International Viewpoint

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published under the $47 SOCIALIST ACTION NOVEMBER 1991 1f Crisis at the request of the Cubans. This agreement was codified with Moscow in 1963, and provided for a permanent presence of the Soviet unit "which was committed to act if a U.S. invasion began."

The U.S. government was aware of this agreement. In 1979, in the midst of the Sixth Non-Aligned Summit in Havana, Washington, "for demagogic reasons and motives related to domestic politics," made a hue and cry about the Soviet unit, called the Motorized Brigade of the USSR's Armed Forces in Cuba. Granma states that the Cubans rejected difficult moments in Cuban-U.S. relations seem to have reappeared.

"Moreover, what symbolism is involved and to what epoch belongs the inhumane and criminal blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba for more than 30 years? What is the symbolism and to what epoch belong the persecution, the hostility, the unyielding efforts to strangle our economy, the barbarous pressures on governments, international agencies and even U.S. businesses with investments abroad, aimed at isolating our country, at bringing it to its knees through political calumny of incomparaA biweekly magazine auspices of the Fourth International One year subscription:

Send to: rue Richard Lenoir, 93108.

Montreuil, France

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Victim of Yugo-Serbian army mortar barrage in Croatia. ...Civil war in Yugoslavia ' *Like Nazi Germany, the Milosevic regime is deeply antagonizing one people after 16 SOCIALIST ACTION NOVEMBER 1991 (continued from page 20: “Stakes are high in Yugoslav civil war”)

response to the Croatian attacks on the Yugo-Serbian army bases on Croatian territory announced by a spokesman for the army. (Der Spiegel, Oct. 7). This statement is clearly a justification for terroristic attacks on human and psychological targets, like Dubrovnik.

Croats face terrorism

In the Sept. 10 issue of the most important Croatian news magazine, Danas, Anton Bebler, one of the main military experts of the Slovenian government, noted the special features of the war against Croatia:

"You face terrorism, which did not happen in Slovenia. Terrorism, such as the taking of hostages, such as the terrorizing of civilian populations to force them to flee their homes, their villages...Clearly, as the main weapon of terrorism in Croatia, they are using morlars.....

"In Croatia, they are used mainly as a weapon of terrorism, as a means of frightening the population, as a means for forcing them to 'accept' a new government, or simply to scatter the population. For that reason, most of the mortar attacks are at night, in order to have a psychological effect on people, to instill fear, a feeling of helplessness....

"It is characteristic of this war that mortars are the main weapon.... With them, it is possible to attack populated areas in front of military positions, that is, under the protection of military units, which are supposedly holding buffer zones."

In an interview in the Oct. 7 Der Spiegel, Serbian minister of foreign affairs Vladislav Jovanovic claimed "we do not deny anyone the right to leave Yugoslavia. But by what right can Croatia force the Serbs who live there to go along with independence by a unilateral declaration. We also demand the right of self-determination for those Serbs who live in areas where they form the majority." He went on to say that "we do not demand the right of self-determination for the Serbs who live in the rest of Croatia. Serbia has no territorial demands on other republics."

This statement is obviously hypocritical because the Serbian-majority areas in Croatia are scattered and of little importance in themselves. They have only served as a bridgehead for an operation aimed at crippling the Croatian state. Moreover, at about the same time as this statement was made, Serbian and Montregrin reservists were sent into another republic, Bosnia, ostensibly to defend the Serbian minority. The republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on October 15 in an attempt to get into a stronger position to defend itself against Serbian pressures.

About 30 percent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina are Serbs, 20 percent are Croats, and just under 50 percent are Muslims who speak Serbo-Croat but have a Turkish culture. Both the Croats and Muslims have allied against the Greater Serbian threat. The republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only institution in which the long persecuted Slavic Muslim people have major voice.

Great Serbian chauvinism

Thus, the Great Serbian pressures on the republic represent a growing confrontation between Serbian nationalists and the Slavic Muslims. (Most of the Albanians are also Muslims.) In response to the Serbian assault, the Bosnia-Herzegovan government also declared its independence from Yugoslavia.

The southern republic of Macedonia likewise declared its independence in the face of the Great Serbian threat. This development could bring on international complications, since the Macedonian people spill over the Bulgarian and Greek borders, and both these countries have historic claims on Macedonian territory.

In an article in the Oct. 28 issue of International Viewpoint, the Englishlanguage publication of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, N. Champi wrote about indications that the Greek government was interested in grabbing Macedonian territory. He also reported rumors that the Serbian dictator Milosevic had offered support for such a move in order to get Greek support. Supposedly, the Serbian demagogue also offered to recognize Italian claims to part of the break away republic of Slovenia. Such rumors are in line with Milosevic's obvious aim of tearing Yugoslavia to pieces in order to get the Der Spiegel largest piece he can.

These reports are part of a proliferation of wild rumors of dirty international deals and betrayals of the victims of Great Serbian aggression by neighboring countries and the European and world powers. The Sept. 27 issue of Danas carried a big cover headline, "Who Has Betrayed Croatia?" The speculation was stimulated by recognition that the great powers, whatever their embarrassment at the brutality of the Yugo-Serbian army's actions, tended to favor Serbia as the "stabilizing power."

Fourth International position The United Secretariat of the Fourth International adopted a statement in October making clear the need for another.' democrats and revolutionists to defend the Croatians and other oppressed nations of Yugoslavia against the Great Serbian neo-Stalinist regime.

"The Fourth International:

• Denounces the aggressive war against Croatian sovereignty and the hypocrisy of the arms blockade imposed by the European Community and others, which makes no distinction between the aggressor and the victim....

• Supports a confederation of national states. Such a confederation cannot be imposed by force, and is impossible so long as a Great Serb policy is dominant in Serbia. There is a distinction to be made between Serb nationalism and that of the other republics, because of the transformation of the Yugoslav army into a Serbian one."

There is a fundamental difference between Serbian nationalism, the nationalism of the dominant, oppressor nation in Yugoslavia, and the nationalism of the dominated, oppressed nations, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, as well as the Albanians of Kosovo and the Hungarians in Vojvodina.

It is the Serbian neo-Stalinists and their allies that have destroyed the Yugoslav federation. First, they made the Yugoslav army into a Serbian one (90 per cent of its officers are now Serbs, and its Serbian character has been reinforced by a massive callup of Serbian reservists). On Oct. 3, the bloc of Serbia and its satellites announced that it had taken control of the Yugoslav federal government. The Montenegrin vice chair, Branko Kostic, announced that the federal goverment had been removed and the parliament dissolved.

The fate of the Albanian people of Kosovo was already a warning for the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Milosevic abolished their autonomy within Serbia and set up a puppet government. This two-million strong population (more numerous than the Slovenians, and hence the third largest people in Yugoslavia) were subjected to the most brutal forms of national oppression.

In an interview in the Sept. 17 issue of Danas, Albanian Human Rights Defense Committee leader Adem Demaq said that more than 73,000 Kosovo Albanians have been fired from their jobs. Virtually none now hold responsible jobs. In addition, 15 thousand primary school teachers are out of work, since the Serbian government has just cut off funds to education.

The president of the teachers' association, Rexhep Osmani said that instruction in Albanian has already been forcibly halted in about half the high schools.

Like Nazi Germany, the Milosevic regime is deeply antagonizing one people after another. This is a rare example of short-sighted arrogance, whose disastrous results are entirely predictable. What is more, Serbian resources fall far short of what probably is needed for them to achieve their objectives even in the immediate period.

Milosevic already suffered a stinging defeat in Slovenia. By means of terrorism and exploiting the fears of the Serbian minority in Croatia, as well as certain weaknesses of the Croatian government, he managed to do more damage to the Croats.

But even the poorly armed and ill-prepared Croat National Guard has begun to take a toll on the Yugo-Serbian army. At the beginning of the war, the Croats did not have a single tank. In Bjelovar alone, they seized 30 tanks and 400 Yugo-Serbian soldiers surrendered. In all, according to Der Spiegel of Oct. 7, some 11,000 Yugo-Serbian soldiers have deserted in Croatia, and 14,000 have been taken prisoner by the Coats. The Croats now reportedly have 120 tanks.

Besieged Croat forces, including local volunteers, have performed feats of tenacity and military effectiveness that have sustained the morale of the Croatian people. For example, Danas of Sept. 24 wrote: "The hottest place is Vukovar, exposed for days to continual infantry attacks and artillery barrages. But, entirely surrounded, cut off from the world, the Vukovarcani have successfully defended themselves against a technologically far superior foe.... The news coming out on the aggressors' losses is almost incredible-dozens of tanks have been destroyed, airplanes have been shot down, enemy losses number in the hundreds."

Moreover, as winter approaches, the Yugo-Serbian army's material advantages are being more and more neutralized, and it faces the problem of conflicts on other fronts, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nonetheless, the desperation and ruthlessness of the Serbian neo-Stalinist regime cannot be underestimated.

The Croats' first setbacks were explained by Bebler (Danas, Sept. 10) as the result of the Tudjman goverment's failure to take Milosevic's threats seriously, their failure to prepare the population for a decisive confrontation. Instead of mobilizing a people's army, he said, they formed competing national guard and police forces. "Those who are in a technologically inferior position have no choice but to rely on the conception of waging people's war."

What has been happening, in fact, in Croatia, seems to be that a people's war against the aggressor has been developing piecemeal and spontaneously. This points to a more fundamental threat for European "order" than the the plotting of Milosevic with various cynical great powers and larcenous Balkan neighbors.

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... Polish elections SOCIALIST ACTION NOVEMBER 1991 17 (continued from page tion from Socialist Action last year, some nostalgia for the old regime was evident because the conditions of the workers have gotten far worse under the new government. The standard of living is estimated to have fallen by 30 percent or more. Industrial production is down by 20 percent. Unemployment is already 11 percent and continues to soar.

Nonetheless, it seems that only a relatively small percentage of the discontented workers have been attracted to the successors of the Stalinist regime. It is probably an oversimplification, moreover, to see the Peasant Party as simply a continuation of the old CP satellite party. Other such satellite parties gained an independent role as the Stalinist regimes broke up.

The peasants needed an outlet for expressing their anger. The policies of the new government so reduced the masses' ability to buy their products that they faced ruin.

In this election, trade-union candidates felt compelled to run directly under the name of Solidarnosc. They seem to have gotten about 6 per cent of the vote, although there were only a few of them, far from a full slate.

Is a coalition possible?

The party of Walesa's premier, Jan Krzystof Belecki, the Liberal Democratic Congress Party, came in seventh, with just over 7 percent of the vote. The appearance of this more consistent freeenterpriser party represents a process of polarization among the forces that represent the middle-class elite that took over Solidarnosc.

Belecki is a businessman who played no role in Solidarnosc. But he is reportedly Walesa's favorite for premier of a new coalition government.

Belecki himself seemed hesitant about trying to continue to lead the capitalist restoration project in the face of a clear disavowal by the voters. In the Los Angeles Times of Oct. 29, Charles T. Powers noted that he was describing himself as "a person who can say that his policies have met with the antipathy of society."

New York Times correspondent Stephen Engelberg speculated about the possibilities for a new government coalition, but he was unable to come up with any convincing possibility for a stable bloc. He acknowledged that the perspective of a coalition of all parties originating in Solidarnosc around the Democratic Union was "unlikely."

The only other possibility Engelberg could come up with was an unnatural alliance of the Center Alliance, the peasant party and Catholic Election Action. The latter party reportedly campaigned for more mercy for the masses in the economic field but demanded a constitutional amendment banning abortion. Even if such a bloc could be achieved in parliament, it is hard to see it getting ...South Africa (continued from page 12)

and exploited." WOSA explained that the front should be based on a mass campaign for a democratically elected constituent assembly.

An "interim government?"

The new Patriotic Front is calling for negotiations to take place "as soon as possible" with the govemment. A declaration issued by the front endorsed the call for a constituent assembly. But it also—without acknowledging the contradiction-backed the ANC's proposal for an interim government.

The call for a popularly elected constituent assembly to write a new constitution is a basic democratic demand. It means that the majority of the people, ny credibility with the population or laintaining any unity in the face of the rowing struggles against the effects of le capitalist restoration policy.

In fact, in an interview with the Polsh Press Agency immediately after the lections, Walesa said that it was necesary to strengthen the presidency and the xecutive branch in order to continue the rocapitalist reforms.

That means in effect that these poliies cannot be continued by arliamentary democratic means. This as been clear for some time. It was adicated already by the fact that after fazowiecki's rout at the polls, the IMF ras able to impose the the continuation f his economics minister, Leszek Balerowicz, who was most directly esponsible for implementing the poliies that were rejected at the polls.

Euphoria to disillusionment The Polish Fourth Internationalist aper, Dalej! ("Forward') has stressed ne falseness of the claim that "economic emocracy" (that is, free enterprise) and olitical democracy go hand in hand.

It pointed out that carrying out the estoration of capitalism would require awarting the democratic aspirations of he masses that forced the Stalinist ureaucracy to retire to the back of the olitical stage. (See Socialist Action, Does Walesa see the handwriting on the wall?

the Black working class and its allies, have the right and the ability to determine the character of the government that represents them.

The idea of an interim government, however, suggests the opposite—that Blacks must share power (albeit "temporarily") with the parties of the bosses and oppressors. It would not be popularly elected, but based on behind-the-scenes negotiations with all the parties concerned.

Last August, the PAC signed a joint press statement with WOSA that rejected the call for an interim government. The two organizations pointed out: "The interim government would result in the cooptation of the liberation movement, which would be forced to administer the apartheid system and would leave the process of 'transition' at the mercy of the state's security forces."

Unfortunately, barely two months later, the PAC seems to have reversed itselfJune 1991 for a summary of Dalej's argument.) This has now become starkly evident, and seems to mark a turning point in the political process initiated by the breakdown of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Engelberg wrote that the Polish election results were "another sign that the euphoria of 1989 has given way to disillusionment." He went on to say that "From Romania to Hungary to Czechoslovakia, the post-Communist governments are walking a fine line between the requisites of market economies and the need to prevent social explosions like the recent coal miners' rampage in Bucharest."

The Polish experience is key for the policy of capitalist restoration in all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, since it is in Poland where it has been carried the furthest and under the most favorable political conditions.

Analyzing the Polish economic problems on the eve of the elections (New York Times, Oct. 25), Engelberg wrote: "Western Financial institutions, which view Poland as a model for the Soviet Union and other countries in the region, are urging government officials to keep money tight and stay the course, even at the cost of more social unrest."

On Oct. 26, the New York Times editors proclaimed "Poland Cannot Flinch." They argued: "For a few billion dollars the West can make sure that the Poles don't need to look back, and that their gallant leap doesn't fall a few feet short." joining the Patriotic Front even though the front is promoting the ANC's interim govemment idea.

A "happy marriage?"

Dikgang Moseneke, deputy president of the PAC, said that the Patriotic Front is "a happy marriage" that will preserve the independence of its participants while allowing them to work together on issues with which they agree. (Los Angeles Times, Oct. 28, 1991.)

But it may be too early to ring the bells of connubial bliss. The fundamental interests and goals of the participants in the front, ranging from labor unions to pro-capitalist organizations, cannot be reconciled.

It is one thing to build a united front around a short-term campaign of mass activity-as WOSA proposed to the Durban conference. The participants need only agree on relatively limited goals.

However, although Engelberg claimed that the market reforms were working, but with painful "side effects," the picture he painted of the economic decline made it clear that "a few million dollars" would only be a drop in the bucket in comparison to what would be needed to carry through capitalist restoration without a major social crisis.

"Mr. Glapinski, the Housing Minister, said that 60 percent of state-owned companies were now insolvent, which in turn caused a budget crisis," since most tax income came from the profits of the state corporations. Engelberg quoted Glapinski as saying that Poland was "in a state of catastrophe."

Engelberg's claim that the private sector is booming reflects pathetic illusions of a huckster utopia. There are more goods in the shops, but that is because most people can afford to buy less, to such an extent that the peasants are unable to sell their products.

Attitudes can change quickly When I visited Warsaw last spring, I found that basic trading circulates the same as in 1981, but there was proliferation of gypsy-like small merchants selling socks, underwear and hotdogs from the back of vans. This might appear to some like a festival of individualism. But it is hard to see it as a paradise, either for the petty merchants or their customers. How long will it take for a new distribution network to arise on the backs of the hot-dog sellers?

The Polish procapitalists know how rapidly the attitude of the masses toward market reforms can change. The rise of Solidarnosc was precedented by a series of major planning failures, owing in large part to the Stalinist experts' overestimation of the possibilities of the international capitalist market for absorbing Polish exports.

So, in the first period of the mass workers' movement, illusions about the market predominated. Then, the workers realized that the market meant higher prices and cuts in social benefits—that is, that it was the program of the bureaucracy and not theirs. So, they shifted abruptly toward looking to self-management. The first big self-management congress was held in the summer of 1981.

When Solidarnosc failed to resist the bureaucracy's military coup of December 1981, the workers began to lose confidence in their ability to change the society. During the period of military dictatorship, middle-class experts, with Western support, were able to gain control of Solidarnosc. Once in government, they tried to follow the prescriptions of their patrons, which Walesa now complains were bad advice.

The wave of strikes that has been growing since the spring against the government and Solidarose leadership's capitalist restoration policies was a clear sign that the workers are turning against the market perspective. It explains, more than just the recession of the economy, why the international capitalist observers were worried about the test of the Polish elections. The results of the elections show that their fears were justified. • But it is quite different to try to stitch together a bloc of parties and groups in hopes of winning (or "negotiating") state power. In such circumstances, the "marriage partners" must make a long-term commitment to a detailed political program.

This means compromise, and hard experience has shown that in multi-class "popular fronts," the pro-capitalist "partners" always call the tune. The organizations of the working class and the oppressed are constantly forced to sacrifice their principles in order to "hold together" the front.

According to ANC and PAC leaders, the "successful" Patriotic Front agreement shows that eventual fusion of their two organizations may be in the cards. In the meantime, however, both groups must contend with militant rank-and-filers and youth, who are angry at their leaderships' increased drift to the right.