AZAPO leader's assessment of Black miners strike
1988 1988-03Read it in the scan (PDF at ETOL), page 9 →
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Question: I was impressed during the three-month miners' strike last year that the Black Miners, Construction and Allied Workers Union (BAMCWU), a NACTU affiliate, honored the NUM strike and actively supported it. BAMCWU, if I'm not mistaken, claims a membership of 175,000 workers.
But I was also interested by the fact that the BAMCWU did not countersign the appeal by the NUM at the beginning of the strike for workers to leave their work place and return to their homes— for most of them the distant homelands. If I'm not mistaken, the BAMCWU explained the the NUM appeal meant that the mineworkers wouldn't be present to make the decisions about how the strike should be run. I think the mineworkers were, in fact, only consulted once during the entire strike.
Answer: I think that BAMCWU'S criticisms of the NUM leadership were justified. It was a miscalculation on their part. But in another sense it was a calculation, because in the previous strike that took place in 1985, many of the workers, when they got thrown out of the mine premises, camped out at the union headquarters.
At one point there was a palace revolt by the mineworkers against the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and others. So the union leadership calculated that they didn't want disgruntled workers who were thrown off the premises to camp on their doorstep this time. That's one factor.
Second, they said they wanted to create an impression of discipline and so on. But that is hogwash. The truth is that they simply didn't want the workers to be faulted by management for blocking minerals from leaving the mines or for confrontations. They wanted to prevent the source of confrontation. But what is a strike if it is not a picketline that manages to stop production.
The NUM leadership just simply didn't take into _ account that there is a huge problem of unemployment, that many tens of thousands of workers were able and willing to be recruited as scabs in the mines. This permitted the mine bosses to bring on their premises these new recruits when everybody else had gone back home. So that in effect there was no defense of their jobs at the mine gates.
And that is why even the president of the mineworkers is out of his job. And so are some 30,000-plus workers.
Question: Did the NUM issue an appeal to the entire labor movement to come to the aid of mineworkers?
Answer: No. The leadership of the NUM-Cyril Ramaphosa in p articular-was very zealous about not wanting interference from anybody else in the strike.
Even when they threatened at the outset of the strike that they had solidarity offers, and when COSATU itself offered solidarity, Ramaphosa and the union executives kept everybody away. They feared at a political level that the moment they allowed other sections of the union movement to go into solidarity action, it would become a political matter, and that political matter would excite the interests of the state, and they themselves would be in serious trouble.
As it was, the NUM leadership played the strike purely at a managementworker level, at an economistic level. But for the strike to have succeeded in these political conditions, it was necessary to have the courage to call an action that assumed a total political dimension. It was necessary to have the vision to challenge the very foundations of the racist-capitalist state. The community and the rest of the trade-union movement were ready for this. Unfortunately, this was not undertaken.
Question: So you think there was a conscious decision to avoid taking the miners' strike to a higher political plane; that is, of preventing an entire social movement to come into play in support of the strike?
Answer: That's right. In fact, more of a social movement developed during the 1985 strike than during the 1987 Still, for a correct balance sheet of the strike, we must understand the significance of a long strike which, all things considered, had a degree of discipline and control to it, which the mine bosses were compelled to refer to with great admiration.
At a political level, one can speak of a stand-off in the relationship of forces between the classes. But in very real terms there has been a setback in terms of layoffs and the weakening of the mineworkers' unions.
A lot of miners' jobs have been lost. It may take a long time before the membership and strength of the mineworkers' unions are regained. When the iron was hot at a political level, the leadership was unable to take the necessary step to thrust the ruling class into the crisis it should have been thrust in.
You must also bear in mind that the international capitalist economy had been experiencing a deepening crisis at the time of the strike. In these conditions, with a sustained and combative strike, it is most likely that the major international capitalist centers would have pressured the mine bosses into reaching a political settlement with the mineworkers. The major capitalist economies are tied to the flow of gold and other precious minerals.
The leadership of the ANC is making same mistake it made in the late 19 when it sought to dilute SACTU at a t when SACTU was beginning to mak real impact in the struggle. The Freec Charter adoption is now really tear COSATU asunder.
Question: So you think it is wrong forces within the COSATU to seek impose a political programmatic docun on the union?
Answer: Yes. Any political prog would be a mistake, not just the Freec Charter. If they pushed the Azar People's manifesto that would also wrong because this is a document some of the membership of COSA supports, but not all.
For a wing of the COSATU leadershi push the Freedom Charter is really to 1 into the hands of the system because we not playing games. These questions a matter of life and death. We are pi against the state in deadly combat. An this comes the provocation of removing fire from the state and turning it in ourselves.
The quest for hegemony among working class is paramount in vari political groupings, but doing it in fashion merely plays into the hands of enemy and allows for a lot of division t sown at a time when solidarity and unil an absolute prerequisite.
Furthermore, the dishonest and vio manner in which the Freedom Charter been pushed down the throats of cer unions, the lies that have been used, undemocratic manner in which it has t carried out, give the lie to everything FOSATU before and COSATU U recently have stood for. There can br democracy in the unions when this typ situation happens, when people in leadership of CCAWUSA find themse under the whip of a faction of COSATU leadership.
Question: A number of charges v raised against the majority of CCAWI by the COSATU leadership, all of w pointed to "anti-COSATU" behavior. T. included having accepted support f unions affiliated with CUSA and AZA( during the 1987 OK Bazaars strike. [CT and AZACTU have since fused into National Council of Trade Uni (NACTU), a 450,000-member federa whose leaders generally identify with views of AZAPO and the Bl Consciousness tradition.] The COSATU leadership also accı CCAWUSA leaders of having atter shop-steward seminars addressed NACTU officials or by "people like Neville Alexander," a leading membe the National Forum with strong Trotsk sympathies.
Answer: I am wondering what is wi with collaborating with NACTU. NAS doesn't represent management. It dor represent the Chamber of Mines. It da represent the system. I should imagine any collaboration with NACTU woul good in order to bring those forces into big merger. This, in our view, is cle what should be happening.
You know it is ironic that whenever have a problem at COSATU House, use NACTU's facilities. So who collaborating with whom when
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SOCIALIST ACTION MARCH 1988 programmatic document.
The CCAWUSA leadership argued that adoption of the Freedom Charter would only divide the membership. CCAWUSA leaders pointed to the fact that some of its members support the Charter while others support the Azanian Manifesto [the basic strategic document of the National Forum and of AZAPO].
In addition, a number of other unions that endorsed the Freedom Charter qualified their support considerably. Many of them referred to the Charter simply as a "good foundation stone on which to start building our working-class program." These unions also stressed their commitment to "building essment NUM-Cyril Ramaphosa in p articular—was very zealous about not wanting interference from anybody else in the strike.
Even when they threatened at the outset of the strike that they had solidarity offers, and when COSATU itself offered solidarity, Ramaphosa and the union executives kept everybody away. They feared at a political level that the moment they allowed other sections of the union movement to go into solidarity action, it would become a political matter, and that political matter would excite the interests of the state, and they themselves would be in serious trouble.
As it was, the NUM leadership played the strike purely at a managementworker level, at an economistic level. But for the strike to have succeeded in these political conditions, it was necessary to have the courage to call an action that assumed a total political dimension. It was necessary to have the vision to challenge the very foundations of the racist-capitalist state. The community and the rest of the trade-union movement were ready for this. Unfortunately, this was not undertaken.
Question: So you think there was a conscious decision to avoid taking the miners' strike to a higher political plane; that is, of preventing an entire social movement to come into play in support of the strike?
Answer: That's right. In fact, more of a social movement developed during the 1985 strike than during the 1987 Still, for a correct balance sheet of the strike, we must understand the significance of a long strike which, all things considered, had a degree of discipline and control to it, which the mine bosses were compelled to refer to with great admiration.
At a political level, one can speak of a stand-off in the relationship of forces between the classes. But in very real terms there has been a setback in terms of layoffs and the weakening of the mineworkers' unions.
A lot of miners' jobs have been lost. It may take a long time before the membership and strength of the mineworkers' unions are regained. When the iron was hot at a political level, the leadership was unable to take the necessary step to thrust the ruling class into the crisis it should have been thrust in.
You must also bear in mind that the international capitalist economy had been experiencing a deepening crisis at the time of the strike. In these conditions, with a sustained and combative strike, it is most likely that the major international capitalist centers would have pressured the mine bosses into reaching a political settlement with the mineworkers. The major capitalist economies are tied to the flow of gol and other precious minerals. socialism" and to struggle "to uphold and advance the leadership of the working class in all spheres of society."
In recent months, however, a split has occurred in CCAWUSA over the Freedom Charter, with the pro-Freedom Charter minority forming a separate union which has, unfortunately, received the support and now the recognition of the COSATU leadership.
What is your assessment of this discussion within COSATU and how do you view the recent split within CCAWUSA?
Answer: It is very unfortunate that the Freedom Charter has caused further disruption within the united trade-union movement. This makes trade-union solidarity so much more difficult to achieve.
The leadership of the ANC is making the same mistake it made in the late 1950s when it sought to dilute SACTU at a time when SACTU was beginning to make a real impact in the struggle. The Freedom Charter adoption is now really tearing COSATU asunder.
Question: So you think it is wrong for forces within the COSATU to seek to impose a political programmatic document on the union?
Answer: Yes. Any political program would be a mistake, not just the Freedom Charter. If they pushed the Azanian People's manifesto that would also be wrong because this is a document that some of the membership of COSATU supports, but not all.
For a wing of the COSATU leadership to push the Freedom Charter is really to play into the hands of the system because we are not playing games. These questions are a matter of life and death. We are pitted against the state in deadly combat. And in this comes the provocation of removing the fire from the state and turning it in our ourselves.
The quest for hegemony among the working class is paramount in various political groupings, but doing it in this fashion merely plays into the hands of the enemy and allows for a lot of division to be sown at a time when solidarity and unity is an absolute prerequisite.
Furthermore, the dishonest and violent manner in which the Freedom Charter has been pushed down the throats of certain unions, the lies that have been used, the undemocratic manner in which it has been carried out, give the lie to everything that FOSATU before and COSATU until recently have stood for. There can be no democracy in the unions when this type of situation happens, when people in the leadership of CCAWUSA find themselves under the whip of a faction of the COSATU leadership.
Question: A number of charges were raised against the majority of CCAWUSA by the COSATU leadership, all of which pointed to "anti-COSATU" behavior. These included having accepted support from unions affiliated with CUSA and AZACTU during the 1987 OK Bazaars strike. [CUSA and AZACTU have since fused into the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), a 450,000-member federation whose leaders generally identify with the views of AZAPO and the Black Consciousness tradition.] The COSATU leadership also accused CCAWUSA leaders of having attended shop-steward seminars addressed by NACTU officials or by "people like Dr. Neville Alexander," a leading member of the National Forum with strong Trotskyist sympathies.
Answer: I am wondering what is wrong with collaborating with NACTU. NACTU doesn't represent management. It doesn't represent the Chamber of Mines. It doesn't represent the system. I should imagine that any collaboration with NACTU would be good in order to bring those forces into one big merger. This, in our view, is clearly what should be happening.
You know it is ironic that whenever they have a problem at COSATU House, they use NACTU's facilities. So who is collaborating with whom when that SOUTH AFRICA * 83 happens? What is the problem with collaborating with another progressive force in the country around our common interests?
Question: Exactly. This is the basis to a united-front approach. This is in fact how the CCAWUSA leadership responded to the charges. In a leaflet addressed to all COSATU members last year they wrote:
"We believe it is our duty to unite workers wherever we are. Any contact that we have had with the workers of NACTU is in the interest of building worker unity. This is not against COSATU policy. We must work toward unity between COSATU and NACTU."
But why is the specter of NACTU raised?
Answer: I think it is merely a red herring. It is typical of people who don't have a leg to stand on. NACTU has not done anything to foment the current problems. These have been created entirely by undemocratic sections of the leadership of COSATU.
Question: But what is NACTU? What defines it as a separate federation? Why did NACTU, or rather the unions identified with it, not participate in the unification in December 1985 which gave rise to COSATU?
Answer: I think it is important to recall the actual chronology and content of what happened in the run-up to the creation of COSATU.
FOSATU [today in COSATU] and CUSA [today in NACTU] had been engaged in talks about creating a new, major trade-union federation. Everything had gone along very, very smoothly until the last couple of meetings that were held in 1985 when onto the scene stepped the General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), which is a United Democratic Front (UDF) affiliate, and SAAWU (the South African Allied Workers Union), which is also a UDF affiliate. [The UDF is an umbrella coalition identified with the political views of the ANC.] Those two unions and other such smaller unions, not based on firm democratic structures but very strong vocally at a political shibboleth slogan level, entered the conference and began to agitate against the FOSATU position, which, you must remember, had consistently advocated steering clear of party political programs.
The agreement reached between the conference organizers and the UDF unions was that they should exclude AZACTU [the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions] and invite everybody else. And that is exactly what happened. Cyril Ramaphosa [general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers and convenor of the COSATU inaugural congress] went ahead and invited everybody else but did not invite AZACTU.
Question: How about CUSA?
Answer: CUSA was invited. I think CUSA made a colossal mistake by not going to the conference. They didn't attend in protest over AZACTU's exclusion.
This as far as I am concerned was a mistake on CUSA's part, because what we are seeing now in COSATU would not have come to pass. Very clearly some of the leadership in COSATU may not have been there if CUSA had been part of the merger.
Question: So AZACTU's position was that it was for the merger without any exclusions?
Answer: Right. The only point which was a point of difference involved certain ideological conceptions and political positions. AZACTU's position was that the new federation should have a clear antiracist, anti-sexist, anti-imperialist position and that the leadership of the union movement could only be in the hands of the Black working class.
Others in what became COSATU felt that this was going too far, that this was really a Black Consciousness position and therefore shouldn't be accepted-and so the whole exclusion.
Question: But was AZACTU in favor of participating in the merger even if its position on the question of leadership was not adopted by the fused federation.
Answer: I think that most sections of AZACTU would have gone along with the fusion even if their position had not been adopted at the December 1985 merger conference. I think that only a few narrow nationalist elements would have stayed away.
Had there been no exclusion, the fusion with AZACTU would have taken place. The large bulk of AZACTU unions and unionists would have agreed to fuse but would have continued to fight for their views within the new federation.
Question: In your opinion, had there not been an exclusion, should AZACTU have joined COSATU?
Answer: Yes. But you must understand (continued on page 10)