Iraqi police. The objective is clearly to isolate the U.S. occupation.

U.S. officials have declared that they intend to shift more and more of the responsibility for security onto the new Iraqi police force they are building up. But this force appears very shaky. It is obviously not trusted by the U.S. military and does not have the support of the Iraqi masses. Feeling their unpopularity, the Iraqi police are understandably reluctant to risk their lives for the low salaries the U.S. occupation authorities are paying them.

A poll done by the universities of Baghdad and Dohuk, in collaboration with Oxford, was reported in the Dec. 2 issue of the Athens paper Elevertheria Typia. It showed that 79 percent of Iraqis have no confidence in the occupation and 78 percent have no confidence in the political parties that have become legal since the toppling of the Saddam government.

The problem of the Iraqi security forces is underlined in a study of the costs that U.S. companies expect to have to pay to defend their operations once they send in large numbers of workers to do the projects for which they have garnered fat contracts.

The Los Angeles Times published a long article about this problem in its Dec. 25 issue. It pointed out: “For businessmen here and abroad, the good news is that the U.S. government is planning to pour more than $18 billion into rebuilding Iraq's antiquated and battered infrastructure. The bad news is that the influx of money is expected to make Iraq more dangerous. “U.S. and corporate officials fear that the thousands of additional workers expected to fan out across Iraq in the coming months to build utilities, ministries, schools and hospitals will prove irresistible targets for insurgents. As it puts the finishing touches on the bidding process, the Pentagon worries that the high security costs and high risks will scare off small firms and entrepreneurs and slow the reconstruction effort.”

The article continued: “‘Everybody's worried about this security issue,’ said Robert Fardi, vice president of Amira Group, which is expanding its business in Iraq but struggling with partners who are unwilling to enter the country. ‘There are still lots of people who want to take the risk. But it's frightening, absolutely frightening.’ ...

“In hundreds of attacks on contract employees, several dozen personnel have been killed or wounded, U.S. officials and contractors estimate.”

Moreover, security is very expensive: “Contractors also face tough choices when they hire armed security teams, which are now a must. They can choose former U.S. or British troops, at perhaps $1000 a day, or Iraqi guards at perhaps one-tenth that price.

”The Iraqi guards can be valuable, especially if they're from an important local tribe and represent the protection of its leader. But their loyalty and diligence is often questionable….”

The Los Angeles Times quoted a U.S. Airforce captain, Sam Dickson, referring to Iraqi security guards, “Who are they really loyal to? Is it possible that they've been contacted by … the resistance movement? Could they possibly be turned to be used against you at a later point? Absolutely.”

The article reported estimates of security costs at nearly a tenth of the total contracts. Of course, the U.S. authorities are willing to offer huge boons to big American corporations, but the cost of these contracts is already becoming a scandal, as attested by the U.S. government’s complaint of overcharging by Halliburton, one of the biggest companies involved, and an article in The New York Times of Dec. 28 that tried to “explain” why there are so many and such large cost overruns.

Moreover, the awarding of these huge contracts is becoming a bone of contention between the United States and some of its historic allies, such as France and Germany, who have been excluded, allegedly, because they did not support the war on Iraq. This policy could have been expected. The ruling classes of these countries opposed the war precisely because they knew it would give the U.S. control of Iraq’s oil, to their disadvantage.

At the same time as excluding the countries that did not support the war, the U.S. is demanding that they write off all or a major part of Iraq’s debt to them. If they do not comply, they risk being frozen out even more completely or more long lastingly, and if they continue to demand payment, they are unlikely to get it. The U.S. has them over a barrel, and this conflict marks an important sharpening of interimperialist rivalries. The risks of riding roughshod over its old imperialist junior partners was one of the elements of the adventure the U.S. rulers decided to engage in when launching their war against Iraq. These risks are increasing, along with the other risks of the U.S. occupation of a relatively large and hostile country. The costs of the U.S. operation can be expected to continue to rise.

However, the outcome of this situation in the short run is not inevitable.

As the Iraqi resistance grows, it will face more political problems, especially as it increases its attacks against Iraqi collaborators. Recent attacks on Shiite and Kurdish leaders, for example, risk unleashing a dynamic of civil war, in which a resistance based mainly on the Arab Sunni minority may find itself isolated. The indifference of Islamist fighters to civilian casualties can have a similar effect.

If the resistance loses momentum, the attempts of the U.S. to buy off unprincipled traditional leaderships may become more successful. There is still no sign that an effective political leadership is arising out of the resistance.

But obviously Iraq is undergoing an intense political experience, as shown, among other things, by the appearance already of 120 different newspapers and journals, representing a wide variety of views. The future not only of Iraq, but of all the peoples of the region who are oppressed and exploited by imperialism will depend to a considerable extent on the outcome of this dialogue.