Right-wing victory assures showdown despite FMLN appeal for negotiations

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Roberto D'Aubuisson, architect of the Death Squads and founder of the ARENA Party, now officially calls the shots in El Salvador. March 18 CISPES protests Thousands of antiwar activists demonstrated in cities all across the country on Saturday, March 18. The actions were organized by the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) to Above: Demonstrators surround the U.S. Federal Building in New SOCIALIST ACTION APRIL 1989 3 The willingness of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) to make dramatic concessions to the country's rulers produced no agreement for a postponement of the elections, and on March 19 Alfredo Cristiani, candidate of the right-wing ARENA party, won the presidency as expected.

Cristiani defeated Christian Democratic (PDC) candidate Fidel Chavez Mena and the left's Democratic Convergence (CD) candidate Guillermo Ungo. Cristiani won close to 54 percent of the votes cast-said by the government to be less than 40 percent of the electorate-and avoided a run-off. Ungo finished fourth with less than 4 percent of the vote.

The United States has pursued its war in El Salvador under the guise of supporting the political "center." This "centrist" showcase has been a pillar of Washington's Central American policy. The ARENA victory could shatter it.

That's why Cristiani has tried to portray a more moderate image than ARENA's real leader, death-squad architect Roberto D'Aubuisson. ARENA has worked hard to cultivate this new image. ARENA leaders haven't forgotten the millions of dollars that the U.S. poured into the coffers of the PDC to defeat D'Aubuisson in the 1984 election.

The major U.S. media have helped ARENA, portraying a "pragmatic" and "moderate" Cristiani and referring to the "new face of the right." Still, a few stories describing the true character of Cristiani have found their way into the press. One article describes him as a man who has workers at his San Vicente coffee plantation living "in dirt-floor shacks under crushing poverty," and who raised their wages only after FMLN threats to attack the farm. (Boston Globe, March 22, 1989)

FMLN proposal rejected The elections took place against the backdrop of an FMLN peace proposal. The FMLN offered, as a "first step toward seeking agreement and generating conditions that make the road to peace irreversible," to participate in the elections if they were postponed for six months.

This was later expanded to include a "definitive" laying down of arms, an agreement to "incorporate into the nation's political life," and recognition of "the existence of a single army" that did not include FMLN forces.

But the Salvadoran rulers ultimately rejected this proposal. Despite broad discussions at the end of February, and much maneuvering, the PDC government of outgoing president Jose Napoleon Duarte and ARENA finally decided to hold the elections as scheduled.

Each of these players had something to lose by postponement. The PDC, who expected to face ARENA in a run-off, saw a risk of opening up that opportunity for the CD instead.

ARENA wanted to say no all along, but was forced to go along with some negotiations "by the proximity of the elections and international pressure," suggested Rene Roldan, vice-presidential candidate of the CD. ARENA saw victory as already theirs; postponement might have snatched it from them.

Army Chief of Staff Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce charged that the proposal was a cynical attempt by the FMLN to fuel divisions within the army, destabilize the existing political order, and set a precedent for ignoring constitutional requirements. The army hinted that, if the proposal was accepted, they might stage a coup. "They wouldn't have to think about it half an hour," a top government official told The Christian Science Monitor.

Disruption campaign intensifies With the rejection, the FMLN renewed its campaign to disrupt the elections. In the week preceding the election, FMILN leaders emphasized their opposition through what was termed "an impressive show of force" by the U.S. media. They cut off electricity to 90 percent of the country, blew up state vehicles parked on city streets, and raided army installations. On March 15 they fired rocketlaunched grenades at soldiers near the National Palace in the capital.

These attacks were coupled with a guerrilla ban on transportation. The FMLN vowed that vehicles on roads would be "turned into flames or blown to pieces." This effectively cut off many towns and cities across the country; military trucks had to be used to carry many Salvadorans to work.

In addition, the FMLN's "urban militias" announced plans to sabotage polling places and "later annihilate the personnel who allow themselves to be used in this farce." The FMLN General Command later denied that officials to stay away from the polls. This suggests some split over tactics.

These PMLN actions brought harsh criticisms from their political arm, allied in the CD. Ruben Zamora is said to have flown to Nicaragua to urge FMLN commanders to lift the transportation ban and not interfere with the voting. Just days before the election, he characterized the FMLN attacks as "a political game. ... We express our opposition to the strike as a negative influence. It is not right."

Guillermo Ungo denounced the FMLN's boycott of the election. He said that encouraging abstention was an "error" that would help ARENA secure a victory. But the FMLN's Ana Guadalupe Martinez characterized these criticisms as a "temporary separation" within the alliance, which has "autono my of tactics. "

The new line-up of power Washington clearly did not want ARENA to win the presidency. Throughout this decade, the United States has pumped over $3.3 billion into El Salvador to shore up the "center" represented by the PDC. But this so-called center has been unable to solve any of the fundamental problems facing the country.

ARENA's victory makes things more complicated for the Bush administration. For years there has been bipartisan support in Congress for financing El Salvador. But Cristiani's election is already having repercussions in Washington.

Sen. Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.) proposes holding back half of El Salvador's military aid for six months to see if Bush and ARENA pursue a negotiated settlement of the war. And Rep. Tony Coelho, the House Democratic whip, asked recently, "Can Cristiani really be the President, or will D'Aubuisson run the government?"

With D'Aubuisson calling the shots, a bloodbath against the workers and peasants is still possible, despite recent U.S. warnings about human-rights violations. D'Aubuisson controls the paramilitary units that kept "peace" in the Salvadoran countryside throughout the '60s and '70s. His followers include many junior army officers. These elements may view the ARENA victory as a ET Reed/S.F. Examiner signal to try their hand and mount a massive reign of terror.

The day after the presidential election, in fact, the army sealed off the headquarters of the National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), indicating that further attacks on the independent union movement may be forthcoming.

Where is the FMLN headed?

The FMLN has vowed to pursue its peace proposal anew now that the elections are over. "The objective," according to Martinez, "is to get everyone to sit down quickly at the negotiating table."

The Christian Science Monitor reported on March 20 that some FMLN spokespeople had voiced hope for an ARENA victory, believing that it would further polarize the country and that negotiations would be more meaningful "with a strong party that could keep its commitments."

In the spring 1989 issue of Foreign Policy magazine, FMLN Commander Joaquin Villalobos provides a clearer picture of the FMLN's commitment to alliances with El protest against U.S. intervention in that country.

York City. basis for a solution among Salvadorans is essentially contained in the Central American and Latin American solutions expressed by Esquipulas and Contadora. The problem to be resolved is the interference of the United States. Everything else is open to discussion."

But the goal of Esquipulas and Contadora, expressed in the so-called "Arias plan," is to disarm the struggles of workers and peasants throughout Central America while consolidating the power of the capitalists in each country.

Adoption of the Arias plan, for example, has isolated the Nicaraguan Revolution from the working class and peasantry in the region-its natural allies. The Sandinistas have been forced to make major concessions to the Nicaraguan capitalists.

In a Feb. 6 interview in Time magazine, Daniel Ortega indicated his willingness to reach compromise on virtually all the complaints the United States has voiced over the years. He also indicated that Nicaragua's model would be the Scandinavian countries: "They're small, they have a heavy emphasis on social programs, the state has a role in the economy, but so does the private sector." He promised no more confiscation of private property.

The FMLN is offering these compromises now. Its lack of confidence in the Salvadoran masses leads them to the negotiating tablewhere they can provide assurances in advance that they won't be another threat in the U.S. backyard. Hence its commitment to powersharing, a mixed economy, and respect for the army.

Villalobos claims that stabilization can be achieved "only through internal agreements and pacts expressing the interests of diverse social and political sectors," meaning concessions to the Salvadoran ruling class. But the FMLN and the popular movement must formulate a program that can fulfill the aspirations of the Salvadoran people to dismantle the oppressive oligarchy that has robbed them of their dignity, their rights, and their ability to put bread on their tables.

The Salvadoran masses cannot successfully travel on this course alone, however. They need the help of the Sandinistas, who must deepen their revolution—not reverse its gains-and extend it throughout the region. • SIORS Les Stone manet Vaugl

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