A critical assessment of the

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Sandinista Revolution John Weeks, Professor of International Economics, Middlebury College:

"For those who look for new thinking on Nicaragua, 'Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolution' is necessary reading. Alan Benjamin offers a well-argued answer to the question, where does the revolution go from • Joe Ricciardi, Economist, academic visitor, Central Bank of Nicaragua:

Professor James Rhodes, Luther College (Library Journal):

"Benjamin provides a tighily argued and carefully documented case for u he terms 'an incomplete revolution' This book is unique in that it assesses impact of U.S. policy within the Nicaraguan political system."

"Nicaragua: Dynamics of an Unfinished Revolution"

researchers at Managua's ITZTANI Institute, 186 pp. Introduction by Rod Holt and Jeff Mackler. To order, send $8.95 (includes $1 postage) to:

Walnut Publishing Co., 3435 Army St., Rm. 308, San Francisco, CA 94110.

SOCIALIST ACTION MARCH 1990 5 the Sandinistas had vowed never to accept. Gorbachev was anxious to demonstrate his willingness to help resolve "regional conflicts" in exchange for increased imperialist credits and investment in the Soviet Union.

Joseph C. Harsch, in an article in the Feb. 6, 1988, Christian Science Monitor, fully captured the role of the Soviet bureaucracy:

"One of the more interesting facts on the world scene now is that Moscow is not saving Daniel Ortega Saavedra. Mr. Ortega, the president of Nicaragua, is in political retreat under the pressures that forced him to lift his state of emergency, permit opposition rallies, and release some of his political prisoners. None of this would have happened had Moscow given him the economic and military support for which he has repeatedly asked.

"The Soviets' biggest omission has been in the supply of oil.... Soviet oil or Soviet money for oil would make it possible for Mr. Ortega to defy his neighbors and the Arias peace plan that he has been forced to accept. He has not been able to defy them."

Harsch, an editorial writer for the Monitor, went on to fully describe Soviet policy toward Nicaragua. He then concluded: "The chances are that Soviet neglect damaged the Sandinista cause more, perhaps much more, than the contras and the U.S. boycott did."

Sandinista responsibility

The biggest problem with the explanations advanced by most solidarity activists concerning Chamorro's victory is that they let the Sandinista leaders totally off the hook for their responsibility in paving the way for this historic defeat.

The Sandinistas persisted in maintaining a capitalist mixed economy-even when it became crystal clear that the Nicaraguan capitalists, who were subsidized by the Sandinista government to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars per year, were taking the money out of the country instead of investing it productively in the economy.

According to a report published by the Managua-based CRIES Research Institute in 1988, the flight of capital between 1979, the Nicaragua by Alt- Baalemin "A useful treatment of Nicaragua's mixed economy." Moisés Hassan (former Sandinista leader and ex-mayor of Managua):

"In a short space, Alan Benjamin has selected the essential issues facing the Nicaraguan Revolution and presented a coherent analysis of the social forces in contention over the past decade.

"Foreign observers who support the revolution tend to uncritically echo the policy positions of the Sandinista leadership, thereby doing a disservice to the revolution itself. Benjamin has avoide this pitfall. He is not afraid to approach the problems confronting the revolution and to offer an alternative solution to the crisis facing Nicaragua."

'ha. the the Sandinistas' concertación implemented in the past-but to no avail.

It is quite natural that in this context, a majority of the Nicaraguan people, seeing no way out of the economic crisis other than reliance on the U.S. government, should opt for the candidate who could best secure a deal with U.S. imperialism: Violeta Chamorro. Why vote for Ortega when Chamorro is most likely to deliver the goods?

A new situation Whether the United States will be able to deliver the goods to the Nicaraguan people— at least at the hoped-for levels—is another matter.

U.S. policymakers, who have funded the contras and their 1990 election campaign, will obviously fully support the Chamorro government. It is their creature. But, surprisingly, in the two days following the elections, numerous U.S. government spokespersons and economic advisers warned that economic aid to Nicaragua would be moderate and "far below expectations."

They argued that U.S. investors were more anxious to penetrate into Eastern Europe than Nicaragua, and that in the days of mounting budget deficits, the economic aid trough had all but dried up. Obviously, to the extent the Nicaraguan people do not see an improvement in their standard of living under Chamorro, social unrest is bound to resume at some undetermined point in the future.

But whatever happens in the long term, one thing is certain. The Nicaraguan Revolution-and the entire world revolutionary movement-has been dealt a tremendous blow. Absorbing the lessons of this defeat will be essential for the next wave of revolutionists in Nicaragua and for all those around the world seeking to advance the struggle for socialism.

For reasons of space, part IV of Linda Thompson's series on the environment will be published in our April issue.