U.S. steps up provocations aimed at overturning Nicaraguan Revolution

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The U.S. ruling class continues to show its determination to overthrow the Nicaraguan Revolution by any means necessary.

After invading Panama, U.S. occupying troops forcibly entered the Nicaraguan ambassador's residence on Dec. 29, violating his diplomatic immunity. The Sandinista government charged that this act was aimed at provoking the ambassador into an armed confrontation that could be used to justify a U.S. inyasion of Nicaragua.

The illegal search of the ambassador's residence, later dismissed as a "screw-up" by President Bush, resulted in the expulsion of 20 U.S. diplomats from Nicaragua. Predictably, the U.S. government responded by warning that fair elections could not take place in Nicaragua in the absence of these U.S. diplomats, whose main job was to "monitor" the elections.

This incident is only the latest in a series of provocations against Nicaragua.

In violation of the Tela Agreement reached by the five Central American presidents last August, which called for the demobilization of the contra forces by Dec. S, the U.S. government-with full bipartisan supportcontinued to pump U.S. tax dollars to the contras.

Bush argued that U.S. funding to the contras would not stop until after the Feb. 25, 1990, elections in Nicaragua-assuming that the United States would certify these elections to be "fair."

At the same time, the U.S. government encouraged contra troops to cross the Honduran border into Nicaragua to intimidate Sandinista supporters and to mobilize anti-government voters. The State Department acknowledges that close to 5000 contra troops have been illegally infiltrated into Nicaragua.

When the Nicaraguan government justifiably responded to this provocation by ending the cease-fire with the contras, Washington let out all the stops in its condemnation of the Sandinistas. And it proceeded to attempt to discredit the upcoming national elections, talsely claiming that "Sandinista mobs" were harassing "peaceful anti-government protesters."

Retreating under pressure

The Sandinista government's response to these escalated attacks has been one of conWounded Sandinista, Matagalpa Department, 1985.

cessions and retreat. At "peace talks" in Washington on Nov. 14 between Sandinista and contra negotiators, for example, the Sandinista government dropped its demand that the contras disband, proposing instead that they simply leave Nicaragua.

The contras only became emboldened by this Sandinista concession. They rejected the offer and demanded that they be allowed to relocate in designated areas inside Nicaragua. What they could not gain militarily on the field, they insisted they be granted at the negotiating table!

A week later, the Sandinistas offered still another concession in the hope of reinstating the cease-fire agreement. They called on the contras to pull back 2300 troops from Nicaragua, thereby allowing approximately 2700 contras to remain inside Nicaragua. But the contras would have no part of this partial retreat-and no cease-fire agreement was reached.

Following the Malta conference between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, the Sandinistas came under increased pressure to make concessions to the imperialists. The New York Times reports (Dec. 7) that following the Malta summit, the Soviet ambassador to Nicaragua personally visited Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega to demand that the Sandinistas halt all logistic and political support to the FMLN fighters in El Salvador.

The meaning of the Malta meeting, where Bush and Gorbachev agreed to settle "regional conflicts," was not lost on the FMLN combatants. The Boston Globe reports (Dec. 1) that "in recent interviews, Salvadoran rebel leaders have acknowledged that Gorbachev's policies of reform, coupled with changes in Eastern Europe, have deleas 'the product of democratic, pluralistic and participatory processes.' Even Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, who only last month was linked to a shipment of arms to the Salvadoran rebels, was pushed into signing the declaration.

"It was a remarkable victory for the rightist government of El Salvador, which has recently been criticized for its human rights record and conduct of the civil war. 'Unbelievable,' said Senator Christopher Dodd, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western hemisphere and peace corps affairs. 'It removes the political legitimacy of the FMILN."

An alternative strategy needed No amount of concessions will ever satisfy the imperialist colossus in Washington. On the contrary, every concession granted only whets the imperialists' appetite for more.

The FSLN government, if it is to defend the gains of the revolution and meet the needs of the Nicaraguan people, must directly take on the contras and their internal allies-the capitalists and landlords. This will require embarking upon a socialist course-such as the one taken by Fidel Castro and the leadership of the Cuban Revolution in the early 1960s. Unless it moves forward, the revolution will continue to retreat—and ultimately be defeated.

But even if it were to move in a socialist direction, the Nicaraguan Revolution could not survive in isolation. The FSLN government must therefore pursue a policy of extending the revolution to the rest of Central America and Latin America. The fate of the revolution is inextricably tied to the struggles in these countries—primarily the struggle in neighboring El Salvador.