Cuban Revolution confronted by 'A period special in peacetime'

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The Cuban Army is the second most powerful in Latin America, but what Cuba economic isolation imposed by the collapse of Eastern European regimes.

After the collapse of the Soviet-led Comecon trading bloc, Cuba has inevitably found itself in a profound risis. Since August 1990, it has been ir a "period special in peacetime," to employ Fidel Castro's euphemism for the most difficult period in the 30 years since the revolution.

This is article is reprinted from the April 29, 1991, issue of International Viewpoint, a biweekly magazine published under the auspices of the Bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

The plans for the country's economic development for this decade, worked out in the framework of the so-called "socialist division of labor," have been rendered more or less redundant.

Based on guaranteed Soviet oil supplies, industrialization was to be centered on narrow specializations; in particular sugarcane products, which have a very important industrial potential; bio-technology stimulated by the successes of Cuban healthcare, indicated by the discovery of the vaccine against Meningitis B; the undertaking, in liaison with East Germany, of the manufacture of parts for computer technology; the modernization of the sugar plants; and the technological updating of the nickel refineries Oil prospecting and the building of a nuclear power plant were to prepare Cuba to overcome its greatest handicap-the almost total absence of energy resources, leading to chronic external dependence for which, given the volatility of raw material prices on the world market and their manipulation according to events, sugar production cannot compensate.

The Gulf war has shown the fragility and speculative character of the oil market, and Iraq's offer after the imposition of the UN embargo to provide free oil to the world's most impoverished countries struck a chord. In fact, most Third World oilimporting countries buy in small quantities and at the highest prices since they do not have the moncy to finance long-term purchasing.

Until 1989 Ouba was free from this constraint, and this was without doubt the main advantage of "frateral" aid, which in other respects was much less of a one-way business than is generally supposed. Any drop in oil deliveries means immediate chaos in transport and at work, affecting industry, food production and supplies to a population two thirds of which lives in urban areas.

The country's defense is in the hands of what is considered the most powerful army 12 SOCIALIST ACTIOI in Latin America after that of Brazil.

In one form or another, 15 percent of the population is under arms, and its military potential is often presented as a direct threat to the USA. Just recently, Jeanne Kirkpatrick has spoken of the danger of the destruction of the nuclear power station at Florida's Turkey Point by Castroite commandos. Such assertions, whose political function is to put pressure on the Soviet government to further turn the screw on Cuba, overlook the fundamentally defensive character of the Cuban army, whose scope is in any case limited by its almost total dependence on external sources of oil and oil products, as well as for spare parts.

Survival of revolution at stake It is thus no exaggeration to say that it is the survival of the revolution that is at stake. For the first time, it is not the risk of direct intervention that is to be feared but the more insidious combination of an extremely serious economic crisis, a reinforcement of the American blockade, extreme difficulties in daily life and, on top of that, real but too superficial political changes. Such a combination can lead to explosions in the most demoralized parts of the population-with an unforeseeable dynamic.

The result of eight months of discussions at a time when Cuban fears were at their height, Soviet-Cuban negotiations that began in May 1990 provisionally concluded in December with the signing of a new agreement. Provisionally, because the new structure of bilateral trade for the new epoch that has opened has not yet been fully defined. The final statements only concern 1991, and further negotiations will be needed to fix the new mechanisms of future economic and trade relations.

The uncertainty stems in part from the fact that, according to Cuban foreign trade minister Ricardo Cabrisas, the negotiations took place when neither the 1991 plan nor the Soviet budget had yet been approved. Their completion is all the less certain in that the negotiators have yet to determine important details, including certain prices; but above all the economic and political crisis in the USSR does not permit any certainty about the future of any agreement.

The old bilateral clearing system will continue to apply until March 31, but after is to break out of that trade must be conducted in hard currency, with prices being worked out on the basis of those on the world market. Even at this price, and whatever the quality, Cuba will not have a choice as far as spare parts are concerned, since much of industry has of necessity been Soviet equipped.

Calculating the price of sugar The taking into consideration of world market prices is not straightforward as far as the price of sugar products (for example) is concerned. As Cabrisas has pointed out, this price reflects neither trade between the European Community and the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries, on the one hand, or between the USA and its traditional suppliers on the other, which takes place at prices significantly higher than those on the world market.

The Soviet Union finally agreed to buy four million tons of sugar in 1991 at the preterential price of $0.24 per pound, a lower price than under the previous agreement but twice the current market price.

Ten million tons of oil and oil products are to be delivered-three million less than previously—at a price of $20 a barrel; slightly higher than the current world market price. Cuba will have to pay transport costs in hard currency. There are also numerous restrictions on other important deliveries.

Agreements had previously been negotiated with 62 Soviet institutions permitting 25,000 establishments to trade with the island. These accords have collapsed, creating supply problems which have had to be met with emergency oil deliveries in January in order to avoid catastrophe.

The most surprising political measure concerns the payment of Cuba's debt to the USSR, on the abolition of which Castro has been counting for years. It is estimated at (approximately) 15 billion roubles, which will be made out in hard currency from next year at a rate of interest that is not yet known. Given the severe shortage of hard currency which the Cuban economy is suffering from, made worse by the fact that it will no longer as in the past be possible to re-export Soviet oil, the 1990s are opening on a somber note.

Feed the population

Cuba has big agricultural potential. However, neither crop production nor livestock are sufficient, despite the progress achieved, to feed the population. This is due to the priority given to export crops, and in the first place to sugarcane and citrus fruits at the expense of output, in particular on the state farms; [that is,] the importance of imports (fertilizers, seeds, spare parts); without forgetting the cost in energy of the mechanization of cane cutting, which is seen as a way of compensating for lack of labor in the countryside. In this field as well, external dependence and economicpolitical decisions have a big impact.

Food imports are being sharply cut back, with a big impact on supplies above all in Havana, where some 20 percent of the population live. The central importance assigned to the Food Plan is explained by the current necessity to ensure the country's self-sufficiency in food after the alarming shortages of 1990, which put the whole country on the alert.

Delays in Soviet grain deliveries have provoked bread shortages, while the lack of grain to feed poultry has led to a spectacular fall in the production of eggs, which were previously freely available but are now strictly rationed at four or five a week. Bulgarian chickens and Czechoslovak beer have not arrived and it has been necessary to reduce the quantities of imported rice, although this is a basic foodstuff on the island.

Cubans are not on the edge of famine, partly because the "libreta" (rationing card) guarantees basic nourishment for all and above all because Cubans eat once a day in the collective structures, work centers, schools and so on, which have their own food supply networks.

The situation nonetheless is all the more difficult insofar as the restrictions combine with acute distribution problems which make daily life an unbearable headache. Queues can be hours long and require complex organization; the whole family is mobilized (notably the grandparents), "rotations" are organized with numbered tickets; absenteeism from work has risen.

Since the end of 1990 the list of rationed items has lengthened. It includes 242 items of daily use such as shoes, clothes, furniture, toys, and hygienic products. Recently detergent, soap, shampoo and razor blades have been unobtainable in some areas.

The sale of electrical goods has also been severely limited for reasons of energy economy and because there is not the money to import them. Thus in Cuba, a tropical country, no refrigerators will he sold in 1991, while air conditioning appliances, an urban inheritance of the American epoch, will be replaced by Chinese ventilators and only the newly weds will have irons.

The bicycle age has arrived (the bicycles also being Chinese) at the cost of several serious accidents, since this form of travel Castro faces biggest dangers in 30-year history of revolution.

is unknown in a country accustomed to using cars in the towns and horses in the countryside. As for the press, the number of journals, the number of pages and their circulation have all been reduced (without any compensating improvement in the quality of the information!).

Crisis In book production The shortage of paper has also caused a big crisis in the book industry. According to The Economist (February 9, 1991) until last year around 500 new titles were published annually for "the island's inhabitants are avid readers and books sell so well that the Cuban Book Institute keeps a weekly list of the 10 bestselling titles."

It is worthwhile recalling at this point, as The Economist's Havana correspondent does, that "in 1959 a quarter of the population was illiterate."

This shows both the dimensions of the cultural revolution in the past 30 years, but also the gravity of the present shock. Cuban scientists have been trying to find a way of using sugarcane husks to make paper, but meanwhile no more books are (continued on next page)

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healthcare system, one of the most (continued from preceding page) being printed and, despite a 50 percent price rise, the remaining stocks are disappearing from the bookshop shelves.

But the most significant symptom of the worsening situation is the strict control on the sale of medicines announced by the government in March.

From now on, the sale of a wide range of medicines in public chemists' shops will be reduced, individual medical prescriptions are being controlled and essential prescriptions are filled in the hospitals. The price of certain medicines is to be raised so as to inhibit any unnecessary consumption.

Given how proud Cuba is of its healthcare system, one of the most advanced in the Third World, these measures are a striking sign of the gravity of the situation.

Cuba must make itself ready for "the worst of economic situations," Fidel Castro warned on February 17, 1991. "We must gain time in this first stage of the 'special period' and prepare ourselves for the second and third stages."

This third period could lead in the worst case-that in which even the current agreement with the USSR is not respected-to the establishment of a sort of war communism in peacetime.

To avoid this, the leadership is relying on an increase in trade with China and Latin America, on increased tourism, on the setting up, under as yet unspecified conditions, of joint ventures with European countries and on the end-entirely hypothetical, alas—of the American blockade. It is necessary to find an economic policy—or simply a policy—which will permit the Cuban people to hold on until the end of the tunnel and until international solidarity shows itself.

Joint ventures multiply

In the meantime, it is necessary to prepare for the worst, make economies [savings] in all fields, in particular in energy, and play for time. The government has already changed its line on mixed enterprises. There are already many joint ventures cooperation; the Chinese have granted credits permitting the construction of bicycle and ventilator factories and there is also collaboration underway in clothing, shoes, ceramics, motors, machine tools, tractors, the food industry, electronics and more.

The Chinese foreign trade minister, Li Langing, has emphasized that the reasons for Cuban-Chinese trade are economic— China is hoping to expand relations with Latin America, while Cuba is seeking outlets for products that it used to sell to Eastern Europe.

But he also identified a political aspect which may refer to the means of payment the breaking of its links with Eastern Europe to return to its natural geo-political framework: the Latin American continent. In practice, the country is no longer totally isolated, and trade has developed. However, this is limited by the fact that the Latin American countries are themselves too heavily in debt, and the pressure of the American blockade is strong.

Bad neighbors

The group of three Latin American producers of hydrocarbons (Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia), from which Cuba could buy oil with much reduced ing commercial profits."

The serious problems in distribution are an additional headache, and there are countless chistes (jokes) deriding the inefficiency and waste of the state sector, from which corrupt functionaries, whose teque-teque (jargon) hides their "doble moral," are nonetheless able to profit." The danger of the criminal classes In a report entitled "Mercantilism and Crime in Cuba: Present Effects and Future Consequences, " Fernando Barral notes "the constant growth in delinquency in the country, whether there is a severe penalty policy, or whether some crimes are depenalized," and the danger of using the