Panama: 80 years of American domination

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Once again the United States is strongarming a small Central American neighbor. "That guy has got to go!" Secretary of State George Schultz bellowed. He was not referring to one of his subordinates, but to a leader of a presumably sovereign statePanama.

This presents no problem to the arrogant head of the State Department, who views the Caribbean as an American lake.

In the past, the U.S. government wanted "that guy" or "those guys" out in Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Chile-among other places. And in those cases, it exerted America's tremendous financial and military pressure until a government it approved of was installed.

The United States is having a harder time with Nicaragua, and it has grim recollections of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. But the United States thinks Panama can be more easily brought under control. This is partly because of the "special relationship" established with Panama at its birth in 1903.

Originally a province of Colombia, Panama was established-under U.S. sponsorship-as an independent state when Colombia was reluctant to accept Washington's onerous terms for cutting a canal through its territory. Several days after an independent government was established, Panama was saddled with a treaty that cut the country in two.

Panamanians not consulted

President Theodore Roosevelt did not negotiate with the Panamanians over the future of their country, but signed a treaty with a French adventurer, Philippe BunauVarilla, who had a financial interest in the canal project. When he went to Washington to "represent" Panama, he was described by a U.S. senator as "the comic-opera representative of a comic-opera country."

The result was a treaty "that no Panamanian signed," described by another senator as "very advantageous to the United States, but disadvantageous to the Panamanians."

The disadvantages rankled in their souls 12 SOCIALIST Al for over 80 years, as Panamanians saw the Canal Zone become a foreign enclave bisecting their country. They were further outraged as they saw the Zone become a military base from which the Americans dominated the entire continent.

However, with the colonial uprisings, the Cuban Revolution, and Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956, liberation of the Panama Canal became an irresistible idea whose time had come.

After mass demonstrations of students, who occupied the Zone to plant the Panamanian flag in 1964, it became obvious to Washington that it could not continue to exclude Panama from the canal.

Negotiations dragged on for over a decade, with Washington reluctantly yielding, step by step. Under the treaty finally signed in 1977, the United States does not relinquish control till 1999, and even then it reserves the right to intervene should Washington judge it necessary.

A new army is created Student and worker unrest in the 1960s not only led to a new canal treaty—it also alarmed the American and Panamanian ruling classes.

For 80 years, Panama had no standing army. Panama could rely on the thousands of American troops in the Canal Zone, Washington said. But now a Panamanian army was needed, Washington decided, to defend the canal and to control unruly demonstrators.

A Panama Defense Force (PDF) was created out of elements of a national guard and a police force. This new military force of 12,000 soon learned the old game of overthrowing civilian governments.

Until 1968, Panama was ruled by a commercial elite, intent on enriching itself, and neglecting the rest of the country. The country was sliding downhill economically, and nothing was being done.

At this point, Gen. Omar Torrijos, commander of the PDF, ousted the civilian government of Ardulfo Arias and ruled with army support for a decade. As a populist, Torrijos pushed for a new canal treaty and maintained relations with Cuba. On the other hand, Torrijos repressed student protests and imposed anti-labor legislation.

CTION APRIL 1988 On July 31, 1981, Torrijos died in a mysterious plane crash. Some charge the CIA with complicity. It was no secret that Torrijos was showing increasing independence from Washington.

Gen. Manuel Noriega was Torrijos's second-in-command. He seized power and maneuvered Ardilo Barletta, a conservative economist, into the president's office.

At the same time, Noriega tightened his hold on the army. He enlarged it to 15,000 men, created more officers, and opened the way for them to profit from their positions. The officers in turn formed a major power base for Noriega, which was cemented by mutual corruption.

Rumors of Noriega's connection to the drug trade had been rife for years. As an international banking center, Panama is an ideal place for laundering drug money.

The most specific accusation against Noriega was made by Dr. Hugo Spadafora, known as the international guerrilla doctor, who had served with Sandinista guerrillas fighting Somoza.

Spadafora publicly condemned Noriega's drug connections, declaring that it was a disgrace that Panama was ruled by an international drug trafficker. Soon after this, on Sept. 15, 1985, Spadafora's decapitated body was found. No one has been charged with the murder. When President Barletta attempted to set up a commission of enquiry, he was ousted by Noriega.

Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle, heir to a sugar fortune, assumed the presidency. One of his first acts was to revise labor laws to weaken the power of the unions and to lower labor costs. Noriega helped push Delvalle's program, and Delvalle collaborated with Noriega for several years.

Drug traffic condoned

Washington knew of Noriega's drug dealing for years, but allowed it to flourish so long as he served the administration's aims.

As a New York Times article (June 12, 1986) put it: "They had overlooked Gen. Noriega's illegal activities because of his cooperation with American intelligence and his willingness to permit the American military extensive leeway to operate in United States over the time and terms of his departure. And many working-class soldiers, enlisted to "defend the people, were bewildered to find themselves guarding the streets against the people.

Although workers may be'losing confidence in Noriega, they have little reason to support the opposition National Civic Crusade, a coalition of bourgeois forces. The commercial elite has been campaigning to weaken the unions through new anti-labor laws. As president, Delvalle pushed this legislation through the Assembly.

Nevertheless, when the Civic Crusade called for a general strike beginning on March 21, thousands of workers responded. Due to Washington's economic strangulation, they were not getting paid. Both the Panamanian commercial elite and the American ruling class must feel some anxiety, however, since the workers are also striking against their own bosses.

The workers know that Washington is pushing Noriega out only to install a more compliant puppet. A striking longshoreman in Colon expressed this view when he said, "We are for the people. We want the United States to stop intervening in our problems."

Installing a successor is a problem for Washington. It wants a sanitized Panamanian Defense Force purged not only of Noriega but of all the nationalists in its leadership. But weakening the PDF threatens stability.

There are indications that the U.S. government is prepared to intervene militarily if it cannot regain control of Panama any other way. Some 10,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Panama. In mid-March, 400 additional soldiers and military police were sent there.

Again the American people must demand that U.S. troops be brought home now. Let the Panamanian people choose their own government. Hands off Panama!

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•. has peace really broken out?

Signing of the cease-fire accord in Sapoá, Nicaragua, on March 23 (continued from page I) want the Marxist democracy of the Sandinistas.

Alfredo César, another contra leader and negotiator, told the The New York Times how pleased he was with the Sapoá agreement. "Our troops get a two-month rest with supplies while we test the Sandinistas' willingness to comply with their promises," César said. "It's an agreement we couldn't turn down."

According to the Sapoá agreement, the contras will be allowed to receive "humanitarian aid" through "neutral channels" during the 60-day truce.

As we go to press, the Democraticcontrolled House just approved a $48million aid package to the contras to be administered through the U.S.-funded Agency for International Development. The package includes aid for food, clothing, and communications equipment.

The contra-aid legislation, according to the March 30 Los Angeles Times, reflected a bipartisan consensus "that the Nicaraguan government cannot be forced to make concessions in the peace talks if the United States unilaterally halts aid to the contras." White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said that Reagan was anxious to sign the contra-aid legislation.

Democratic Party House Speaker Jim Wright (D.-Texas) also wrote a letter to House minority leader Robert Michel (R.III.) in which he pledged to give "timely consideration" to a military aid request for the contras in the event the Sandinistas do not meet the contras' political demands.

Pressing for concessions

In an editorial dated March 25, the Nicaraguan right-wing daily La Prensa gave an account of what the contra leadership, the U.S. government, and the Nicaraguan capitalists mean by "democratization."

"The Sapoá agreement provides for 60 days during which the basis for democratizing the country will be approved; a process without which this agreement is worth absolutely nothing," La Prensa stated. "This means that the Nicaraguan government must now approve the 17 constitutional reforms which constitute the foundation for remodeling our political institutions."

The 17 constitutional reforms La Prensa refers to were first put forward last December by a bloc of 14 political opposition parties—including the two pro-Moscow Stalinist parties, the PSN and the PCdeN. The package " of reforms necessary for the democratization of Nicaragua" includes:

* full amnesty for all political prisoners and ex-Somoza National Guardsmen;

* an end to Sandinista party control over the armed forces, the electoral process, and the judiciary;

* the creation of a non-Sandinista army and police;

* a limit to presidential power (a president could not succeed himself;

* an end to the military draft;

* a prohibition from voting for members of the armed forces;

* full access by the contras to the media (including the right to open radio and TV stations);

* provisions to strengthen guarantees to private property.

Demands to capitulate

These 17 constitutional reforms amount Gordon Stone/Examiner to a call for the Sandinista government to undo the gains of the revolution and capitulate to the U.S.-backed mercenary army. What the contras were unable to secure on the battlefield for lack of support among the Nicaraguan people, they are now demanding at the negotiating table.

The determination of whether or not the Sandinistas have met these imperialist demands, moreover, will be in the hands of two "arbitrators" long known for their open support to the contras: Cardinal Obando y Barricada Bravo and Organization of American States General Secretary Joao Clemente Soares.

[The Sandinistas had proposed that the Sapoá verification commission be composed of government officials from Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Canada. But at the Sapoá meetings, the Sandinistas backed down and accepted Obando and Soares, the two men proposed by the contra negotiators.] The importance of these two men for the cause of the contras is not lost to U.S. imperialism. A New York Times editorial dated March 25 put it this way: "The national dialogue [between the Sandinistas and the contras] could be dismissed as eyewash except for the guarantors: Cardinal Obando y Bravo and General Secretary Clemente Soares."

Indeed, if Obando and Soares decide that the Sandinistas are unwilling to "democratize"-that is, provide the Nicaraguan Arias's true colors are showing through more clearly with each passing day. On March 17, for example, Arias condemned Nicaragua for "invading Honduras" and for its "lamentable attitude of seeking to force its adversary to the bargaining table on its knees."

Arias has remained silent on the continued contra incursions into Nicaragua. But he was quick to jump to the aid of the contras when the Sandinistas, in legitimate self defense, pursued the contras across the border into Honduras in mid-March.

And on March 24, Costa Rican Ambassador to Nicaragua Farid Ayales gave an interview to the Nicaraguan daily La Prensa in which he (1) urged the Sandinista government to meet the contras' demands for "democracy," (2) condemned the Sandinista militants (whom he called "mobs") for demonstrating against the contras, and (3) urged the Sandinistas to return land and property taken by the workers and peasants to their "lawful" owners.

Role of Soviet bureaucracy Nor can the Nicaraguan Revolution count on the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet bureaucracy, in fact, has been one of the forces most responsible for pushing the Sandinistas to the negotiating table with the contras.

A March 27 New York Times article by Stephen Kinzer points out that the Soviet Union has become a "maddeningly unreliable ally" of the Sandinista government. "It has become increasingly clear," Kinzer notes, "that the Soviet Union is not interested in taking on another charity case."

Specifically, in mid-February, top Soviet officials announced they would not continue to underwrite the Nicaraguan economy and would only provide half of Nicaragua's total requirement of about 900,000 tons of oil in 1988.

An article in the Feb. 6 Christian Science Monitor fully captures the role of the Soviet bureaucracy:

"One of the more interesting facts on the world scene now is that Moscow not saving Daniel Ortega Saavedra.

"Mr. Ortega, the president of Nicaragua, is in political retreat under the pressures that forced him to lift his 'state of emergency,' permit opposition rallies, release some of his political prisoners...

"None of this would have happened had Moscow given him the economic and military support for which he has repeatedly asked. The Soviets' biggest omission has been in the supply of oil...

"Soviet oil or Soviet money for oil would make it possible for Mr. Ortega to defy his neighbors and the Arias peace plan that he has been forced to accept. He has not been able to defy them."

No Contra Aid!

The Nicaraguan Revolution is in grave danger. Antiwar activists in this country should oppose all contra aid and all U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.

It is one thing for the Sandinista government, which has a gun placed at its head by the imperialist brigands, to be compelled to make concessions. But we in this country are under no such obligation.

Those who support the clause in the Sapoá agreement which allows for "huma-

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