"For every one of our

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SOCIALIST ACTION NOVEMBER 1987 1 since we had more fire-power, they decided to disperse their forces. This was a temporary, tactical decision and not a strategic one.

I think that to a certain extent they succeeded in carrying off this tactical dispersal of their forces. That has led concretely to an increasing number of small armed actions in the recent period. Small armed actions reflect strategic weakness. So far this strategic weakness has not been definitive, and our immediate response has been to transform their tactical dispersal into a strategic dispersal. This means keeping [them] from exercising centralized control over their dispersed forces.

Through our military offensive and new tactical deployments of our army, our intelligence and other forces of the Ministry of the Interior, we have succeeded in inflicting impressive human losses on the contras. For every one of our people who falls, three to four contras are made harmless. Our capacity for replacing our forces is much greater than that of the contras. Over the "Reagan's intent is to continue his past two years, their military forces have decreased by more or less 50 percent.

Nonetheless, it has to be said that they have achieved a certain capacity for renewing their forces. That is, they have recruited. They recruit essentially backward peasants, either through shang-haiing people or through standard propaganda and relying on large financial resources.

However, if you remember that before their last offensive, they had a large part of their forces trained in Honduras and in the United States (training that included preparation for anti-aircraft warfare with very sophisticated weapons, such as "red eyes" ", and for using considerable communications equipment and decoding devices to intercept our army's messages, you can understand that the major losses we inflicted on them have had a particular effect on these militarily best prepared troops. Naturally, the new forces that they have incorporated, which are made up to a greater extent of children of 12 and 13 years of age and women, are militarily much less effective.

So, their best trained forces have considerably shrunk. This reflects a very great decline which will be aggravated by the signing of the Guatemala peace plan. Their weakening is also reflected in the extent to which members of their forces have expressed their satisfaction at the peace plan and their wish to go home.

We, for our part, have demonstrated our seriousness in welcoming men and women who break from the contras. We welcome them in a humanitarian way, and we offer them jobs or other means of reintegrating themselves into social and civilian life.

Toussaint: Do you think that the right opposition could win elections?

Borge: There is always that possibility, and the constitution provides for respecting an election victory by forces other than the Sandinista front. But I think that it is hard to imagine the Nicaraguan people turning their backs on history. Such a thing has never happened. To encourage everyone to be more realistic, I would say that it is virtually impossible that the people would decide to return to the road of the past. But, if that were to happen, we would have to yield power, and I would stop believing in humanity.

Toussaint: The right opposition says that in order to apply the peace accord it is necessary to lift the state of emergency, and to permit the reopening of La Prensa and Radio Catolica. What do you think about that?

Borge: I am reading the accord signed in Guatemala, and it says exactly the opposite. This accord implies that the state of emergency will be lifted when the war ends. When somebody is pointing a pistol at us, it would be crazy to put down the one that we are holding. I think that negotiation could lead to suspending the state of emergency. For our part, we will move ahead very quickly in implementing the peace plan. We are setting up the National Reconciliation Commission. our military or our political weapons or the legal weapons authorized by the constitution. But we would be ready to stop shooting if there were no longer any enemies that we had to shoot at. And likewise we would be ready to stop using the state of emergency, the legal means provided by the constitution, if that were no longer necessary. If we were not ready to do that, we would fall into an illegal and dictatorial state of affairs.

Toussaint: Since 1979, a revolutionary regime has existed in Nicaragua in which political pluralism and real trade unionism has survived. What balance sheet do you draw from this situation?

Borge: Pluralism and the mixed economy in people engaged in a revolution finds new sources of energy."

Nicaragua are the natural results of our revolutionary process. This is not a trick or a tactic for gaining time. The problem is not whether this is positive or negative. It is a fact that cannot be gone around. It has not been easy to establish political pluralism, because in order to maintain this pluralism and mixed economy, the state has had to make major concessions to the employers.

We have encountered difficulties because the political factor took precedence over economics. That is, the class interests of those sectors excluded from political power (those who retain political options without holding political power) have created blockages in production and in the economy in general. In other words, ideally, if we could separate the political aspect from the economic one and solve the problems in each of these areas separately, things would be much easier. The problem is that politics and economics are tightly intertwined.

The fundamental aspect has been politics. More than an instrument of producers, the COSEP [employers' organization] is a sort of political party. Moreover, concretely, it is part of the Acasa coordinating body, which is a political instrument opposed to the revolution. It is clear that the room for political pluralism will increase to the extent that the provisions of the Guatemala peace accord are applied, because it has to be said that the state of emergency has restricted the activities of the opposition parties to a certain extent.

Toussaint: In this stage of the Sandinista revolution, what is the role of the Sandinista Defense Committee (CDS)?

Borge: The mass organizations have developed considerably since the revolution. Before the victory, they were underground, while now they are part of the revolutionary power.

The CDS are a special form of representing the inhabitants of a neighborhood. They have been going through a process of finding ways to act and function. In the last analysis, the CDS can be the road to follow to consolidate mass participation in the revolutionary power. Now, the CDS are no longer essentially devoted context. Within the CDS, elections are genuinely democratic; they take place by means of secret ballots. I have witnessed a series of elections in various parts of the country. The CDS do not necessarily elect those who are recommended by the Sandinista Front, even though the majority in the CDS agree with the positions of the FSLN and recognize it as the revolutionary vanguard.

Toussaint: What remedies are there to bureaucracy, taking account of the fact that at the moment the main danger comes from imperialist aggression?

Borge: I would like to know what chemical formula is effective in fighting bureaucracy. But I think that they will find a cure for AIDS first. I think that we really have to find mechanisms for fighting bureaucracy. But often this is very difficult because the forms that bureaucracy takes are so incredible that I am not surprised at the capacity it shows for survival.

I said to a friend a little while ago in a discussion on human rights and bureaucracy: "If people commit the folly of launching a nuclear world war, humanity will disappear from the surface of the earth, but the bureaucratic cockroaches will survive."

That is a way of describing the difficulty of dealing with bureaucracy. Nonetheless, you have to deal with it, and I think that the main means for fighting it is for the leaders, the revolutionists, to maintain a direct contact with reality. And you cannot get to know the reality in an office except through direct contact on the ground with the masses, the working people, the people in the neighborhoods and so forth.

To make myself understood, I am going to give you an example. A document arrives in an office describing the problems in a factory, where the workers are complaining about noise. Reading this paper is no substitute for visiting the factory. I went, and I realized that the problem was not that there was a lot of noise, but that the noise was intolerable, and that unless technical means were found to remedy this the workers were going to go deaf.

If the functionaries or minister responsible for this factory did not confront the facts, the problem would not be solved. Reports never describe the facts exactiy. They give you only a distorted view.

Today, imperialism and bureaucracy are our main enemies, and it is harder to fight bureaucracy than it is to fight imperialism.

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aggression against our country and to block the peace process in Central America."

people who falls, three to four contras are made harmless."

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