Soviet Union pushes 'peaceful co-existence' in southern Africa

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South African Defense Force withdrawing from Angola. What battlefield may be given to them at the negotiating table.

Has "detente" come to southern Africa? In recent months, the Soviet Union has held several meetings with South African officials. The Soviets point out that a diplomatic settlement is possible in the region on terms highly favorable to the apartheid regime. And the South Africans are responding.

The negotiations could have an effect on the outcome of several conflicts, including the right-wing guerrilla wars against the governments of Angola and Mozambique. Ultimately, the Soviets suggest, an accommodation could be arranged between anti-apartheid fighters in the African National Congress (ANC) and the regime in Pretoria itself.

The first stage of a regional settlement, in fact, has already been put into place. On April 1, a transitional period begins in the South African colony of Namibia, when United Nations Resolution 435 comes into effect. The resolution, first adopted in 1978, prescribes a step-by-step process to set up an independent Namibian state.

The implementation of Resolution 435 was made possible under a "protocol" that was signed on Dec. 22, 1988, by South Africa, Angola, and Cuba at the United Nations in New York. The Soviet Union played an important behind-the-scenes role in engineering the pact.

No less than Chester Crocker, the U.S. representative in the negotiations, lauded the work of the Soviet officials. He stated that the protocol "constitutes a very remarkable textbook case of American-Soviet cooperation to recognize the current historical realities and resolve a regional problem." (Le Figaro, Dec. 24, 1988)

South Africa gets Under the terms of the Dec. 22 accord, Cuba-which was instrumental last year in defeating the South African invasion of southern Angola-agreed to redeploy its troops toward the north of Angola. By July 1, 1991, Cuban troops will be pulled out of the country entirely.

In exchange, the South African Defense Force must abandon its bases in northern Namibia (which borders Angola). This would presumably prevent the South Africans from providing military aid to its allies in Angola, the UNITA terrorist forces.

Under Resolution 435, thousands of U.N. "peacekeeping" troops and observers will be sent to Namibia to supervise the November 1989 constituent assembly elections there.

But South Africa has received important concessions. A Pretoria-appointed administrator will share responsibility with the United Nations for the implementation of Resolution 435. The colonial administrator is solely in charge of maintaining "law and order."

South Africa will retain a military presence in the southern portions of Namibia and it Will continue to dominate the country's economy. South Africa, for example, claims sovereignty over Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port.

"Peace" in South Africa?

Also as part of the deal, the African National Congress (ANC) agreed to close down its guerrilla bases and refugee camps in Angola-as well as in Namibia. Over 6000 ANC fighters and their families must now find refuge in Tanzania or another country far from the "frontline" states bordering South Africa.

The Soviet Union undoubtedly had a major role in convincing the ANC to withdraw from Angola. And in recent weeks, according to numerous reports, Moscow has raised the stakes. The ANC has been asked to back off from its strategy of guerrilla warfare against the South African regime and to seek negotiations with Pretoria.

"In our opinion, we doubt that revolution in South Africa is possible, if you're talking of revolutionaries storming Pretoria," said Boris A. Asoyan, deputy chief of the Department of African Countries in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. "There is really no alternative to a peaceful solution." (The New This anti-apartheid front would include members of the capitalist class and their political parties (such as the "liberal" Progressive Federal Party). Therefore, the struggle of workers against the capitalist class must be put off to the indefinite future. And "liberal" whites must be granted guarantees against domination by the Black majority.

Gleb Starushenko outlined the Stalinist viewpoint quite succinctly in a June 1986 speech: "Communists do not advance at the present stage of social development any other slogans but general democratic ones. They believe that the restructuring of South African society along socialist lines is a matter of the future and will be possible only after the conditions are ripened." (Free Azania, Special Issue 1987)

The ANC's dilemma According to this view, the ANC must be on constant guard against "adventurist" elements that wish to carry the struggle "too far." In the words of Starushenko: "The ANC is a factor of stability. If it is destroyed, the more radical left will take its place." (The Star, Johannesburg, July 25, 1988)

The ANC is caught in a dilemma. If it is to keep its influence among the Black masses (and outflank the "more radical left") the ANC must maintain its image of an organization of activists and fighters against apartheid. But the Soviets now urge the ANC to take a different course: one of negotiations and blatant concessions to Pretoria.

Already, there have been reports of resistance inside both the ANC and the South African Communist Party to the "new thinking" expressed by Soviet officials.

Even if this is so, it is not likely to deter the Soviet bureaucracy-which has bigger fish to fry than just the freedom struggle in southern Africa. Ultimately, Moscow is seeking a broad detente with the United States itself.

The Soviet bureaucrats want to prove "regional conflicts partners in settling themselves willing advantageous to U.S. imperialism. In return, they hope, the United States will ease up on the military and economic pressure it places upon the Soviet Union.

All the rope it needs The U.S. government, for its part, is willing to give the Soviet Union all the rope it needs to hang its allies in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. While Chester Crocker was showering praise on the Soviet Union for a job well done in Angola, for example, George Bush was promising redoubled aid to the UNITA rebel force there.

The U.S. Army has carried out joint military maneuvers with Zaire with the longterm objective of providing UNITA with logistical support for a new base in northern Angola. According to the journal Africa Confidential, UNITA is already making use of some 60 experts in explosives who were trained by U.S. advisers together with the Nicaraguan contras.

As in Nicaragua, the Bush administration has not given up hope that UNITA can apply enough pressure on the Angolan government to force it to agree to a coalition government.

In the meantime, Angola has been given a carrot by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It may obtain more loans and credit in return for pursuing a government plan to loosen price controls, privatize some sectors of the economy, and open up the country to private capital.

In Namibia, likewise, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)— which stands to win a majority of seats in the new constituent assembly-has pledged to maintain a "mixed (capitalist) economy." Soviet officials encourage this course, stating that it's not possible to "build socialism" there. (The New York Times, Feb. 20, 1989)

Meanwhile, South African Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha recently suggested another settlement on the Angolan/Namibian model-this time on Africa's east coast.

Botha pointed out that the Soviet Union could be brought in to help broker a pact between the government of Mozambique and the cutthroat RENAMO rebel troops. In the past, RENAMO has been financed by South Africa and by ultra-conservatives with murky ties to U.S. military intelligence.

"If we could do it in the west," Botha said, "why can't we do it in the east?" And why not, indeed? If the Soviet bureaucracy is willing to cut a deal—and it no doubt is very willing—the forces of reaction could make great gains in Mozambique.