How the U.S. 'set up' Iraq to invade Kuwait

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'When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, Iraq had some $80 billion in hard currency reserves. The resistance of the Iranian population resulted in a protracted eight-year war, during which Iraq was armed by the United States and Western Europe and bankrolled by the rulers of Kuwait and This final article series.

During the 1970s, the regime of Saddam Hussein approached the Kuwaiti emir on several occasions with the goal of reaching a settlement to its longstanding dispute over Kuwait.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq visited Kuwait City in 1972 with a specific proposal wherein Iraq's claim to its former district—1.e., Kuwait—would be abrogated in exchange for "border adjustments." Specifically, the Iragi minister asked that Iraq be allowed to gain access to its former islands in the Gulf.

On May 16, 1978, the Iraqi Minister of Internal Affairs went to Kuwait to discuss the border issue, notably because the border was "creeping north," in the words of Tragi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Several committees were established but nothing was ever agreed.

Iraq pushed to invade Iran With the revolution in Iran and the overthrow of the Shah, Saddam Hussein formally replaced al Bakr as President of Iraq.

According to authoritative Kuwaiti sources, at a secret meeting in Kuwait in late 1979, U.S. Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed to Saddam Hussein that he invade Iran and detach Khuzistan, thereby giving Iraq access to the Gulf through the Shatt-al-Arab, the narrow waterway between Iraq and Iran. The U.S. goal was to contain and roll back the Iranian Revolution. Hussein was the ideal candidate to help in this effort.

The Khomeini regime had betrayed the aspirations of the national minorities of -from the Turks and the Kurds, to the Arabs of the south-continuing the policy of Farsi (Persian) domination.

Iran's Admiral Madani, the governor of Khuzistan, began to suppress the Arab minority in general and the oil workers in particular. It was assumed, therefore, that an Iraqi invasion would be seen by the Arab minority as an army of liberation from Farsi domination and that the seizure of the oil fields of Khuzistan would be facilitated by the population.

In fact, the Arab minority in Khuzistan consisted of the oil workers at the great refineries of Ahwaz and Abadan. They were among the most militant and radicalized sector of the Iranian workers.

It was the protracted general strike of the oil workers, over the objections of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, which had broken the back of the Shah's regime. Khomeini had feared that the oil workers-radical and secular—would displace the Mullahs of the Islamic Republic and overthrow the capitalist order.

Nonetheless, when Iraq invaded, the oil workers and the Arab minority perceived the invasion as an attack on the revolution itself. They resisted.

The secret meeting in Kuwait promised Saddam Hussein the financial support of the Kuwaiti and Saudi regimes for his invasion. When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, Iraq had some $80 billion in hard currency reserves. The resistance of the Iranian population resulted in a protracted eight-year war, during which Iraq was armed by the United States and Western Europe and bankrolled by the rulers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Kuwait moves its border Meanwhile, as Saddam Hussein was doing the bidding of the United States' and Kuwait's rulers through the war against Iran, the Kuwaitis were steadily encroaching north, notably into the area overlapping the great Rumaila oil reserve of Iraq.

Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz observed in a document dated Sept. 4, 1990:

"It should be noted that for the entire period ... [when] Iraq was preoccupied with its internal problems and regional affairs, including, most recently, the eight-year-long war between Iraq and Iran, the rulers of Kuwait were taking advantage of the situa4 SOCIALIST ACTION I tion to advance northwards, where they established control posts, military installations, farms, and oil facilities.

These encroachments were not haphazard. The floating border enlarged Kuwait by over 900 square miles until the southern tier of the Rumaila oil reserve was under Kuwaiti occupation.

The Kuwaiti sheikh then purchased the Santa Fe Drilling Corporation of Alhambra, Calif., for a sum of $2.3 billion. Santa Fe Drilling was noted for its sophisticated "slant" drilling equipment, wherein oil drilling proceeded not vertically but horizontally. For years, Kuwait proceeded to drill deep into the Rumaila reserve in Iraq, extracting billions of dollars of Iraqi oil.

Iraq pressed to repay debt But the dispute between Iraq and the Kuwaiti emir did not center solely on territory or physical possession of the oil reserves. Having fallen $80 billion in debt, Saddam Hussein was now pressed by his feudal paymasters in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for repayment with interest. The principal source of hard currency earnings, petroleum, was highly susceptible to price fluctuations pegged to production quotas.

Iraq and other OPEC members began to argue for production quotas which would enable producing states to exercise some modicum of control over price structures.

Although billions of dollars are earned from crude oil, these earnings pale before the profits made from refined products and from the distribution and processing of petroleum. Virtually every commodity has a petroleum or distillate component, from plastics to synthetics. Petroleum-based manufacture is monopolized by the imperialist states.

Hussein is no longer needed With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein found that his erstwhile allies among the Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt no longer were willing to hold to OPEC decisions on production. Even when decisions were taken to fix production levels, the Emirates, and notably Kuwait, would ECEMBER 1990 Saudi Arabia.' flood the market. Protests from Iraq, Libya, Iran and others were met by increased naval activity in the Gulf by the United States.

In February 1990, Saddam Hussein spoke at the Amman Summit on the relationship between oil production and the U.S. armed presence in the Gulf. Noting that the original pretext for the presence of the U.S. fleet, namely the Iran-Iraq war, was absent and yet the fleet remained and was being steadily augmented, Saddam Hussein began to sense that his usefulness to the United States was nearing an end.

He said the following:

'The continued presence of the American fleet in the Gulf is due to the fact that, as a result of developments in the international political situation ... the Gulf has emerged as the most important spot in the region, and it may even be the most important spot in the world....

"If the Gulf people and the rest of the Arabs along with them fail to take heed, the Arab Gulf region will be ruled by American will. Should weakness remain among us and we fail to heed what is now happening, matters will get to the point where the United States will dictate the quantity of oil or natural gas to be produced by each state, the quantity which can be sold to this or that state; and prices will be fixed—all on the basis of a special outlook which has to do solely with U.S. interests and in which no consideration is given to the interests of others."

Within days of this speech, the Western press began to carry stories about Saddam Hussein's missiles, chemical weapons, and nuclear potential. The Israeli press openly speculated about pre-emptive strikes on the model of the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear power plant in 1981.

"Immediately thereafter," said Tarig Aziz, "the rulers of Kuwait-together with the Emirates—came up all of a sudden with calls for increases in their production quotas. Without waiting for discussion, they flooded the oil market with a huge surplus. Prices dropped from $21 per barrel to as little as $11 per barrel, which meant a loss of earings amounting to billions of dollars under the trying circumstances for us brought about by the huge costs of the war."

Iraq sent envoys to Kuwait, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia-their recent financial sponsors. They met with no response.

At the Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad on May 28-30, 1990, Saddam Hussein stated during a closed session:

"War is at times waged by troops, and harm is inflicted by explosions, by slaughter, and by coup attempts; at other times, it is inflicted by way of the economy. To those who have no intention of waging war against Iraq, I say this is a kind of war against us.' At the end of June, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi carried personal appeals from Saddam Hussein to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and Jaber al-Ahmad and Sheikh Zayed of the Emirates proposing a solution based upon standard production quotas—as had been set by OPEC on numerous earlier occasions.

Iraq proposed that quotas should allow crude oil to market at $25 a barrel, a price which would permit reduction of the deficits arising from its war with Iran.

Price increases in crude oil bring billions in additional earnings to the producers. Consequently, the insistent lowering of their own earnings could only be construed by Iraq as a political decision aimed at destabilizing the Iragi economy and the regime itself.

Economic war against Iraq Iraq was rebuffed. Saddam Hussein now appealed for a meeting at the summit between the heads of state of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. This request was refused. A meeting was then proposed by Iraq between the oil ministers of the Gulf states.

The four oil ministers met on July 10, 1990. An agreement was reached to establish production quotas which would allow the price to float upward gradually. The day after the meeting had been concluded, however, the Kuwaiti oil minister announced to the press, after conferring with the Emir, that Kuwait would increase production substantially by October 1990.

On July 16, 1990, Saddam Hussein made a speech in which he asserted that the deliberate flooding of the market had caused the price of Iraqi oil to drop from $28 to $11 per barrel, a loss to the Iraqi economy of $14 billion in a matter of months. He accused the United States of orchestrating an economic war against Iraq and issued a warning that Iraq could not afford to accept passively an effort to undercut its economy.

"Iraqis, on whom this deliberate injustice has been inflicted," Hussein said, "believe firmly in defending their rights and in self-defense. Better to be deprived of life than the means of living. If words fail to provide us with protection, then deeds are badly needed to restore rights to those whose rights have been usurped."

Iraq was now assailed for bellicose and menacing declarations. Hussein prepared a statement in which he pointed out that great harm was being willfully and deliberately inflicted on Iraq's national economy. Almost pleadingly, he sought the motives for this sustained provocation:

"It is a treacherous stab in the back of Iraq, a country which emerged from a long, costly war and which incurred heavy debts which it had to repay in order to proceed with its development program. We have to feed a people which has suffered a great deal, which sacrificed the flower of its youth in defense of the Gulf region."

The Iraqis were incredulous that, having undertaken a war at the behest of U.S. imperialism with the explicit mandate of insulatcal challenge, their own government should now be targeted. Saddam Hussein summoned the Saudi Oil Minister, Hisham an-Nazer, on July 9, declaring: "I revolt from the idea that Iraqis should go hungry and Iraqi women should go naked from destitution."

Iraq's detailed memorandum

On July 15, Tariq Aziz delivered a detailed memorandum to the Secretary-General of the Arab League in Tunis. The document set forth the chronology, facts, and figures of a deliberate "conspiracy on the part of the rulers of Kuwait to destroy the Iraqi economy."

For the first time, the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein delineated the process (continued on next page)

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Gorbachev's invaluable assistance 'State Dept. officials led Saddam Hussein to think he could get away with grabbing Kuwait... Small wonder Saddam concluded he could overrun Kuwait.

Bush and Co. gave him no reason to Send to: 3435 Army St., Rm. 308, San Francisco, CA 94110 SOCIALIST ACTION DECEMBER 1990 5 Throughout the nearly 30-year preparation for direct U.S. intervention in the Gulf, the role of the Soviet Union was viewed as a critical factor in facilitating U.S. plans.

Under the heading, "U.S. Officials Satisfied with Soviets' Gulf Role," the New York Times (Sept. 20) disclosed that "10 days after the summit meeting [between Bush and Gorbachev] in Helsinki, Bush officials are satisfied with Soviet cooperation in isolating Traq."

The Times article notes that there has been strategic planning between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Israel:

"U.S. officials noted with particular enthusiasm the warming in Moscow's relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia. 'We've been exceptionally pleased with the Soviet role,' said a senior State Department official. 'Without the current Soviet position, the whole color of the Gulf problem would be totally different."

U.S. officials cited the visit to Moscow of Israeli cabinet minister Ariel Sharon "for several days last week," as evidence of an understanding having been reached about the current crisis.

Michael Mandelbaum, director of East-West studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, concluded that "the Soviet Union had done much since the summit meeting, besides restoring relations with Saudi Arabia. The most important contribution the Soviets have made is ... that for the first time in 40 years, we can conduct military operations in the Middle East without worrying about triggering World War III."

On Oct. 28, the Los Angeles Times carried a story about the meeting between Soviet President Mikhail (continued from previous page) through which the border was inched northward and the Rumaila oil reserve pillaged.

Taken together, it was, the memo stated, "an attack upon Iraq by the government of Kuwait which is, in reality, a double attack. It has involved encroachment upon our territory and our oil fields, theft of our oil wealth which, it now becomes apparent, is a deliberate attempt to cause a collapse of the Iraqi economy. The effects of this aggression are no less adverse than those of military aggression."

A final meeting was requested by Iraq, which occurred on July 30 in Jedda, between Saddam Hussein and the Crown Prince of Kuwait. Kuwait would agree neither to production quotas nor to cease pumping oil from Iraq's Rumaila reserve. It would not forego any of Iraq's debt.

Tariq Aziz concluded:

"It was inconceivable that a regime, such as that in Kuwait, could risk engaging in a conspiracy of such magnitude against a large, strong country such as Iraq, if it were not being supported and protected by a great power; and that power was the United States of America."

The entrapment of Hussein The ruthlessness and practiced duplicity of British imperialism, in the course of forging the Empire, earned its rulers the nickname "Perfidious Albion," meaning "treacherous England." Events in the Persian Gulf prove U.S. rulers to be their worthy successor.

On Sept. 18, 1990, the Foreign Ministry of Iraq published verbatim the transcripts of meetings held between high-ranking U.S. officials and Saddam Hussein just days before Iraqi troops entered Kuwait on Aug. 2.

James McCartney, columnist for KnightRidder newspaper's Washington bureau, acknowledges that these transcripts are "not disputed by the State Department." On July 25, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, informed Saddam Hussein in her official capacity, "We have no opinion on ... conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

Glaspie repeated this several times. To make sure the point was taken, she added, "Secretary of State James Baker has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this instruction. "

Indeed, Gorbachev and Spanish Prime Minister Felip Gonzalez. "The Soviet leader," the Los Angeles Times said, "left no doubt about his condemnation of the Iraqi aggression. 'We must maintain firmness,' he said."

Gorbachev made a particular point of assuring his host that he was completely aligned with the imperialist powers.

'There is no need to panic," Gorbachev is quoted as saying. "The alliance against Iraq is controlling the situation. Saddam Hussein is not going to divide us. If he thinks like this, he is very wrong. We are not going to give up on our principles on this issue."

After receiving a $1.5 billion loan from Spain, Gorbachev informed the assembled Spanish journalists:

"In the last five years, we have started a process of change that has taken other countries centuries to accomplish. We have to change our way of life, our economic system, our political processes, and to make these changes, we have to change ourselves."

The next day, according to the Los Angeles Times, Gorbachev announced a series of economic measures sharply devaluing the ruble and allowing "100 percent foreign ownership of companies in the Soviet Union" as part of "his plan to convert this nation of 285 million residents to a market-based economy over a period of about two years."

The pending war in the Middle East is directly linked to the alliance between the Soviet leadership and U.S. rulers.

The worldwide resistance to the pending slaughter will challenge the right to rule of Bush and Gorbachev themselves, whose predatory role will become as transparent as that of their clients, the corrupt feudal emirs and sheikhs they seek to maintain in power at the cost of many lives.

Margaret Tutweiler, and Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, "both did exactly that. A week before the invasion both repeated publicly that the United States was not obligated to come to Kuwait's aid if it were attacked. " (Santa Barbara News-Press, Sept. 24, 1990).

McCartney is incredulous in reviewing the heavy-handedness with which the message was conveyed to Saddam Hussein. "At one point in the conversation, Glaspie said: *I have direct instruction from the President...'"

Two days before Iraqi troops entered Kuwait, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, where Rep. Lee Hamilton, (D-Ind.) asked him "if the United States was committed to come to Kuwait's defense."

Later, Hamilton recalled Kelly before the Sub-Committee to remind him of their colloquy:

"I asked you if there was a U.S. commitment to come to Kuwait's defense if it was attacked. Your response over and over again was: 'We have no defense treaty relationship with any Gulf country.""

Columnist James McCartney, like Hamilton, concludes that the United States had, with deliberation, given Saddam think otherwise.

Hussein "a green light for invasion. George Bush ... left the door open and Saddam Hussein walked through. And much blood may be shed as a result."

A similar conclusion was reached by the New York Daily News, but with a most revealing twist. In its lead editorial on Sept. 29, ("Assessing Iraq: The Blame Can Wait"), the editorial states:

"State Department officials ... led Saddam Hussein to think he could get away with grabbing Kuwait." Reciting the uncontested facts, the editorial continues, "Small wonder Saddam concluded he could overrun Kuwait. Bush and Co. gave him no reason to think otherwise."

The newspaper concludes, coldbloodedly, that, embarrassing though this revelation may be, the crisis was going to get "tighter and tougher" and "when the smoke clears in Baghdad, there will be plenty of time to examine Bush's Iraq policy, preferably with tweezers and a microscope."

That's for after the war. For now, "George Bush deserves plenty of credit for his impeccable handling of the Persian Gulf crisis. He may also deserve credit for allowing the crisis to happen in the first place."

In this vein, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, head of the U.S. Central Command and now commander of all U.S. forces in Operation Desert Shield, was reported to have anticipated Iraq's occupation of Kuwait with uncanny precision:

"Only two weeks before the invasion, officials said, Schwarzkopf convened his top I 16 months for $3 Andy Hernandez/Newsweek commanders for an exercise that simulated 'exactly the contingency of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait.' "'The similarities were eerie,' one source said. He added that 'when the real event came, the only way they could tell real intelligence from the practice intelligence was the little 't' in the corner of the paper -it' for training.'" (New York Daily News, Sept. 29)

Professor Michael Clare of Hampshire College also makes reference to a National Security Council White Paper, prepared in May 1990, in which "Iraq and Saddam Hussein were set forth as 'the optimum contenders to replace the Warsaw Pact' as the rationale for major military expenditure." (quoted by Daniel Sheehan at Sept. 14 Berkeley antiwar teach in)

It is evident that Saddam Hussein was deliberately squeezed, with the intent that he should resolve the crisis facing him by reclaiming Kuwait. It is ironic that, alone among Iraqi rulers, from the Ottoman Empire to the present day, he had acquiesced in the colonial severance of Kuwait from Iraq-and even served, in the war with Iran, as the guarantor of the Emir's rule.

From King Faisal I, King Ghazi and Nuri es-Said to Abdul Karim Qassim, each ruler of Iraq has reflected, however reluctantly, Iraqi national indignation at the deliberate amputation of Kuwait. Only the postQassim regimes, in all of which Saddam Hussein had a part, conceded Kuwait's severance and Iraq's indispensable access to the Gulf.

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