Nicaragua today: Resistance, reaction, and the meaning of the general strike

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Lily counterrevolutionary opposition, the ernment remained committed to what euphemistically termed their "mixed lomy" policy-their strategic alliance the ruling Nicaraguan capitalist class, it an ever-smaller section of it. le Nicaraguan workers and peasants, ever, have maintained a virtually uninipted series of offensive and defensive ilizations for the entire period beginning i the overthrow of Somoza to the present But the essential role of Sandinista leadip throughout has been to strive to bal: itself between these mobilizations and unrelenting efforts by Nicaraguan capitaland U.S. imperialism to resist and roll ‹ the efforts of the exploited masses to ind and advance the limited conquests of r struggle.!

Hobbled by capitalist alliance he Sandinista leadership, attempting to i a course between the forces of revolu. and counterrevolution, was threatened ›ne side by Nicaraguan and world capital, which would like nothing better than to ih them along with the continuing revoonary threat; and on the other, by the ker and peasant masses who just as relessly pressed the Sandinistas to deepen revolution and resolve the question of ch class shall rule. ne of the most important lessons of his' is that such mass mobilizations cannot in indefinitely. Time is an element in the slutionary equation. Whole classes, like ividual combatants, can ultimately get n out in the course of prolonged periods eightened class struggle. In the last anal;, time is not on the side of the masses; masses must find their way through the dow of revolutionary opportunity before ruling class regains its balance and it ritably closes. • revolutionary crisis is reached when the ises can no longer endure intensified hard› and when workers in their great majorenter the field of combat. In such mass urges the intrinsic social power of the kers is manifested by generalized strikes occupations of society's workplaces. i contrast, the "almighty" capitalist class uddenly deprived of the very source of its ¡al and economic power. The workers' acity to wrest control over the economy ly from the capitalists has electrifying act on all classes. It stuns, demoralizes, nters and immobilizes the capitalists. It sires the suffering layers of the middle ises to follow the workers' example. y are also drawn onto the field of battle A penetrating analysis of 10 years of the Nicaraguan Revolution. "Nicaragua:

Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolution (176 pp.) provides the key to understanding the situation in Nicaragua today.

Written by Socialis

Action editor Alan Benjamin (in collaboration with researchers at the ITZTANI Institute in Managua), with an introduction by Rod Holt and Jeff Mackler. Price: 7.95.

ng Co., 3435 Army St., Rm. include $1 for postage.

Sandinista strikers put up barricades in Managua.

on the side of the workers to bring an end to their misery as swiftly as possible.

But the ruling class will gradually recover if the initial blow dealt them is not followed up in time with the institutionalization and consolidation of the newly revealed power of the workers and their natural allies. The least conscious layers of the workers and the middle classes will gradually tire and lose confidence in ultimately gaining a decisive victory over the oppressors. In the end, revolutionary leadership or misleadership is decisive.

The Sandinista leadership failed to follow the example of their Castroist predecessors, who made a successful transition to fuller revolutionary consciousness in the very heat of the revolution, enabling them to bring it to a victorious conclusion.

Why they failed, despite the very best of intentions, is no mystery. Castro, himself, advised the Sandinistas not to follow Cuba's example! He, in turn, was no doubt motivated by concern over the greater geographic vulnerability to imperialist invasion of Nicaragua, which, unlike Cuba, is not surrounded by an ocean.

Castro, and of course the Sandinistas, must also have correctly calculated and were probably even straight-out told by the Stalinists) that the Soviet bureaucracy would not risk granting Nicaragua the kind of assistance they gave Cuba. They knew that another socialist revolution-this time on the mainland of the Americas-would be received by U.S. imperialism with the utmost hostility. Thus, the Sandinistas, with the support of the Cuban leadership, decided to try a "middle" course.

It is even likely that they hoped to gain time until a spontaneous rise in revolutionary struggle throughout Latin America would so alter the relation of forces that social revolution in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the hemisphere might become a realistic perspective. But revolution and counterrevolution did not stand still in Nicaragua, while waiting for new revolutionary reinforcements to arrive. Moreover, the Sandinistas, consistent with their failure to extend the revolution inside Nicaragua also failed to extend it outside Nicaragua.

They thus defaulted on their responsibilities to fully aid, support and inspire the worker and peasant masses of Latin America to carry out a resolute struggle against their capitalist oppressors and exploiters at home and abroad. Instead, they followed the worst of the examples of the Cubans by carrying out a pro-capitalist foreign policy in the vain hope of neutralizing and even winning the support of "progressive" national capitalists.

Electoral defeat is qualitative A qualitative shift in the relation of class forces was registered with the electoral victory of Violeta Chamorro on Feb. 25, 1990. A turning point in the revolution no doubt occurred at least as early as Aug. 7, 1987, with the signing of the Arias Peace Plan in Esquipulas, Guatemala, by Daniel Ortega. But Chamorro's election to the Nicaraguan presidency crystallized a decisive shift from a gradual to a more rapid strengthening of the forces of counterrevolution.

One incident stands out revealing the inexorable erosion of revolutionary potential, which occurs when a decisive resolution of the class struggle in favor of the workers is unduly postponed.

Immediately after the Sandinista defeat Socialist Action noted in its March 1990 edition: "A Sandinista victory had been expected by most observers of the Nicaraguan elections. They pointed to opinion polls and to a Sandinista election rally of 800,000 in Managua on Feb. 21, the largest in Nicaraguan history, to back their prediction that the Sandinistas would win....

"But to the shock of the Sandinistas and their supporters, the Nicaraguan peoplemoved by their desire to see an end to economic deprivation and deepening hardships voted for a candidate who they believed would best deliver U.S. economic aid and hasten an end to the U.S.-contra war. "They voted with their stomachs,' is the way most observers described the vote.

'''It is clear that at least half of the 800,000 people at the [Feb. 21] closing election rally of the FSLN, and a good number of those interviewed by the pollsters, actually voted for Chamorro, ' Fernando López, a Nicaraguan election observer, told Socialist Action.

'''A large proportion of them,' López continued, 'were government employees. They were scared to publicly reveal their support for Chamorro for fear of losing their jobs if the Sandinistas won. Others were simply too embarrassed to tell. They probably considered themselves supporters of the revolution, but could not vote for six more years of economic austerity-and, besides, they saw no credible alternative "2 Counterrevolution on offensive It was a surprise to no one when the counterrevolution went on the offensive after its candidate was installed as president of Nicaragua. Neither was it a surprise when the workers mobilized almost from the outset to defend their living standards.

The "Program of Austerity and Revitalization" enacted by Chamorro's Minister of the Economy, Francisco Mayorga, called for sharp budget cuts, the elimination of tens of thousands of jobs in the state sector, the gradual reprivatization of all state farms and agricultural cooperatives, and a series of currency devaluations aimed at reaching parity between the córdoba, Nicaragua's currency, and the dollar.

At the same time, credit to small and medium farmers has been made more expensive—a policy decision aimed at driving them out of business and allowing the reconcentration of land in the hands of the largest landlords, many of whom are returning from their exile in Miami.

Since Chamorro became president on April 25, 60,000 jobs have already been lost and living standards have plummeted. So far the currency has been devalued 12 times, which has resulted in skyrocketing inflation rates.

In mid-June, the National Workers Federation (FNT) of Nicaragua initiated a general strike of all public and private-sector workers. By July 10, union leaders said that 100,000 workers were on strike. (According to The New York Times, there are 150,000 government employees alone.)

The FNT, a newly formed coalition of pro-Sandinista unions, put forward 12 demands. These included the increase of the minimum wage to $200/month; the cancel.. lation of Decrees 10-90 and 11-90, which provide for the reprivatization of state lands; the reinstatement of the Civil Service Law, which protects the jobs of tens of thousands of public employees; and the maintenance of government subsidies for public transportation, healthcare, and education.

On the barricades On Friday, July 6, three weeks after the general strike began, negotiations between Chamorro's minister of labor, Francisco Rosales, and the negotiators for the striking unions, Lucío Jimenez and Damaso Vargas, broke off. The Chamorro government adamantly refused to make any concessions to the strikers.

Then, on the afternoon of Sunday, July 8, Chamorro went on national radio and TV to urge the strikers to go back to work Monday morning. She warned that all strikers who failed to do this would be fired. Chamorro's threat outraged the strikers. That same evening thousands of people spontaneously took to the streets to shout anti-goverment slogans and to support the strikers.

In the course of these mass protests, barricades were set up in Managua's neighborhoods and main thoroughfares. Managua awoke the next day looking like it did just prior to the overthrow of Somoza.

Rodrigo Ibarra, a leader of the Movement for Revolutionary Unity (MUR) reports that in Villa Flores, one of Managua's working-class districts, 15 Sandinista members started digging up the cobblestone streets on Sunday evening. "But by Monday evening," Ibarra stated, "after the police had attempted unsuccessfully to take them down, over 200 people were on the barricades. Among them were some 40 or 50 people who we knew had voted for Chamorro and the UNO coalition."

Ibarra also explained that the workers and youth on the barricades were fully armed. "They knew instinctively," he said, "that Chamorro would call out the army, and if that failed, the contras, who had been relopartment of Chont ut an agreen etween the Fr strikers for the weapons when c forces. Those wh away. And even been disarmed, as ties, by the Sani forces.

On Monday mo were set up, the i FLN sent out it bers to try to cor order to tear them Chamorro to take of the Sandinistas.

cording to hose on the ba in this decision b that day by ENTi called on the wo Ortega, in the nat ship of the FLN to urge the strike! cades.

Ortega blamed 1 be respected. T Jimenez, who wa Ortega, also appe:

This same tensi leadership and the the surface in m Workers Associat occupy the lands the government wi the APPs [the state The peasants a 22 private farms from their leaders. the lands of the i manded that they said they were ar following througt to redistribute lanc The ATC leade peasants who occ Chamorro and the land occupations leaders backed do ants, shortly aftery takeover or left it the underlying dist A settle Soon after the b: negotiations were ment of the strike.

Throughout Tur culated througho tions had been re morro and the un announced that Vi Andrés Pérez hi "negotiated Sandinistas and th The next day t agreement betw Workers Front] : made public. It (given the monthl cent wage increas the central dema "concessions" inc! mit top Sandinista the government's! farms. Also, there three months' con state workers, ar reprisals against: public transportati tion were also rein But even these pected to be taken olutionary govern The strikers, se tive from the FSI to continue the Moreover, Humbe

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them out of business and allowing the reconcentration of land in the hands of the largest landlords, many of whom are returning from their exile in Miami.

Since Chamorro became president on April 25, 60,000 jobs have already been lost and living standards have plummeted. So far the currency has been devalued 12 times, which has resulted in skyrocketing inflation rates.

In mid-June, the National Workers Federation (FNT) of Nicaragua initiated a general strike of all public and private-sector workers. By July 10, union leaders said that 100,000 workers were on strike. (According to The New York Times, there are 150,000 government employees alone.) • The FNT, a newly formed coalition of pro-Sandinista unions, put forward 12 demands. These included the increase of the minimum wage to $200/month; the cancellation of Decrees 10-90 and 11-90, which provide for the reprivatization of state lands; the reinstatement of the Civil Service Law, which protects the jobs of tens of thousands of public employees; and the maintenance of government subsidies for public transportation, healthcare, and education.

On the barricades On Friday, July 6, three weeks after the general strike began, negotiations between Chamorro's minister of labor, Francisco Rosales, and the negotiators for the striking unions, Lucío Jimenez and Damaso Vargas, broke off. The Chamorro government adamantly refused to make any concessions to the strikers.

Then, on the afternoon of Sunday, July 8, cated in the "development poles' in the department of Chontales."

But an agreement was apparently reached between the FSLN army and police and strikers for the latter to put away their weapons when confronted by the armed forces. Those who didn't, had them taken away. And even earlier the peasantry had been disarmed, as had been many in the cities, by the Sandinista controlled armed forces.

On Monday morning, after the barricades were set up, the regional committee of the FSLN sent out its most authoritative members to try to convince the workers to tear down the barricades. They told the workers that if they didn't do this, the police would have to defy the Chamorro government's order to tear them down-and this could lead Chamorro to take the police out of the hands of the Sandinistas.

According to MUR leader Rodrigo Ibarra, those on the barricades listened patiently to the explanations by the FSLN regional leaders and some were confused. "But the overwhelming majority defied the FSLN representatives and decided to maintain the barricades," Ibarra explained. "They were buoyed in this decision by a public declaration later that day by FNT leader Lucio Jimenez, who called on the workers to resist the government with all means of struggle. This was a clear call to keep the barricades up."

On Monday night, however, Daniel Ortega, in the name of the national leadership of the FSLN, went on nationwide TV to urge the strikers to take down the barricades.

Ortega blamed the Chamorro government for provoking the strike through its austerity policies, but insisted that law and order must be respected. The next morning Lucío Jimenez, who was obviously reined in by Ortega, also appealed to the workers to tear down the barricades.

This same tension between the Sandinista leadership and the union heads had come to the surface in mid-May, when the Rural Workers Association (AT) threatened to occupy the lands of large private growers if the government went ahead and reprivatized the APPs [the state farms].

The peasants and agricultural workers on 22 private farms, not waiting for an okay from their leaders, moved swiftly to occupy the lands of the private owners. They demanded that they be given the land. They said they were angry at Chamorro for not following through on her election promise to redistribute land to the peasants.

The ATC leadership initially backed the peasants who occupied the land, but when Chamorro and the FSLN insisted that these land occupations were "illegal," the ATC leaders backed down and many of the peasants, shortly afterward, either ended their land takeover or left it to the courts to adjudicate the underlying dispute.

A settlement is reached Soon after the barricades were taken down, negotiations were begun to reach a settlement of the strike.

Throughout Tuesday, July 10, rumors cirarmy, had warned early Wednesday morning that he would use the armed forces to impose law and order against the "left-wing and right-wing extremists."

This was the second time in the three months since Violeta Chamorro took office that the unions were forced to strike to try to prevent the government from dismantling many of the hard-won gains of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

The earlier nationwide strike of public workers had begun on May 10 and ended six days later. Strikers had demanded a 200 percent increase in wages and the maintenance of the civil service law guaranteeing no firings of Sandinista government workers. This law was enacted by the Ortega government just prior to Chamorro's election.

The strike settlement, then, also included an insignificant 60 percent wage increase for public workers, representing almost nothing when you take into account the skyrocketing inflation rate. And the strikers were forced back to work without any guarantee of job protection-and with little else—leaving many of them demoralized. 1 Rearguard actions or new upsurge?

How is the changed relation of class forces expressed in Nicaragua today? How does it effect the fighting mood of the workers and peasants? And what are the prospects for a renewed struggle to regain the offensive and deepen the revolution?

The Sandinista leadership has definitively committed itself to collaboration with the counterrevolutionary Chamorro government and its "Program of Austerity and Revitalization." The Nicaraguan capitalists and their imperialist sponsors welcome this collaboration. They have everything to gain from the assistance they are getting from the Sandinista leaders and the army and police, which are for the moment still under Sandinista control.

The capitalist electoral victory has qualitatively enhanced the capability of imperialism to directly intervene to put down resistance by the Nicaraguan masses to counterrevolution. The election gives imperialism's phony pretense for military intervention, "in defense 'of democracy," more credibility. Concomitantly, the likelihood of massive resistance by the American people to direct U.S. military intervention, is also considerably reduced.

This major change in the objective situation undoubtedly contributes further to the Sandinista leadership's decision to collaborate with the counterrevolution. There can be no doubt, however, that they are motivated by a concern to gain the best from a very bad situation. But just as their earlier policy of holding back the revolution was wrong-and led to the qualitative shift in favor of counterrévolution—it is just as wrong today to help undermine worker resistance.

Thousands of armed contras are now positioned inside Managua and other major cities. Many have already been incorporated into the army and police and will polarize the demoralized elements there around themselves. This, in turn, will contribute to the breakdown of the strong bonds of solidarity between Sandinista soldiers and their worker and peasant sisters and brothers.

And within the civilian population, the armed contras now constitute the core around which the shock-troops of the counterrevolutionary forces will be formed.

These big changes in the relation of class forces have shown their effects in the two national strikes just ended. While a militant vanguard of strikers has shown its willingness to take to the barricades to mount a struggle to defend the gains of the revoluuon, they constituted a relatively small minority of the working class. The hundreds of thousands-and more-who had participated in demonstrations, marches and rallies in previous mobilizations have been reduced to a few thousands, in addition to strikers, in the two recent national strikes.

It is extremely unlikely that more than rearguard actions will be possible in Nicaragua based on the relation of forces inside Nicaragua alone. Only a major class upsurge outside Nicaragua-altering class relationships on an international scale, especially in Latin America—can reasonably be expected to open up the possibility of a renewed revolutionary offensive in Nicaragua.

Proletarian revolutionists in Nicaragua will undoubtedly be on guard against misreading the objective possibilities for a new revolutionary upsurge.

It is absolutely imperative to take whatever actions are necessary to preserve the fighting capabilities of the proletarian vanguard. The nucleus of a new revolutionary proletarian leadership can be built in this most difficult time. But it cannot be done by throwing caution to the winds. Intelligently organized resistance to the counterrevolution is absolutely imperative.

The cadre of a future mass revolutionary workers' party in Nicaragua will be alert to provocations that are certain to come when imperialism believes mass resistance has been sufficiently reduced so as to permit a final bloody settling of accounts with the best of the class struggle fighters.

Of course, it's better to go down fighting than not to fight at all, but it is even better to struggle to hold our fighting forces together while avoiding deadly traps set in our path, and be prepared for the next big battles, on more favorable ground, which are certain to come.

Footnotes: 1-For documentation of this process see "Nicaragua: Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolution," by Alan Benjamin (San Francisco, Walnut Publishing Co., Inc., 1988). 2—See "Why Sandinistas Lost Elections in Nicaragua," by Alan Benjamin, March 1990 Socialist Action. 3—See June 1990 issue of Socialist Action for analysis of the May public employees' general

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nce, reaction, eneral strike