New situation in South Africa fraught with danger for both regime and ANC
1992Peter Blumer 1992-11Read it in the scan (PDF at ETOL), page 3 →
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Following are excerpts from an article that appeared in the Oct. 12, 1992, issue of International Viewpoint, a biweekly journal published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.
The article provides important background to the negotiations between the South African government and the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies, which are scheduled to resume this month. The major demand of the ANC is for an "interim government of national unity." Meanwhile, South African President F.W. De Klerk, in an attempt to mitigate opposition from the ultra-right, is standing fast for "guarantees" for the white minority.
The decision by the ANC on June 21 to break off the CODESA [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] negotiations was a sign of deep disillusionment, as the ANC leadership realized that these discussions were leading to no reduction whatever in the level of violence directed against its own activists and supporters. They found out that each apparent retreat by the regime on this or that point was each time anticipated by a new offensive on some other terrain of the talks.
This was what happened when the govemment came up with its proposals for a second chamber [in a proposed legislative body], while the ANC was putting all its energies into pursuing the question of an interim government. Nelson Mandela's movement thus found itself dragged along in the wake of De Klerk's initiatives, as the latter bit by bit revealed new elements in a coherent constitutional project.
This could be seen at the time of the whites-only referendum of March 17, 1992. After some 69 percent voted "yes" to De Klerk's proposals, Mandela declared: "We hope that National Party leaders will stop regarding themselves as leaders of an ethnic group but that they will regard themselves now as part of the leadership of the total population." (Saturday Star, March 21, 1992.)
De Klerk had certainly explained two days before that he considered himself "bound by his mandate." (The Citizen, March 19, 1992.) But the mandate in question had equally clearly been given on the basis of a dozen "bottom line principles," which taken together, amounted to a barricade of safeguards for keeping the white minority veto.
CODESA trap closing
The referendum had, without doubt, a contradictory impact on the ANC's strategy, but Mandela's ambiguities, as shown in his above-quoted remark, also smoothed the way for the regime's attack.
There was growing discontent in the ANC, in particular among its intermediary cadres, and inside the COSATU union confederation. Above all, the rank-and-file lost patience and confidence and the moment was approaching when the leadership risked repudiation. The CODESA trap was closing, gravely endangering the unity of the anti-apartheid movement. If the negotiations were to be continued, then at least the rules had to be changed.
The mass campaign announced by the ANC/Communist Party/COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] coalition, which was said to be aimed at bringing down the government and imposing a constituent assembly, led to the general strike of Aug. 3 and 4.
Nonetheless, the ANC's basic perspective remains that of negotiations. It felt the need to make up lost ground, increase its ability to bring pressure and respond to the exasperation of the rank and file. Discussions with the government could only be resumed if they were seen to represent a new "stage" in the introduction of a "post-apartheid society' It is necessary underline ANC ranks are frustrated with slow tience of sections of the population radicalized by two years of negotiations and waiting. Each day the television told them of the great changes, while daily life was getting worse. Thus, wages have lost ground against inflation on the order of 16 percent. However, the cost of a shopping basket of food for a family has risen by 28 percent, and vegetables by 80 percent. The mines have seen 3000 layoffs a month. The textile workers' union (SACTWU) has stated that 20,000 of its members have lost their jobs. In metal and engineering, 35,000 jobs went in 1991 and a further 13,000 in the first six months of this year.
Rise in union activity There has been a sharp rise in union actions and strikes in recent months. One of the most significant was by healthworkers in June and July, which affected 59 hospitals throughout the country.
The general strike in August thus showed that, despite the weakening of organized social movements, popular combativity remains high. The strike was massively observed as broad sections of the Black population showed their continuing readiness to respond to calls for mobilization and action. [There is a contradiction between the militant attitude of the masses and the conciliatory attitude of their leadership.] This problem is illustrated by an episode MOSTAN BOLIS NO of changes in South Africa. on the eve of the August strike when COSATU signed a blueprint for a charter with the SACCOLA employers' union. The two parties announced that they were going to organize and call together on all South Africans to make Aug. 3 a "day for peace, democracy, and economic restructuring."
The South Africa Labour Bulletin modestly explains: "The draft agreement eventually floundered when SACCOLA was unable to win support for it from its constituent business organization."
But one paragraph in particular highlights current union strategy. The two parties propose "an open and inclusive approach at both [the] national and industry level to economic restructuring and to agreeing on an economic strategy that will deliver high and sustainable levels of growth and development. To this end, to seek to avoid unilateral economic restructuring and to seek consensus between government, labor, and business in this regard."
Aside from its wholly illusory view, such a declaration by COSATU is in total contradiction with the calls for a war on the bosses such as that issued by NUMSA in May. But it is, in fact, the same leaderships who are responsible for both.
To understand the confusion that such contradictions can cause, we need to remember that the August strike took place against the economic background that makes the whole philosophy of the SACCOLA/COSATU agreement redundant.
It should be recalled that the govern-