A 20th century chronicle of Iraq's attempt to regain Kuwait Imperialism responded with secret deals, coups and assassinations

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Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. Iraqi leader Nasser Baghdad Pact on the condition Kuwait be returned to Iraq.

In a Nov. I editorial, The New York Times warned against giving any credence to the view that Iraq has a legitimate historic claim to Kuwait, calling it "Goebbels-like Iraqi propaganda." The Times is obviously disturbed that the truth about the Iraq-Kuwait dispute is starting to get out. In this Part 2 of a three-part series, Ralph Schoenman continues to establish the facts about this hidden chapter of Middle Eastern politics.

In the aftermath of World War I, the Arab people's aspiration for self-determination was crushed when the major European powers reneged on their pledges to grant independence and divided up the Arab world among themselves. Iraq, in particular, was prevented access to the Gulf through the amputation of its Kuwaiti district.

In many ways the cold-blooded murder by British agents of King Ghazi I of Iraq marked a watershed for British rule in the region. Ghazi had refused to abandon his support of the Kuwaiti National Movement in its insurrectional struggle to reunite Kuwait with Iraq.

Ghazi was murdered on April 5, 1939. This was the eve of World War II, which would be fought, like the global conflagration of 1914, between rival imperial powers seeking to secure hegemony over subject peoples and world markets.

A new claimant, however, had emerged on the scene. Washington was now preparing actively to displace the colonial domain of enemy and ally alike. And by the end of the war, the United States was the dominant force in the region.

David Lamb described the new U.S. role in an article in The Los Angeles Times (Aug. 19, 1990):

"It was not until the final days of World War II in 1945—a war that extended U.S. interests to every corner of the globe-that Washington finally decided to exert its influence in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula."

In February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt met Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud, whom Lamb describes as "a barely literate warrior-leader whose isolated kingdom mattered little except to the oil barons."

But Roosevelt was not merely seeking to establish priority for U.S. oil companies in 12 SOCIALIST ACTION this previously British domain. "Roosevelt hoped to gain support for increased Jewish immigration to Palestine," Lamb writes. "The two men [Roosevelt and the Saudi leader] got along well, and Roosevelt promised that the United States would make no policy decision on the Palestinian issue without first consulting Saudi Arabia."

Like the British before him, Roosevelt icted on the operating imperial principle "Promise them anything. • AS Lamb put 1 "It was the first of many promises that the United States would make to the Arabs in the post-war era. Few were ever kept."

The plan to establish a colonial-settler state in Palestine was linked directly to U.S. plans to displace Britain and France in the region. The United States needed a surrogate force on the scene to cope with the anti-colonial revolution in the Arab world. The Zionist leaders left Washington in no doubt as to their intentions.

In 1940, Joseph Weitz, the head of the Jewish Agency's Colonization Department who was responsible for the organization of settlements in Palestine, stated the official position: "Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country. We shall not achieve our goal if the Arabs are here in this small country. There is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to neighboring countries-all of them. Not one village, not one tribe shall be left."

On July 9, 1947, Rabbi Fischmann appeared before the United Nations Special Committee of Inquiry on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to present formally the claims of the Zionist movement. "The Promised Land," he said, "extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates. It includes parts of Syria and Lebanon."

In fact, the map presented by Fischmann to the United Nations designated all of Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan, two-thirds of Syria, half of Iraq, a third of Arabia and Egypt up to the Nile, including Cairo, as part of "Eretz Israel" —or the land of Israel.

The partition of Palestine and the sanctioning of a settler state was part of a deliberate plan to displace Great Britain as the dominant colonial power in the Arab East. To achieve this end, Harry Truman enlisted Joseph Stalin, whose collusion with the United States was essential for the estabNOVEMBER 1990 lishment of the state of Israel.

Within six months of the partitioning of Palestine and before the formal establishment of the state of Israel, the Zionist militia began the destruction of Palestinian towns and villages. In all, 800,000 people (out of a population of approximately 950,000) were expelled from their lands.

The resistance waged by the feudal Arab regimes was marked by scarcely concealed collusion. On July 21, 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan, brother of King Faisal I of Iraq, was assassinated upon discovery that he had conspired to divide Palestine between the Zionists and the Hashemite monarchy.

It was the collusion of Egypt's King Farouk with the British which inspired the Officers of the Liberation, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, to overthrow the monarchy on July 23, 1952. The wave of national pride which swept the Arab nation was directed against imperial domination in general but against the corrupt, feudal rulers in particular.

Revolt sweeps Arab world The tide of revolt swept British colonialism aside. On Oct. 19, 1954, the AngloEgyptian agreement was signed in Cairo. By June 13, 1956, the last British contingents left Egypt. Thirteen days later, President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.

It had been clear from the end of World War II that the United States had become the principal imperialist power. From 1952 to 1955, Nasser sought to come to terms with U.S. capital, seeking U.S. arms and secretly soliciting U.S. support for a settlement with Israel.

Instead, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles inaugurated the Baghdad Pact, designed specifically to counter the surge of revolt in the Arab East. On Nov. 21-22, 1955, the first conference of the signatory countries was held: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain participated. The United States was listed as an "observer" for cosmetic purposes.

The Baghdad Pact was perceived throughout the Arab world as an alliance of regimes subordinate to British and American imperialist control. In Iraq, it was greeted by riots of protest.

Time magazine (Nov. a graphic description of the mood in Iraq:

"Iraq has long been the only strongly pro-Western Arab state. This is largely the doing of astute old Premier Nuri es-Said, once an officer in the Ottoman army. His country is oil prosperous ... but mobs in the street denounce Nuri es-Said as a British stooge. Last week, open trouble broke out. For six days Arabs demonstrated in the holy city of An Najaf.... Radio Cairo boasted of open civil war in Iraq.

"Nuri es-Said jailed five opposition chieftains, including a former Justice Minister and a former President of the Chamber of Deputies for appealing to King Faisal II to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact."

Behind the scenes, however, Nuri es-Said signaled to the United States that he needed immediate help. Specifically, he sought U.S. assistance in securing the return of Iraq's southern district—that is, Kuwait—10 Iraq in order to contain a revolution whose day had come.

As Time revealed, "Iraq was, until recently, counted a British preserve. Tough old Nuri es-Said, Iraq's strongman, is Britain's best friend in the area, but under pressure of nationalists he (1) announced publicly, after the Suez invasion, that Iraq will boycott all Baghdad Pact meetings attended by Britain, and (2) told the U.S. privately that if he is to survive he must disengage from the British."

With the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, the mood throughout the Arab world was revolutionary.

Time reported on Dec. 31, 1956: "In most Arab lands of the Middle East, young army officers with revolutionary social ideas and anti-Western feelings are riding high. But they have yet to unseat Iraq's strongman, Nuri es-Said. Nuri has often been accused of being a British stooge. It took courage for him to keep Iraq in the antiCommunist Baghdad Pact along with Britain after Britain invaded Egypt."

Once again, Nuri es-Said "declared martial law, closed schools, and clapped on heavy censorship."

Radio Cairo broadcast throughout the Arab world, "The traitor is doomed." Nuri es-Said arrested 100 political leaders and court-martialed five of the most prominent. "Nuri," U.S. Ambassador Waldemar John Gallman told Time, "has ridden out the storm."

The secret deal over Kuwait What was not reported at the time, however, was Nuri es-Said's secret appeals to the British and Americans to help him placate Iraqi national sentiment by returning Kuwait to Iraq.

On March 9, 1956, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd visited Baghdad for the Consultative Meeting of the Permanent Council of the Baghdad Pact. Nuri es-Said specifically requested that Kuwait revert to Iraq as part of the union with Iraq and Jordan.

Selwyn Lloyd promised to place the matter before the British cabinet. Britain responded in typical fashion. Ambassador Michael Wright informed Nuri es-Said that "Britain is prepared to grant independence to Kuwait. As to the question of accession to Iraq, Kuwait has freedom of choice."

In April 1957, Iraqi Deputy-Prime Minister Tawfiq as-Suweidi held a meeting with the Sheikh of Kuwait, Abdallah asSalim as-Sabah, in Shtoura, Lebanon. They began negotiations on Kuwait's accession to Iraq, negotiations which were contingent upon British approval-as the Sheikh feared his removal unless British sanction were secured.

In January 1958, Nuri es-Said addressed a meeting of the Baghdad Pact, which was attended by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain as formal participants-with John Foster Dulles present. The Iraqi Prime Minister urged upon Baghdad Pact members the incorporation of Kuwait into Iraq. All present agreed with the sole exception of Great Britain, whose representative voiced opposition.

On Feb. 14, 1958, Iraq and Jordan formally federated, forming a union. In a meeting with British Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, the Union's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfiq as-Suweidi, raised the issue of Kuwait's accession to Iraq. He sought to convince the British that the "stability" of the Iraqi government would be greatly enhanced if Kuwait were to revert to Iraq.

The British evaded the request, as they had before. Once again, on May 5, 1958, Sheikh Abdallah as-Salim as-Sabah of Kuwait vis(continued on next page)

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(continued from previous page) ited Baghdad for a meeting with King Faisal Il and Nuri es-Said. The latter formally sought the Kuwaiti Sheikh's agreement for Kuwait's accession to Iraq. Again, the Sheikh agreed, subject to British acquiescence.

Accordingly, on June 5, 1958, Iraq and Jordan, in the persons of Nuri es-Said and King Hussein, raised the demand for Kuwait's accession to the union of Iraq and Jordan in a confidential memorandum addressed to the British Embassy in Baghdad.

This time the language used was not supplicatory and its presence in a formal memorandum effectively placed Britain on notice that its clients were determined to confront Britain on the subject of severance of Kuwait from Iraq.

Now Britain's two client governments declared:

"Kuwait was a territory that was subject to the sovereignty of the Ottoman State from the point of view of international law. It was a District within the jurisdiction of the Province of Basra. That sovereignty was the subject of no doubt or disagreement, either on the part of the local Kuwaiti authorities or the British authorities.

"Indeed, it was implicitly recognized by the British government in the TurkishBritish Agreement signed in London on 29 July 1913 which, in its Article VI, provided for the right of the Sheikh of Kuwait to exercise his administrative powers as an Ottoman Chief of Direction under the jurisdiction of the Province of Basra."

Iraq was now convinced that Britain was the sole obstacle to its ability to weather the gathering storm against the government of Nuri es-Said-both within Iraq and throughout the Arab world. Irag believed it could delay or dissolve the tempest by regaining Kuwait.

Iraq proceeded to inform Britain that it was preparing a formal memorandum, well supported by documents and copies of secret understandings, on the necessity for Kuwait's immediate accession to the union of Iraq and Jordan. It warned, moreover, that this memorandum would be made public on July 12 1958.

The British ambassador now informed Tawfiq as-Suweidi that Great Britain had "approved in principle" Kuwait's return to Iraq. The British requested, however, a meeting to be held in London on July 24, 1958, between Iraq's Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and the British Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the other, to work out "the details."

But Britain had stalled and lied too long. On July 14, 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in the revolution led by Abdul Karim Qassim. King Faisal II and Nuri esSaid were executed. Britain immediately abrogated the agreement regarding Kuwait. And the Union between Iraq and Jordan was broken.

Jordan's King Hussein described the impact of the overthrow of the Iragi monarche in an interview with Cable News Network on Aug. 11, 1990.

"In the 1950s, when the Arab Union existed between Jordan and Iraq, where Kuwait had not received its "independence,' the famous late Nuri es-Said, the Prime Minister of the Union, spoke to the British very forcefully that either Kuwait returned to Iraq or the Union would take some action. Within days of those final discussions, the Union collapsed with the revolution in Iraq. This is the real background to the problem."

The July 14, 1958, revolution which overthrew Nuri es-Said ended the secret agreements to return Kuwait to Iraq. There is evidence that the United States and Britain had concluded that Nuri es-Said had outlived his usefulness to his sponsors when he decided to go public, in the manner of King Ghazi, with the demand for Kuwait's return to Iraq.

The overthrow of the monarchy A recently published book titled, "Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf," by Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie (New York Times Books, 1990), describes the circumstances of the July 14 uprising.

Two years after Suez, Egypt and Syria joined, under Nasser, to form the United Arab Republic:

"The union of the Arabs, the overcoming of colonially imposed frontiers, seemed at hand.... In that heady atmosphere, a group of Arab nationalist army officers, led by General Abdul Karim Qassim, succeeded in overthrowing the Iraqi monarchy. Although the armed force that attacked the palace was small (less than 100 people) and lightly armed, the regent, Abdul Illah, failed to order the 2500-man contingent of well-armed Royal Guard ... to fight back.

"Abdul Illah's resignation and defeatism has never been satisfactorily explained. The commander of the Guard sought Abdul Illah's permission to attack the rebels. It was denied."

The regime had been left to its fate.

The book makes clear, moreover, that coconspirators Abdul Karim Qassim and Colonel Abdul-Salam Aref were regarded, notably Aref, as "containable." But now the Iraqi masses took over.

"Within an hour, a huge mob, the poor and dispossessed of Baghdad, was in the streets shouting, cheering and calling for vengeance. They raged through the city, attacking the British embassy and other tarIraqi women are mobilized to defend gets, killing several Jordanian ministers. The mob seized the body of Abdul Illah and proceed to mutilate it and drag it through the streets. When Nuri es-Said was discovered the next day, he was immediately shot."

The Boston Sunday Globe (Sept. 9, 1990) aiso shed light on these events. Jeff McConnell, an expert "on national security issues," wrote a major article titled "CIA's 'mission' against Hussein has a familiar ring to it."

The Globe article reveals that when George Bush ordered the CIA "to overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, a small circle of Americans felt a sense of deja vu. This was not the first time that the CIA had been asked to overthrow a radical Iraqi leader who was believed to oppose American interests."

McConnell points out that the coup led by Abdul Karim Qassim against Nuri es-Said did not initially alarm the CIA or Washington. Rather, it was the radicalization unleashed in the population, which obliged the regime to shift left, that mobilized the CIA.

When the Qassim government lifted the ban on the Iraqi Communist Party, "[t]his was too much for CIA officials.... CIA Director Allen Dulles hatched a plot to "incapacitate' Colonel Qassim. The job was assigned to the CIA's euphemistically named Technical Services Division, or TSD."

This was not the first attempt by the CIA to assassinate Abdul Karim Qassim, nor was it the last. The CIA's evaluation, recounted "Qassim continued to alienate both the United States and Britain. Despite Iraq's opposition, neighboring Kuwait, until then a British colony, was declared independent in 1961. Iraq had opposed Kuwait's very existence for much of the century. It looked upon Kuwait, situated on land between Iraq David Turnier and the Persian Gulf, as an artificial British creation to weaken Iraq and keep it from easy access to the Gulf. Qassim's threats to Kuwait were countered by Britain, which rushed in troops."

McConnell reveals the unrelenting campaign by the U.S. government to murder Qassim and overthrow his government. Finally, "in February 1963, everything changed," McConnell writes. "A second coup shook Iraq, ousting and killing Qassim. This was the result it [the CIA] had sought for five years. The CIA undertook an airlift of arms into Iraq to help... the coup plotters and help solidify their control among the coup plotters."

The operation to murder Qassim, according to McConnell, resulted from his "disappointing" the CIA, who, it now emerges, had arranged for Nuri es-Said to be deprived of the support of his Royal Guard in the expectation that a military coup would assuage popular anger. The popular uprising, however, forced the Qassim regime left, bringing the CIA into action to select a more pliable "replacement.'"

The leaders in the Ba'ath Party who carried out the coup for the CIA, according to McConnell, were competing for CIA favor in replacing Abdul Karim Qassim.

The origins of Saddam Hussein The group which actually replaced Qassim was dubbed "the centrists" by Bruce T. Odell, who headed the CIA airlift. "The 'centrists,' Odell confided, "were much SOCIALIST ACTI friendlier to the West. They dropped opposition to Kuwait's independence and entry into the United Nations."

McConnell also reveals an interesting twist to these events regarding a young Iraqi under Odell's direction-Saddam Hussein, a "prominent member of the right-wing faction."

In 1968, Odell's right-wing client, Saddam Hussein, and other members of his faction "defeated the "centrists'." The role of Saddam Hussein as the point man for the CIA was also disclosed by Jack Anderson on Oct. 28, 1990, in a syndicated column titled "Is Saddam Really As Bad As They Say?"

Anderson writes, "At 24, he [Saddam] unquestionably tried to assassinate Abdul Karim Qassim," describing one of the operations of the CIA in Baghdad.

Miller and Mylroie confirm these accounts. A year after Qassim overthrew the monarchy, they write, a group "tried to seize power by machine-gunning Qassim's car in broad daylight. Saddam was a member of the hit team.... He had already proven his mettle, or in the jargon of the American underworld, had 'made his bones,' by murdering a Communist supporter of Qassim in Takrit."

What ensued was a generalized slaughter of the left. Communist Party members, trade unionists, radicals of every tendency were tortured and killed, the CIA giving direction. According to Miller and Mylroie, "Saddam quickly found his place in the new regime. He became an interrogator and torturer in the Qasr-al-Nihayyah, or 'Palace of the End.""

By 1965, Saddam Hussein's older cousin, General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr became secretary-general of the Ba'ath Party, backed by Odell. By 1966, Saddam was made deputy secretary-general. On July 30, 1968, "Saddam and his Ba'athist comrades succeeded in seizing and holding state power. Bakr became President and Commander in Chief.... Saddam was made deputy-chairman of the Revolutionary Council in charge of internal security."

The relationship between the series of CIA-backed regimes in Baghdad and the posture of Iraqi governments toward imperialism centered on Kuwait. It was within days after Nuri es-Said prepared to go public with his demand for the recovery of Kuwait that he was overthrown.

The Qassim government was no less adamant about Kuwait. When Britain announced Kuwaiti "independence" in 1961, a collateral agreement between Sheikh Abdallah as-Salim as-Sabah of Kuwait and the British government was announced. Abdul Karim Qassim held a press conference on June 25, 1961, and declared:

"Iraq regards Kuwait as an integral part of its territory; it does not recognize the special relationship agreement between Britain and Kuwait signed on June 19, 1961, by Sheikh Abdallah as-Salim as-Sabah of Kuwait together with British Political Resident in the Gulf, M. G. Mead."

It was following this announcement that Britain massed forces in the Gulf and in Kuwait. From 1961 to 1963, however, Kuwait was unable to gain admission to the United Nations. After the overthrow of Abdul Karim Qassim, the "Prime Minister" of Kuwait visited Baghdad. For the first time in 30 years a joint statement was issued.

And, with the assumption of power by Saddam Hussein on July 30, 1968, a shift occurred. Hussein, in the words of current Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, "was bent upon reaching a settlement of the problem as would provide for a reasonable measure of the historic rights of Iraq as well as redress a part, limited though it might be, of the grievous wrong inflicted on Iraq since the beginning of this century."

Throughout the 1970s the regime of Saddam Hussein attempted a compromise with the Kuwaiti rulers. Iraq's only insistence was that it regain access to its former islands on the Gulf. As Tariq Aziz put it:

"During the 1970s, it was Iraq which took the initiative in approaching the rulers of Kuwait for such a settlement but, with the encouragement of their foreign power allies, they always insisted that Iraq accept the measures imposed by British colonial power."

These attempts at accommodation, however, went nowhere.

The third and last part of this series will deal with the expansion of Kuwait deeper into Iraqi territory in the 1970s (encompassing Iraqi oil fields), the ensnaring of Saddam Hussein by the Kuwaiti and Saudi monarchies to attack Iran, and the economic warfare waged against Iraq by the Sheikhs of Kuwait, the Emirates, and the Saudi monarchy.

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"Throughout the 1970s, the regime of Saddam Hussein attempted a compromise with the Kuwaiti rulers.'