Lessons of the Summit strike: A critical assessment

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6 SOCIALISTACTION AUGUST 1992 the five striking unions never attempted to close down the hospital. Despite the union's open and courageous statements that anti-picketing injunctions would not be respected, scab workers were able to enter the hospital through its many unprotected entrances, without resistance.

At best, the union contemplated engaging in various civil disobedience-type actions designed more to publicize the strike with a few planned arrests, than to close the hospital.

Closing down the hospital would have represented a course of action that would have meant a direct confrontation with the scabs, the Oakland Police Dept., and some 300 security guards hired to defend the hospital against such contingencies.

Union leadership unprepared In the face of these forces, the full mobilization of the five striking unions in defense of their jobs, combined with a major mobilization of the Bay Area labor movement, was essential. But it didn't happen.

In this respect, the striking unions were very much unprepared. The ranks had not been effectively mobilized prior to the Josaph Ryan/Soclollst Action strike to discuss key questions of strategy and tactics. During the course of the battle, only a small proportion of the union membership attended any kind of meeting.

The strike was largely directed by union staff people and officials, who, while committed to the effort and dedicated to the interests of the union and its ranks, had not taken the necessary steps to organize strike committees involving the rank and file.

This weakness was soon recognized by the union leadership, which saw no way to reverse it in midstream, even if they had wished to do so. It soon became obvious that a significant attempt to close down the hospital was not possible and that the union leadership would instead rely on a potpourri of tactics hoping that their cumulative effort would result in victory.

Activities build morale The five unions proceeded to organize a series of activities designed to embarrass the hospital administration and win public support, while at the same time maintaining what amounted to informational picket lines at the hospital site.

This included a relatively ineffective boycott of Clorox products, since one of the hospital board members was a Clorox official. It included a concerted effort to bring Bay Area and nationally-recognized Democratic Party politicians to the picket lines to pledge their support and press the hospital to resume negotiations.

Various small-scale "Corporate Campaign" tactics of this kind were employed, ranging from boisterous leaflet distribution in management's corporate offices to similar activities at various events like a local corporate-sponsored golf tournament.

The unions were able to organize three larger demonstrations of 600-1200 workers, but these were designed more to showcase the support of Democratic Party politicians and union officials than to mobilize labor to actively defend the jobs of the strikers against a scab-herding corporation.

The strength of these demonstrations was in their capacity to involve new forces in the strike and to demonstrate the potential