The struggle in South Africa after E the 'whites only' referendum

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'For millions of Black workers and rural people poverty is deepening as a result of the 12 SOCIALIST ACTION MAY 1992 The following is an interview with members of the secretariat of the Workers' Organization for Socialist Action (WOSA), a South African revolutionary organization, who give their view on the results of the March 17 "whites only" referendum and assess the current stage of the negotiation process between the African National Congress (ANC) and the De Klerk government. The interview is taken from the April 13, 1992, issue of International Viewpoint, a biweekly magazine published under the auspices of the Fourth International.

Question: The De Klerk government won a significant victory in the recent referendum. How would you explain this clear change in white sentiment, which has occurred without any change of government or in the nature of the state?

Answer: A big majority voted "yes" in the racist referendum: 68 percent against 32 percent. Most political analysts had predicted a closer result, with the right wing expected to get over 40 percent, which is what the pre-referendum by-elections had seemed to indicate.

The white electorate had two choices: either the old apartheid policies, which are now seen as impractical; or a power-sharing negotiated settlement, which [big] business and most of the white middle class now see as offering the greatest safeguard for their interests and privileges.

The rapid return of South Africa into the world community, with the lifting of trade, sporting and cultural boycotts, helped convince many whites who remained suspicious of the negotiations that a power-sharing settlement really represented the best option.

Even a large section of the Afrikaansspeaking white workers, from traditionally very conservative areas of the country, voted yes, although they are the section of the white population worst hit by the current economic recession and also the social layer which has the most to lose under a de-racialized system.

Three factors lie behind the strong endorsement of the negotiations by the white electorate:

• The lack of an alternative to negotiations. It was clear that the policies put forward by the right wing would lead to great political and social instability.

They would mean a state of emergency, political unrest, further international isolation, and so on. The experience of the 1985 uprising was fresh in everyone's memory.

• It was clear, in spite of the far right's propaganda, that the negotiations were not about handing over power to the Black masses.

The way in which legal apartheid had been scrapped, without any substantial change in the social and economic position of whites, showed that De Klerk's enterprise was not going to jeopardize the privileged position of the majority of whites.

• The actual course of the negotiations had made whites confident that they were being entered into from a position of strength, with the ANC (African National Congress) being forced to make the majority of compromises.

In the last few months particularly, the ANC has appeared as a very respectable political movement rather than a liberation organization with an armed wing.

It was also clear from the Namibian settlement and the performance of SWAPO (the South West African People's Organization) that the fundamental way of life of whites was hardly affected.

The fact that racism has become an autonomous factor and that many whites now have to compete with Black workers for jobs explains why almost one million voters still remain opposed to negotiations. If the negotiations do not lead to an economic upturn, and violence and crime continue to spiral, many of those who "reluctantly" voted "yes" will turn against the government.

Those who interpret the result as meaning that the white electorate is now prepared to hand over power to Black majority rule are making a grave mistake.

The govemment campaign made it clear that the mandate they were seeking was for power sharing and if that was not accepted at the negotiations the government would go back to the whites to seek a new mandate.

This is why a large number of whites who would normally support the right wing in elections supported the "yes" vote.

Since the referendum, the government has taken a very hard line in the ConvenRoger Meintjes recession?

tion for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, as seen in their proposals on the interim government.

They have proposed a two chamber parliament with a chamber representing minority groups that would have a veto [power] on decisions reached in the other chamber. Also, they propose the creation of advisory councils, like the advisory councils with no power for Blacks under the apartheid system.

They are insisting that the ANC completely abandon the armed struggle and disband MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed wing) before any agreement on an interim government.

Of course with MK posing no security threat this demand has more to do with trying to divide the radicals from the moderates in the ANC and ensure that when the government shares power with them they will act to respect law and order and will not tolerate the existence of private armies.

O: How would you characterize the current feeling amongst the Black population? Is there a widespread feeling that society is changing and that Mandela has won the first round?

A : There was widespread relief amongst many Blacks that the "no" vote lost. The immediate prospect of a Conservative Party government, of harsh repression and civil war, was averted at least for the moment.

Yet at the same time there is not much optimism amongst Blacks that major change is at hand. The scale of the violence on the Reef, in Natal and even in Cape Town is tempering any hopes Blacks might have in the "New South Africa."

For millions of Black workers and rural people poverty is deepening as a result of the recession.

Illusions that negotiations, scrapping of apartheid, [and] the right to vote will bring about major changes in people's lives is steadily being eroded by the violence, falling living standards, the sharp rise in unemployment, and violent crime.

At the moment, in the absence of a credible alternative, many Black people are still tions. Many working class activists are confused by the contradictory situation where the de-racializing of the system is taking place but at the same time the working class is suffering major attacks.

For many the situation is one where they have one foot in the negotiations and another remains in the mass movement favoring mass action.

The ANC leadership's response to the "yes" vote has been muted. Clearly, by supporting the "yes" vote, the ANC recognized that the negotiations were not being undertaken from a position of equal strength but that power was still chiefly held by whites.

Many in the leadership of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) are aware that De Klerk will use the "strong mandate" to force even more concessions in the negotiations and were therefore not overly enthusiastic about the referendum result.

Q: Could you briefly describe what socio-economic changes could occur in the coming years and what the legacy of apartheid will be?

A: While the CODESA negotiations proceed, not much is being done at the socio-economic level. Although there is much talk about a social contract and the need for an economic forum involving govemment, the bosses and the unions, not much progress has been made.

Meanwhile, the bosses continue with their rationalization program which involves large scale retrenchments, closure of inefficient plants, imposing of wage freezes, and so on.

For its part, the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance is demanding that they be consulted on the economic restructuring and the goverment should not proceed unilaterally. In this regard, the government has suspended its program of privatization.

The government intends, on a limited scale, to redirect state expenditure to address some of the most pressing social problems affecting the urban and rural poor.

However, this represents a mere drop in the ocean and at any rate is constrained by the regime not wanting to alienate further sections of the white electorate.

Under current conditions, economic revival depends very much on attracting new foreign investment. This in turn depends on the negotiations leading to stable social and political conditions that would encourage inflows of foreign capital.

Here the international situation is also crucial; that is, the state of the world economy and the ability of the major industrialized countries to offset the effects of the current recession.

This does not mean that the political reforms and the ending of sanctions will not have a stimulating effect on the economy. It will also accelerate the growth of the Black middle class, as access to management training and the professions will increase.

What we are saying, however, is that it will not be on the scale required to address the huge inequality between Black and white. For example, four conglomerates own 75 percent of the shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

More than 90 percent of industrial property and 87 percent of the land is owned by whites. This is not even to mention the huge backlog in hospitals, clinics, schools, housing and so on.

Unemployment is estimated to be approaching 50 percent of the entire Black work force!

Q: What has been the attitude of the main trade union federations toward the referendum and the negotiations? The international press has mentioned some tensions between COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and the ANC.

A : There has been a debate as to whether COSATU should participate in CODESA.

The COSATU Central Executive Committee resolved to seek membership in CODESA—a position strongly rejected by COSATU's second strongest union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), who argued that the interests of their members would be adequately represented by the ANC and SACP.

NACTU (National Congress of Trade (continued on next page)