Growing debate surrounds El Salvador nat'l elections

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Minneapolis Black community protests police violence

JIM HENLE

Events are moving rapidly in El Salvador, and the situation is growing more polarized.

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has offered a dramatic peace proposal that includes an offer, for the first time, to lay down their weapons and abide by the results of elections. The ruling Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is fading. Deathsquad activity is on the rise, and the rightwing ARENA party is poised to consolidate its grip over the country with a victory in the upcoming presidential election.

The FMILN peace proposal, described widely as a "total and fundamental change" on the part of the guerrilla leadership, has become the focus of the national political debate.

The guerrillas have reversed positions they held for a decade. For the first time, they agree to abide by election results—if elections are postponed until September—and no longer insist on the formation of an interim government in which they would share power. They no longer demand that their forces be integrated into a new national army, calling instead for changes in the structure and size of the Armed Forces.

As we go to press, Salvadoran President José Napoleón Duarte has agreed to postpone the elections and hold talks with the FMLN. Duarte called for holding the election on April 30, six weeks after the scheduled date, and proposed that a referendum be held on postponing the date if talks couldn't resolve the issue. Duarte is bound by the constitution to leave office June 1.

Duarte also called for an immediate ceasefire if the FMLN accepts the proposal. At press time, the FMLN had not responded to Duarte's proposal.

This development comes in the context of the FMLN's desire to find an opening with the new U.S. leadership. FMLN leaders have stated that their most recent military offensive is designed to gain an advantage in negotiations.

FMLN leader Comandante Balta explained: "We want to convince Washington that we are a serious player here, to make them sit at the bargaining table with us. The Bush administration certainly won't be willing to give us a role unless they're faced with the prospect of losing everything." (San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 12, 1989)

The FMLN's desire to negotiate a settlement on new and different terms comes on the heels of the message they've gotten from Moscow.

According to U.S. News and World Report, after their unprecedented tour around South America and Europe last year, "top rebel commanders Joaquin Villalobos and Leonel González ... learned that Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union is no longer interested in promoting distant revolutions and cannot even be counted on for economic aid if the FMLN wins the war." (Jan. 23, 1989)

The FMLN proposal The FMLN worked hard to obstruct the last five national elections, which they called a façade for oppressive U.S.-sponsored regimes. But in their proposal, initially offered on Jan. 23, the FMLN General Command offered to participate-if the March 19 presidential election is rescheduled and reorganized.

The guerrillas point to the March elections as a "detonator of a major political crisis that will lead to a definitive power vacuum," with the possibility of "genocide" from the right and "insurrection" from the left.

So, they call for a postponement of the elections until September (which would require a change in the Salvadoran constitution), and promise to respect the results if a number of conditions are met to ensure their free participation in the process.

Henderson/Socialist See page 3.

Duarte's initial response was to characterize it as "a proposal for war... plagued by a Feb. 20-21 meeting in Mexico between FMLN commanders and 13 Salvadoran political parties. The Armed Forces refused to participate, and Duarte was not directly represented.

The meeting saw a broadening of the FMLN's original proposal. A guerrilla statement on Feb. 21 indicated that compromise was possible, with. their initial proposal characterized as "a first step toward seeking agreement and generating conditions that (continued on page 8, in “Little enthusiasm for major rivals in Chicago elections”)

Millions of Soviet voters will soon participate in national elections unlike any held since the Stalin era. But the differences are more show than substance.

Final voting for the new supreme governing body, the Congress of U.S.S.R. Peoples' Deputies, will end on March 26. It will convene in April when its first order of business will be to select 400 to 450 deputies for a new two-chamber Supreme Soviet. This will be the new permanent standing legislature.

The Congress will also elect a president, presumably Communist Party (CPSU) General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to preside over the smaller Supreme Soviet.

The full Congress will meet once a year. It will be comprised of 1500 elected deputies— 750 from territorial and 750 from national districts, as is the case today-and an additional 750 elected by the officially recognized "party, trade union, cooperative, youth, women's, veterans', academic, and artistic organizations."

To be elected, therefore, a candidate must first be nominated in one of three ways-by existing territorial districts based on population; by national districts, which give representation to the 14 non-Russian republics; or by the highest governing bodies of the "official" organizations.

This elaborate setup is generating as much confusion-and suspicion—as anticipation. There are good reasons for the skepticism.

Official groups retain control As the election rules indicate, one-third (or 750) of the delegates to the Congress are reserved for organizations officially recognized by the government. What choice does this give to the Soviet people? These organizations have all been blind supporters of the bureaucracy for decades.

The Communist Party Politburo set a shining example for the other official organizations by nominating precisely 100 candidates for the 100 Congress deputy positions allocated to it. Lower party units (continued on page 12)

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Democracy Gorbachev style