Socialist Action (US)

The monthly paper of Socialist Action, San Francisco, 1983–2010

Eastern strike

Socialist Action, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1990 · scan p. 21 · Malik Miah · about 1,698 words

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Lessons for working people Eastern Airlines machinists have been on strike for one year. 20 SOCIALIST ACTION MARCH 1990 up on ity March 4 marks the first anniversary of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) strike against Eastern Airlines. Despite the claims of Texas Air Chairman Frank Lorenzo, the corporate owner of Eastern Airlines, the machinist strike has dealt blows to his plans to build the largest non-union airline empire in the world.

In 1986 the combined market share of Texas Air's two airlines-Continental and Eastern—was the largest in the country. Today Texas Air ranks fourth, with 12.7 percent of the market. Its debt of $5.1 billion is one of the highest in the industry.

The rank and file IAM strikers have displayed tremendous heroism and determination throughout the strike. They have inspired broad support throughout the airline industry and among other unions and union supporers.

But the strikers' determination has not been enough to force Lorenzo to the bargaining table, or force Texas Air to sell the company to someone who would negotiate with the unions.

At this stage of the strike, prospects for victory are slim. An important layer of strike activists continue to fight and defend their dignity. These workers want to bring Lorenzo down, making him pay a big price for his union-busting. They need the solidarity of all supporters of unionism.

The IAM strikers have refused to be broken by Lorenzo. While many workers have lost marriages, homes, and other personal possessions, few became scabs.

Lorenzo had made clear at the outset of the strike that no union members would be allowed to work for Eastern-except on his terms. After two years of working under Lorenzo's rule of organized terror, the strikers knew what Lorenzo's terms were. They didn't want any part of it.

The question for them was simple: stand and fight or lose all self-respect and move to another job. The overwhelming majorchose the first course.

Unprecedented unity

The unity of the three unions at Eastern— the IAM, the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), and the flight attendants' Transport Workers Union (TWU)-was unprecedented.

It was not anticipated by the owners of Eastern or the Bush government. It was the primary reason less than 10 percent of the flights were scheduled the first three months of the strike. That early success helped to isolate Lorenzo in the public's eye and aided the consumer boycott of Eastern and Continental.

Lorenzo was shocked by the pilots actions. He assumed he could replace the machinists and flight attendants. But he needed the pilots.

I asked a co-worker of mine at United, who was a long-time shop steward at Eastern's Miami maintenance base but was fired 15 months before the strike for his union activity, why he thought the pilots and flight attendants went on sympathy strikes.

"They had no choice but to walk," he said. "Like us, they knew if Lorenzo broke us, they would be next."

Lorenzo underestimated the pilots and flight attendants. The ALPA and TWU were ready to strike. The action of the highly paid pilots was a big surprise to those outside of Eastern. But according to Capt. Lew Baldwin, as told to Matt Witt of Airline Pilot, the pilots had been polled before the strike and were ready to walk out.

"In applying the lessons of Continental," where the unions were broken by Lorenzo in Malik Miah is a mechanic at United Air Lines in San Francisco and a member of IAM Local Lodge 1781. 1983, Baldwin said, "Eastern pilots saw they had two choices: (1) to let Lorenzo continue to destroy pilot job security by taking the airline apart, breaking IAM, and then attacking the ALPA contract, or (2) supporting other Eastern employees to bring about a change in the course of the company."

Once the pilots went out, the long struggle was on. The question became who could hold out longer and if the IAM leadership could tap the sentiment of the ranks and other IAM members to keep the scabs off LOREN Eastern property and force Lorenzo to negotiate with the unions.

Lorenzo and government in bed Lorenzo's goal was to rebuild a smaller nonunion Eastern. Even before the strike began, he had started selling off Eastern assets, and this accelerated after the walkout. He has sold aircraft, gates, routes, and a majority interest in the System One computer reservation system.

The Bush administration came to Lorenzo's aid by siding with Lorenzo from day one of the conflict. After Lorenzo turned down the IAM officials' call for arbitration, Bush rejected a National Mediation Board (NMB) request that he intervene under the Railway Labor Act to delay the strike for 60 days. 'In 211 previous cases," wrote the Airline Pilot, "every president since 1928 had always agreed to such an NMB recommendation."

In November Bush vetoed a Congressional decision to establish a "blue-ribbon" panel to investigate and recommend solutions for the conflict at Eastern. And in December the General Services Administration, with Labor Department blessing, granted Eastern a $120 million contract.

Many Texas Air top employees Reagan administration and Bush supporters.

Lorenzo feels he's in good hands and can wait out the strike despite the record losses Eastern and Texas Air suffered in 1989$885.6 million.

Officials' response

How have the IAM top leadership responded to Lorenzo's and the government's attacks? What policy have they followed to win the strike?

The IAM international leadership have not Joseph Ryan/Socialist Action tapped the rank and file's militancy to push Lorenzo to the wall. Instead, from day one, the strategy of the officialdom has been to find another airline boss to buy Eastern from Texas Air, while pressuring the government and the courts to intervene against Lorenzo.

A new owner was almost found in April. Former Baseball Commissioner Peter Ueberroth reached a tentative agreement with the IAM which included major concessions from Eastern workers. Lorenzo balked and the deal fell through.

Unfortunately, the IAM officials have maintained that dead-end strategy-looking for a friendly businessman to buy Eastern.

They have sought to get labor "friends" in Congress to pressure Bush to intervene. These Democratic Party politicians have been no real help. The biggest problem with this perspective is it tells the IAM membership that a resolution of the conflict is dependent on the courts and government and not their own actions.

Opportunities to extend the strike have been missed. Most important is the failure to tap the anti-Lorenzo sentiment of other airline workers. No preparation was done at airlines such as Northwest and United to take demonstrative actions for the Eastern strike before and after it began. Sympathy among rail workers was also not organized into any meaningful solidarity actions.

What needed to be done to aid the fight and move it forward was to reach out to all airline workers, other transportation workers, and working people in general to take militant action to keep the scabs from working Eastern planes.

Other solidarity actions within the transportation industry-sympathy strikes at other airlines or rail carriers-would have put pressure on Lorenzo to settle with the IAM. While this is not likely today, it was what was needed to force Lorenzo to negotiate with the IAM.

At the beginning of the strike such broad action was possible. Airline workers would have been open to doing more if the IAM leadership clearly explained before the strike why broad united action was needed to win. That was lacking in the 1981 PATCO (air traffic controllers) strike broken by Reagan. We needed to build on the unity of the IAM/ALPA/TWU members at Eastern.

Several months into the strike, lacking a fighting perspective to shut down Eastern and broaden the strike, strike activities became focused on convincing consumers not to fly Eastern and Continental. As effective as the boycott tactic has been, it hasn't been enough to keep Eastern aircraft from flying.

The focus of the fight now-for both the officialdom and ranks of the IAM— is liquidation of Eastern. A battle on this level reflects the anger of the workers who have lost their jobs and want revenge against Lorenzo.

But the failure of the IAM policy (which was supported by ALPA and TWU officials) must be noted and discussed.

The ALPA and TWU leaderships decided to call off their sympathy strikes in November. They came to the conclusion that it was no longer possible to win the strike. The likelihood of a union Eastern seemed remole.

The union officials and many of the ranks believe that beating Lorenzo today means to bust up his empire. But that won't minimize the failure to win union contracts at Eastern. Nor will it get any of the former Eastern employees their jobs back.

Pittston example

An important example of a better way to conduct a strike was seen in the Pittston coal strike. The United Mineworkers Union (UMWA) went on strike against a union-busting coal operator a few weeks after the Eastern workers went on strike. Ten months later they came out victorious. [See story, page 18.] By using militant pickets, refusing to accept court injunctions (and incurring $64 million in fines), and winning over local communities, they forced the owners of Pittston, the courts, and government to back down. They organized Camp Solidarity where other workers, including Eastern strikers, came to express support for the miners and receive solidarity in turn.

While the new Pittston contract contains some concessions, miners won a big advance from what Pittston first demanded. They gained what they did because they didn't let the anti-labor laws deter them from winning their fight. It is an example from which all workers can learn.

Turmoil in the airline industry It is important to place the strike at Eastern in the broader context of the airline industry. A generalized shakeout is underway that affects all airline workers.

While the problems of Texas Air are severe, exacerbated by the Eastern strike, other carriers are in deep trouble. "Troubling Times in the US Airline Industry" reports the Feb. 26 New York Times. The industry is expanding rapidly even as profits decline.

(continued on page 17)

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MATA CONTE LAR LON COMON PORTS AGAINST EASTERN

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