An interview with Tomas Borge

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After six years of fighting to beat back the U.S.-funded contra war against Nicaragua, Tomas Borge, a member of the central leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and the sole surviving founding leader of the FSLN, gives his analysis of the recently signed Central correspondent for International Viewpoint, a biweekly magazine published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. It is reprinted here from the Sept. 28, 1987, issue of International Viewpoint.

"We must find a means for coexistence... But our national sovereignty and the revolution are 14 SOCIALIST ACTION NOVEMBER 1987 Toussaint: After the signing of the peace accord in Guatemala, do you think that there are real prospects for peace in Central America?

Borge: Nicaragua is a country with a great interest in achieving peace, both for principled reasons and because of immediate needs. We want peace for reasons of principle because the revolution was made to win lasting peace. We are champions of peace out of necessity. We cannot continue to live with a situation of endless war.

In reality, war means a lack of oxygen for us. While it is true that the moral and political reserves of a people involved in a revolution are inexhaustible, the fact is that a certain anxiety has arisen among the people over the question of peace.

The people have not yet become tired. Even when its dynamism seems exhausted, a people engaged in a revolution finds new sources of energy. I think that I represent the feeling of the Nicaraguan people when I say that they are in favor of peace, inasmuch as over these last years they have sacrificed a lot of their blood in the struggle. Nicaragua's biggest and most torrential river is neither the Rio Coco nor the Rio Matagalpa, but the river of our blood.

Toussaint: In June, President Daniel Ortega said that he would not negotiate questions of domestic policy outside the country. Isn't that what he has just done in Guatemala!

Borge: This accord does not concern domestic policy. It describes our point of view on democracy, and this point does not pose any problems for us, because it says, "The governments pledge to give impetus to an authentic democratic, pluralist, and participationist process, which involves advancing social justice and respect for human rights, national sovereignty, the territorial integrity of states and the right of all nations to determine their economic, political and social blueprints freely and Without foreign interference of any kind." (Esquipulas Accord, No. 3.)

We have nothing to add to this document. It is easier for us to sign this document with Guatemala than with any other government in Central America. So, Daniel Ortega was not in contradiction with what he said in June.

Toussaint: Despite the peace accords, it is likely that the United States will not withdraw their support from the contras. And so, it seems difficult to foresee cease-fire. What is Nicaragua going to do then? Eric Toussaint, Managua Borge: I think indeed that the United States in practice holds a veto over the Guatemala accords. Reagan's intent is to continue his aggression against our country and to block the peace process in Central America. However, there are a series of important factors that make it difficult for him to carry out his plans. The United States had decided to intervene directly in means coe Nicaragua. But then there was the Irangate scandal, the shooting down of Hasenfus's airplane and other elements that prevented such an intervention.

In the same way, I think that a series of factors are going to emerge that will force the government of the United States to accept the reality of the Guatemala accords. The American government's wish is to liquidate the Nicaraguan revolutionary process. But it has not succeeded in doing this. The fact that this intention has been implicit shows the extent of the difficulties that it faces in trying to prevent the implementation of the Guatemela peace accords.

Moreover, if Reagan intervened with his own peace plan a few days before the meeting of the five Central American presidents, that shows that he was in a difficult situation that forced him to give ground to a certain extent. Even though the way the plan is formulated is unacceptable to us, we would be prepared to open a discussion on it. In fact, this plan reflects a certain flexibility on Reagan's part. What is more, one might suppose that Reagan will encounter certain difficulties in retreating from it.

Toussaint: Do you think this peace accord is a victory for Nicaragua?

Borge: I think that it is a victory for all the Central American countries and most especially for ours, which is undoubtedly the one with the greatest interest at stake in these accords. It is not surprising that we have already started to implement it. We take account of the fact that we face a real danger of an invasion by the United States.

The signing of this peace accord puts difficulties in the way of Reagan getting congressional approval for new subsidies to the contras. Rejecting new subsidies to the contras would be the best contribution American members of Congress could make to the implementation of the Guatemala peace accords. In this way also, they would open up an honorable way out for the Reagan administration. Moreover, the very fact that the United States agreed to accept dialogue, even if the starting points were unacceptable to us, represents a step forward.

After long internal discussions, the Sandinista leadership decided to open a dialogue on the basis of the American proposition, knowing full well that the United States would defend a position completely contrary to our interests.

It has to be understood that in any negotiation, the parties involved begin by taking the most intransigent positions. Should we think for example that the United States is going to say to us: "Gentlemen, we recognize your existence. We are going to stop our aid to the contras. We agree to say that you are a legitimate government. We support the autonomy plan for the Atlantic coast. We think you are respecting human rights." Obviously, that would not be negotiating; it is a total utopia.

Regardless of negotiations, the Reagan administration's point of view will always [be] in conflict with ours. Nonetheless, we must find a means for coexistence. We take the interests of the United States into consideration, even if they see them in a way that is quite out of line with reality.

They are afraid that Soviet bases will be established in Nicaragua. Alright, that is a concrete point on which we can come to an agreement. We can offer a pledge about that. However, they feel perfectly free to set up American bases everywhere it suits them and to station troops everywhere in the world. But it is totally intolerable to them that other countries station troops abroad.

Well, we are realists. We recognize that American imperialism exists, and we consider that we could reach an agreement that would put an end to some of the United States' worries.

What is not negotiable is our national sovereignty and the existence of revolution. But it is precisely these things that are being challenged by the United States. Now, they are terribly worried because the Persian Gulf has been partially mined. But they themselves mined the for coexistence... But port of Corinto, that is, "right under our nose"! That is the way they are! That is how unjustly they treat the rest of the world, and not just the poor countries.

Toussaint: What is the situation of the contras?

Borge: To gauge the strength of an army, you have to look at its morale in combat and not only just its armaments. For example, shortly before the triumph of the revolution, the forces and equipment of Somoza's National Guard were intact. But a series of politico-military factors led to its defeat. On this level, the morale of our armed forces is excellent, and the same cannot be said for the contras.

The contras adopted a strategic perspective of inflicting a military defeat on the armed forces of the revolution and of taking power. They have given up this objective and adopted another—to create ideal conditions for American military intervention.

Before adopting this new strategic objective, they tried to take a stretch of Nicaraguán territory in order to set up a government, they tried unsuccessfully to occupy a city, to stabilize a contra zone in order to establish a strategic bastion. They did not achieve these objectives, evidently, since their zone of influence is in the north near Honduras. That is the real theater of the war, regardless (continued on page 15)

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(continued from page 14) of the fact they have been able to penetrate as far as they have into the interior of the country.

It has been very important to us to understand the enemy's strategy in order to establish our own priorities. Since the contras did not manage to stabilize large compact military units, since they did not manage to get enough military personnel to form such big units and However, until we reach an overall and simultaneous accord in Central America, nothing requires us to suspend the state of emergency. Before such an accord, we can decide to suspend the state of emergency only if we think that the conditions have been assembled for this. The state of emergency is not an end in itself. It is a temporary measure designed to meet the needs of a war situation.

Now, in the present conditions, we cannot lay down to revolutionary vigilance, in any case not in the form that was practiced a few years ago.

The CDS are the trustees and interpreters of the demands of the people in the neighborhood. Thus, these people have a channel for advancing their immediate demands-demands that are not outside the political

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American peace plan. The interview was given to

vereignty and thi not negotiable."