Walesa elected president; instability still continues

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Lech Walesa praying for a miracle? How can he implement policies overwhelmingly rejected in elections?

*..the Polish workers are not unemployment and poverty that comes with the tyranny of the SOCIALIST ACTION JANUARY 1991 13 WARSAW-The second round of Poland's presidential elections gave Lech Walesa the easy victory that was expected With every prominent Polish poltician and media personality united behind him, Walesa captured three-quarters of the vote.

His opponent, "Stan" Tyminski, had been subjected to a devastating campaign of personal denunciation. (Earlier, Polish TV showed interviews with Tyminski's neighbors in Canada, who accused him of everything from wife-beating to starving his children.)

The West had made it clear that a good score for Tyminski would jeopardize trade and credit relations. The Roman Catholic Church, still a very powerful force in Polish politics, had called on the faithful to vote for Walesa. In these circumstances, Walesa's victory was never in doubt.

Nevertheless, Walesa and his supporters were far from happy after the voting was over. First, the very fact that Walesa had to face a complete unknown in the run-off second round detracted from his victory.

Second, despite the frantic appeals to "patriotic Poles" to vote against Tyminski and avert a national disaster, the turn-out was well down on the first round, amounting to just over 50 percent of eligible voters.

Third, Walesa had to make a scries of conciliatory gestures towards Mazowiecki (the outgoing president) and his supporters to secure the votes of their electorate.

The victory celebrations were therefore much more muted than anyone could have imagined before the election campaign began. And the nationalistic rhetoric and exaggerated religious imagery of Walesa's inauguration could not conceal the fact that the Polish political system had moved into a new and deeper phase of instability and crisis.

Unable to form government The two weeks that elapsed between Walesa's election and the Christmas holidays were enough to prove that the real problems were only beginning. Unable to assemble a cabinet, select a premier, or define any concrete policies for whatever government would finally be appointed, Walesa began to back down on his campaign promises one by one.

Walesa's basic campaign slogan had been that of a "speedup"—a process of accelerated political reform (rapid elections to parliament) and also economic reform (faster privatization and marketization). He had fiercely criticized the hardship caused by Mazowiecki government's economic policies. And he had promised to square accounts with the Stalinist bureaucrats who still occupy the dominant position in the Polish civil service and economy.

Yet, just before Christmas, Walesa was forced to suggest that it might be best if the Mazowiecki government carry on as before-despite Mazowiecki's having received a resounding vote of "no confidence" from the Polish people in the first round of the elections (only 18 percent of the votes cast). As an alternative, Walesa proposed any govwith an introduction and article by Carl Finamore ernment appointed by himself be given an extended term of office, delaying the parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring by another full year. Hardly the "speedup" he had promised!

The essential problem Walesa faces in putting together a government centers on the figure of Leszek Balcerowicz, vice-premier in the Mazowiecki cabinet and the author of its economic program—the so-called "Balcerowicz plan."

While critical of this plan during the election campaign, Walesa now claims it represents the only real possibility of modernizing Poland's economy. Under heavy pressure from the capitalists in the West and the bureaucrats in the economic apparatus, Walesa now concedes that Balcerowicz will have to Poland:

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This has raised a storm of protest from Walesa's own supporters, particularly from the rank and file of Solidarity. Balcerowicz is firmly identified with a policy of mass unemployment, recession, and widespread pauperization. The votes for both Walesa and Tyminski were primarily votes against Balcerowicz.

Poland's voters overwhelmingly rejected the policy of preparing the way for a restoration of capitalism by slashing living standards and selling off the country's factories. Yet this is what Walesa is now proposing.

Walesa is now caught between the devil and the deep blue sea—in more ways than one, in fact. To retain his base of mass support, he must distance himself from the economic policies of the Mazowiecki government. But he himself is fully committed to restoring capitalism. As he is now finding out, there is no "painless" way to do this. It requires an all-out attack on the living standards of working people, the very people who form his base of support. This is why he is compelled to call on the services of Balcerowicz.

Moreover, the project of capitalist restoration also needs the assistance of Western capital—as Walesa has repeatedly declared himself. Yet Western capital will only be prepared to move into Poland when they see the working class has been defeated and demoralized, docile enough to accept the terms that Western capital itself dictates.

This is the road that Balcerowicz has been proposing, and the West is demanding more of the same, threatening to withdraw support from Walesa if he changes course.

(The U.S. State Department is the most vociferous supporter of Balcerowicz becoming the new premier; indeed, the first meeting between Walesa and Balcerowicz was arranged by the U.S. ambassador.)

Finally, Walesa is beginning to realize that he cannot deliver on the last of his campaign promises either—that of squaring accounts with the Stalinist bureaucracy. In the first place, he cannot run the country without their assistance; not for a very long David Turnles time, at any rate. Their stranglehold on Poland's administrative and economic infrastructure is still practically absolute.

Secondly, it is the Stalinists who hold the key to any real attempt to restore capitalism. They alone have the funds and connections, and they alone are properly placed to constitute the "first wave" of home-grown capitalists.

Thirdly, should the going begin to get rough, it is the Stalinists, still well entrenched in the army and police, that Walesa will have to call on to get him out of trouble.

Rumblings among rank At the time of this writing, Walesa has been in office only 18 days. Yet it is already clear that his presidency will make no change in the disastrous policies pursued by the Mazowiecki government.

Just like Mazowiecki, Walesa remains a political prisoner of both Western capital and the country's Stalinist bureaucrats. It is these people who are calling the tune in Poland today-and Walesa shows no signs of opposing their plans to restore capitalism through a vicious attack on Polish workers' living standards.

The difference, however, is that most Polish workers emerged from the election campaign-and the strikes which accompanied it—with a new sense of self-confidence. They had accomplished what they had set out to do: bring down the Mazowiecki government and display their rejection of the "Balcerowicz plan." Walesa can have few illusions that they will now stand back and accept the same policies from him.

In fact, the last few weeks have already seen the beginnings of a certain recomposition within the Polish labor movement. In a few regions, new rank-and-file structures have emerged within Solidarity, opposed to both Walesa and Mazowiecki. In several key industrial plants, splits within Solidarity have led to the creation of new, extremely militant, left-wing structures. This includes the Crakow Steel Works, employing over 40,000 and the FSO car factory in Warsaw, employing 22,000.

The basic contradiction in Poland remains as it was: the contradiction between the project of merciless capitalist restoration pursued by the country's pro-imperialist politicians, and the project of real democracy and social justice which inspired the founding of Soldarity and continues to inspire many working people.

Under Walesa's presidency, this contradiction can only become more acute. Having fought for 10 solid years to overthrow the tyranny of Stalinism, the Polish workers are not about to accept the unemployment and poverty that comes with the tyranny of the capitalist market.

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the fight for workers' democracy

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