Answer to a reader: What else could the FSLN have done in Nicaragua?

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14 SOCIALIST ACTION DECEMBER 1991 Nicaraguan peasants march The letter by Stansfield Smith (see "Our readers speak out" on page 15) raises an important question. In today's world, would carrying through the socialist revolution in a country like Nicaragua amount to "suicide?" Would it mean dying from "economic strangulation, constant war, and lack of foreign aid?"

The answer to this question is of farranging significance. Carried to its logical extreme, wouldn't such a position mean that the socialist revolution in most of the world must wait until there is a socialist victory in at least one of the main imperialist countries to effectively counter the threat of "economic strangulation" and "constant war?"

And what about Revolutionary Cuba? Is the Cuban revolution doomed by the cutoff of fair trade by the decaying Soviet bureaucracy and its repudiation of defending Cuba against an imperialist attack? Are the Cuban revolutionists wrong to state they will fight to the death rather than submit to Washington?

On the contrary, carrying the Nicaraguan revolution through to the expropriation of the capitalists and the establishment of a workers' state was not only the only alternative to "compromise it until you surrender," but was the road which offered the greatest chances for the advancement of the working people of Nicaragua and of the world.

(Before taking this up, we should clear up that we were for more Soviet aid to Nicaragua, not less, as Smith implies.)

Revolution and leadership Revolutions are not created by revolutionary organizations. They erupt as a result of profound changes in the great masses of people in the course of the struggie between social classes. But the success or failure of revolutions depends in large part on the calibre of leadership that is put in power by the masses.

The FSLN did not create the Nicaraguan revolution. That was created by the masses, who found the continued rule of the Somoza dictatorship, and the imperialist and capitalist exploitation his rule signified, to be intolerable.

The FSLN, only a few hundred strong at the time of the July 1979 mass insurrection that overthrew the Somoza regime, was catapulted into power by the workers and peasants. This was by virtue of its record of heroic struggle against the dictatorship, and its image as a force that would fight for the interests of the workers and peasants.

But we know that in spite of important in 1987. FSLN only took half-way measures to solve mobilizations and organization of the masses in different fields, and above all in the great mobilization for the war against the imperialist-backed contras, they did not lead the struggle of the workers and peasants through to the end. What could they have done differently, and what would have been the effects of a consistent class-struggle policy?

First of all, they failed to immediately and decisively embark on the road of carrying through the agrarian revolution, the central social task of the democratic revolution. They made half-way steps in land reform, stopping short whenever the needs of carrying it through clashed with the property interests of the landowners.

This was in marked contrast to the October Russian Revolution, when the new Soviet state immediately backed the peasant war for the land. It was also in stark contrast to the Cuban Revolution, which immediately embarked on a thoroughgoing land reform—no matter how much the big landowners screamed.

In both the Russian and Cuban examples, the result was to win the peasants to the side of the revolution and lay the basis for a step forward in agricultural production. Both revolutions would have been overthrown early-on without this decisive step.

Such an orientation in Nicaragua would have mobilized the peasants to increase production and brought them more decisively into the defense of the revolution.

Failure to implement the agrarian revolution in Nicaragua meant the contras were able to demagogically appeal to some peasants who wanted land. This gave the contras, who were created and armed by Washington, a social base, especially in the north. A thorough agrarian revolution would have minimized this development and shortened the war.

It would also have helped in food production, and reduced the numbers who fled the countryside into the cities where they led a marginal existence and became another source of discouragement within the revolution.

Revolutionary strategy deferred Another democratic social task the FSLN should have taken on immediately concerned the national oppression of the peoples of the East Coast. They finally came to grips with this in 1985 through the autonomy programs, but by that time much damage had already been done, with sections of these populations supporting the counter-revolution.

Also, in 1985, under the impact of the war, a partial correction was made concering the land reform, but it was not agrarian problem.

consistently carried out for the whole of the peasantry.

Another necessary revolutionary step, which was only partially developed early on and then abandoned, would have been to set up a generalized system of workers' control in all capitalist enterprises, including whatever capitalist farms might remain after carrying through the land reform.

Such workers' control would not only have mobilized workers to fight for their own interests in such enterprises, including increasing production for the war effort and heightening their revolutionary consciousness and commitment, but would also have been a powerful weapon against the massive decapitalization the capitalists carried out during the war.

Workers' control would have built up workers' support for—no, it would have built up workers' demands forthe expropriation of the decapitalizers. All capitalists who sabotaged the anti-contra war effort should have been immediately expropriated.

Such workers' control would have amounted to hundreds of thousands of eyes and ears of the revolution against all the ways the capitalists and their middle-class hangers-on found to give support to the contras, and would have given the revolutionary state much more power to fully implement one of the FSLN's positive decrees, that is, control over foreign trade.

Of course, carrying through these measures, while not going beyond a radical democratic and anti-imperialist revolution in and of themselves, would have meant a willingness to challenge capitalist private property rights, and led to even sharper conflicts with the capitalists.

When this happened during the course of the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban leaders rallied the workers and farmers to nationalize the holdings of the capitalists "down to the nails of their boots,' " in the words of Castro at the time, and establish a workers' state based on economic planning.

But the leaders of the FSLN refused to carry through the land reform and workers' control. They demurred on the basis that they could not violate the property rights of the "patriotic" bourgeoisie, who, in fact, were not so "patriotic" in the fight against the imperialist-backed contras. Thus the revolution was demobilized at a half-way point, and with the demobilization of the workers and peasants the capitalist political forces were strengthened to the point where they were able to take over the government, with the FSLN now playing the role of junior partner in the liquidation of the revolution.

This is not to minimize all of the positive steps the FSLN took. We are not going to list them all here, and will just note that all of their achievements are now in jeopardy because of the failure to carry the revolution forward to the establishment of a workers' state.

One important mobilization the FSLN led was of the army in the actual fight against the contras. The fact that the workers and peasants prevented the contras from holding any real territory from which they could set up a "government" to appeal for direct imperialist intervention showed what the working people are capable of. How much stronger could they have been had the FSLN stuck to its old motto of "only the workers and peasants will go all the way!"

Build a mass party In addition to carrying the revolution through to the expropriation of the capitalists and the establishment of a planned economy, there are other key developments the FSLN could have and should have led-but didn't.

One was the mobilization of the workers and peasants in the formation of mass democratic councils (soviets) to form the basis of the state. This would have strengthened the revolution greatly by increasing the masses' direct participation in making the difficult decisions in the face of "economic strangulation, constant war, and lack of foreign aid."

The other was transforming the FSLN into a real proletarian mass party, based on democratic decision-making and centralized functioning, and on a revolutionary socialist program.

The authoritarian structure of the FSLN, despite the subjective revolutionary convictions and character of its leaders, was a negative factor in the mobilization of the masses. Its lack of a resolute socialist program in action led to the revolution's derailment.

What would have been the consequences if the FSLN had charted such a course? Would it have eliminated the difficulties of the war, the inadequate aid from the Soviet Union, the inherited backwardness and poverty resulting from imperialist exploitation? Obviously not.

But it wouldn't have meant suicide, either. The war would have been shorter, and more decisively won. The economy would have been strengthened compared to what happened under the capitalist sabotage. Economic planning with participation of the working people would have helped, not hurt, the economy.

Could socialism be built in Nicaragua? No. If socialism in one country was a reactionary utopia in the Soviet Union, it certainly would be so in little Nicaragua. It would be a workers' state, in transition from capitalism to socialism, whose ultimate fate would be decided by whether the socialist revolution is victorious in the advanced capitalist countries in time.

But it could have been a shining example, impelling the revolutions in El Salvador and the rest of Central America. It would have had an important positive impact on revolutionists in the rest of Latin America, just as the Cuban Revolution did. And the Cuban Revolution would have no longer been alone in the Americas. The revolution in Cuba would have been deepened. Revolution would have been on the offensive in Latin America.

Would the U.S. have intervened directly with troops? Possibly, in a desperate attempt to roll back the revolutionary wave that a victory in Nicaragua would have unleashed. But this would have created a massive antiwar movement right here in the U.S. And a mobilized Nicaraguan people would not be like Iraq under Hussein this would be a people's war that would threaten to set fire to the continent.

Unfortunately, the FSLN strategy of stopping short at "violating" capitalist property has taught all the wrong lessons.

It has demoralized the masses in Nicaragua and elsewhere. It has caused former revolutionists to doubt their convictions and even reject the revolutionary road in awe of the supposed invincible might of capital. It has strengthened the idea that revolution is "suicide."

But this is temporary. The class struggle continues—capitalism and imperialism sees to that.