"The thousands of youth who are waiting for a chance to enter the training camps are an indisputable sign that the PKK is being seen as
1992 1992-04Read it in the scan (PDF at ETOL), page 19 →
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the only available alternative to the widespread unemployment, destitution, and oppression that SOCIALIST ACTION APRIL 1992 17 ISTANBUL-Having worked its way up from being an isolated guerrilla movement in the 1980s, to being the leadership of an increasingly dynamic national liberation movement with a mass following in the 1990s, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) appears to have reached a critical turning point.
The gains of the struggle so far include the recognition of the Kurdish people as a distinct nation with rights to linguistic and cultural expression, as well as the election to parliament of 20 representatives who are openly in favor of the national liberation In the government itself, more and more politicians are in favor of granting democratic rights to the Kurds in order to quell the blazing struggle for liberation, whose repercussions are beginning to be felt even in the major cities of Western Turkey. But the regime is doing its utmost to keep such concessions to a minimum.
Although people are no longer being imprisoned for speaking Kurdish, there are certainly no plans for teaching the language in the public school system. And no one in the government today has referred to the possibility of a Turco-Kurdish federation.
This is despite the fact that the Turkish ruling class has hailed the emergence of formally independent Turkic republics in the territories of the former Soviet Union and that this reshaping of the map would give special force to the idea of transforming Turkey into a federation of Turks and Kurds.
The newly elected coalition govemment in Turkey has been promising to end the violence in the region and start treating the local people "gently." Obviously, these promises are designed to undermine the PKK's base of support and win the confidence of the population for the state.
But they can have no effect unless the government is able to get rid of the counter-insurgency teams, which are continuing to kill people indiscriminately; unless it can lift the state of emergency that has been in force since 1978; unless it can withdraw the so-called special teams of police that are intensely hated by the population; and unless it can scrap the despised village guard system whereby certain families are paid to work as informers.
In order to make these crucial changes, however, the government would have to confront the entrenched Turkish military, who hold the real power in the region and are known to act outside the government's control. As the struggle continues to escalate, it remains to be seen whether the government will have the strength and determination to take on the military.
Repression incites revolt
The bankruptcy of the policies of state terrorism and intimidation that have been relentlessly applied throughout Kurdistan since the military coup of 1980 is now quite clear. In fact, such policies did not begin in 1980. Intimidation, forced exile, genocide and forced assimilation have been practiced since the Turkish republic was founded.
With the growth of the guerrilla movement in the 1980s, however, the struggle took on new dimensions. Every time the state's special counter-insurgency forces murder a Kurd, whether a civilian or a guerrilla of the PKK, the response is a mass funeral-demonstration involving anywhere from several thousand to half a million persons shouting slogans in Kurdish and vowing to take their revenge.
Even the repeated over-the-border bombings of Kurdish villages in Iraq by the Turkish air force—which have been clearly aimed not only at destroying the PKK's training camps in the mountains, but warn the population about what will befall them if they fail to "cooperate"-have had the opposite effect of uniting the struggle on both sides of the artificial border.
A new sister party to the PKK, known as the PAK (Kurdistan Freedom Party, was founded in southern Kurdistan (Iraq) in June 1991. It is becoming a pole of attraction for more and more Iraqi Kurds, especially youth, who are by now disillusioned with the conciliationist politics of the traditional leaderships.
The PKK's undisputed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, generally called "Apo," has repeatedly criticized the Barzani and Talabani groups, and the other organizations that make up the Kurdistani Front in Iraq.
He criticizes them for their reliance on external forces, their concessions to both the Iraqi and Turkish regimes, and their refusal to lead a consistent struggle for characterize the area."
national liberation.
On the other hand, in late 1991, "Apo" himself appealed to the government to negotiate and declared that he was ready to take part in any such talks without conditions. He renounced Marxism-Leninism, which he now says is "an issue of debate throughout the world."
At the same time, he has abandoned the demand for an independent Kurdistan, which he says is an impossibility. These shifts are cause for wondering where the PKK is headed.
Contradictory role of negotiations It is possible that the sudden call for unconditional talks may be only a maneuver designed to highlight the hypocritical nature of the Turkish regime and to make it clear that the source of the terror is in fact the Turkish state itself. But following through with such a policy would end up breaking the momentum of a powerful struggle.
In that case, Kurds could be forced to settle for vague promises of "autonomy" that could be revoked by the state once the balance of forces was again in its favor. A quick glance at Kurdish history is enough to reveal the danger involved in such a compromise, which is clearly not what Kurdish freedom fighters are dying for every day.
Meanwhile, the PKK, which is said to have about 6000 armed militants in Turkish, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian territories, continues to expand and prepare for the establishment of a popular army under the command of its armed wing, the ARGK. In fact, it is complaining of inadequate training facilities for the massive influx of recruits.
The thousands of youth who are waiting for a chance to enter the training camps are an indisputable sign that the PKK is being seen as the only available alternative to the widespread unemployment, destitution, and oppression that characterize the area.
As this goes on, the PKK is also engaged in setting up a Botan-Bedian (a region in eastern Turkey) wartime governSARASS- Au my job. And always did good job.
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