Essential reading

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To order, write to: Walnut Publishing Co., 3435 Army St., Rn 308, San Francisco, CA 94110. Include $1 for postage.

SOCIALIST ACTION AUGUST 1990 basics, of a Tintin Revolu by Loat order, write to: Walnut 308, San Francisco, CA A penetrating analysis of 10 years of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

"Nicaragua:

Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolutio (176 pp.) provides th key to understanding the situation in Nicaragua today.

Written by Socialis Action editor Alan Benjamin (in collaboration with researchers at the ITZTANI Institute in Managua), with an introduction by Rod Holt and Jeff Mackler. Price: 7.95. probably even straight-out told by the Stalinists) that the Soviet bureaucracy would not risk granting Nicaragua the kind of assistance they gave Cuba. They knew that another socialist revolution-this time on the mainland of the Americas-would be received by U.S. imperialism with the utmost hostility. Thus, the Sandinistas, with the support of the Cuban leadership, decided to try a "middle" course.

It is even likely that they hoped to gain time until a spontaneous rise in revolutionary struggle throughout Latin America would so alter the relation of forces that social revolution in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the hemisphere might become a realistic perspective. But revolution and counterrevolution did not stand still in Nicaragua, while waiting for new revolutionary reinforcements to arrive. Moreover, the Sandinistas, consistent with their failure to extend the revolution inside Nicaragua also failed to extend it outside Nicaragua.

They thus defaulted on their responsibilities to fully aid, support and inspire the worker and peasant masses of Latin America to carry out a resolute struggle against their capitalist oppressors and exploiters at home and abroad. Instead, they followed the worst of the examples of the Cubans by carrying out a pro-capitalist foreign policy in the vain hope of neutralizing and even winning the support of "progressive" national capitalists.

Electoral defeat is qualitative A qualitative shift in the relation of class forces was registered with the electoral victory of Violeta Chamorro on Feb. 25, 1990. A turning point in the revolution no doubt observers described the vote.

'''It is clear that at least half of the 800,000 people at the [Feb. 21] closing election rally of the FSLN, and a good number of those interviewed by the pollsters, actually voted for Chamorro,' Fernando López, a Nicaraguan election observer, told Socialist Action.

''' A large proportion of them,' López continued, 'were government employees. They were scared to publicly reveal their support for Chamorro for fear of losing their jobs if the Sandinistas won. Others were simply too embarrassed to tell. They probably considered themselves supporters of the revolution, but could not vote for six more years of economic austerity—and, besides, they saw no credible alternative.''2 Counterrevolution on offensive It was a surprise to no one when the counterrevolution went on the offensive after its candidate was installed as president of Nicaragua. Neither was it a surprise when the workers mobilized almost from the outset to defend their living standards.

The "Program of Austerity and Revitalization" enacted by Chamorro's Minister of the Economy, Francisco Mayorga, called for sharp budget cuts, the elimination of tens of thousands of jobs in the state sector, the gradual reprivatization of all state farms and agricultural cooperatives, and a series of currency devaluations aimed at reaching parity between the córdoba, Nicaragua's currency, and the dollar.

At the same time, credit to small and medium farmers has been made more expensive-a policy decision aimed at driving

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