Red Rosa's fight for the second revolutionary socialism

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14 SOCIALIST ACTION JULY 1987 The high point occurred late in 1917 when one of the less prominent of the European socialist parties led the world's first successful proletarian revolution in Russia. The low point had been three years earlier, on Aug. 4, 1914, when the mightiest socialist party of them all—the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) suddenly betrayed its Marxist heritage and collapsed as a revolutionary force.

On that day, the SPD's parliamentary delegation voted to approve funding for the German government's imperialist war plans. Four years later, the SPD itself would become the governing party in Germany and would use its power to suppress a massive revolutionary uprising of the workers.

These momentous historical events form the background of a new film focusing on the most important of the revolutionary leaders—Rosa Luxemburg. The film deserves high grades for historical accuracy and artistic quality. Barbara Sukowa, who plays the title role, won the Best Actress prize at last year's Cannes Film Festival.

The film's main shortcoming, in my opinion, is its tendency to oversentimentalize Rosa Luxemburg and to play up her "vulnerability."

In one objectionable scene, Luxemburg blurts out something suggesting that her political activity was a product of frustration due to lack of fulfillment in other aspects of her life. Whether or not the scriptwriter found that line somewhere in Luxemburg's correspondence, it is essentially a distortion of her revolutionary commitment.

Nonetheless, von Trotta's portrait of Rosa Luxemburg is a sympathetic one. "Rosa," says Sukowa, " was different from the characters I usually play—probably the only woman I've played who is not neurotic."

Other historical figures who come on screen or are mentioned include August Bebel, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, Carl Legien, Philipp Scheidemann, Friedrich Ebert, and Eduard Bernstein. A full appreciation of the film requires some familiarity with the roles played by some of these people in the SPD's decline and fall.

mass revolutionary party From modest beginnings in 1875, the German Social Democratic Party rose to become the largest political party in the country on the eve of World War I. It claimed a million members, 90 daily newspapers, and the votes of more than one-third of the electorate.

Social Democratic sports clubs, women's organizations, youth groups, consumers' cooperatives-even singing clubs—provided the day-to-day focus of culture for the German working class.

What made this an historically unique social phenomenon was the SPD'S explicitly Marxist revolutionary program. The point of departure of its 1891 Erfurt Program was the "ever bitterer class-war between bourgeoisie and proletariat."

What a shock it was, then, when the party's 110 delegates to the Reichstag voted unanimously in favor of war credits for the capitalist government.

The Aug. 4, 1914, vote also marked the collapse of the Second International. Since the German SPD was by far the International's strongest component, its defection alone would have sunk the International. In addition, however, most of its other sections-most importantly, the French-also lined up in support of their respective governments' war efforts.

As Rosa Luxemburg noted, this made a mockery of the International's slogan, "Workers of the world, unite!" Instead of uniting, the German and French workers would fight and kill each other with the blessing and encouragement of their own socialist parties.

The seemingly inexorable growth of the SPD vote (from 3 percent in 1871 to 10 percent in 1887 to 20 percent in 1890 to 35 percent in 1912) led some to believe that one day it would surpass the 50 percent mark and the party would take over the goverment.

Reformism and revisionism

This stimulated the growth of a purely parliamentary tendency within the SPD—a moderate wing that began to eschew any radicalism that might frighten middle-class voters.

Another center of reform politics was developing in the SPD-led trade unions. Membership statistics indicate the unions' explosive growth—from 277,600 members in 1890 to 1,344,000 in 1905 to almost two-and-a-half million in 1914.

The unions developed their own insurance system covering strike pay, sickness, accidents, and unemployment— thus becoming wealthy organizations and gaining a vested interest in the maintenance of capitalism.

The issue arose as to whether the unions were to remain subordinated to party policy and the long-range goal of social transformation. Central union leader Carl Legien believed that the unions should stick to the task of improving workers' wages and working conditions-and even promote friendly relations with "reasonable" employers.

A rise in labor militancy occurred in 1905. Union leaders tried to dampen it, in particular trying to hold back the growth of a coal strike in the Ruhr. But the strikes spread rapidly.

Meanwhile, the Russian Revolution of 1905 broke out, taking the form of mass political strikes. Similar actions began to occur spontaneously in Germany. The SPD revolutionaries led by Rosa Luxemburg, inspired by the events in Russia, grew stronger. They demanded that the party call and lead political strikes.

The conservative labor leaders were appalled by the idea; their desire to cut their ties with the party intensified. At the SPD's Mannheim Congress in 1906, the union leaders demanded and won recognition of their independence from party control. In fact, although it was not openly acknowledged, the trade-union leaders had begun to control the party.

The great revisionist debate Meanwhile, in the SPD itself, the leadership was also becoming more conservative. By 1914 the party, tradeunion, and related apparatuses had grown tremendously, numbering approximately 3500. A hierarchical leadership structure and a large paid staff began to crystalize into a permanent bureaucracy with social interests different from those of rank-and-file party members.

These conservatizing tendencies found partial expression in the "great revisionist debate" that raged in the SPD, and through it in the International, from 1898 through 1903.

In 1898, Eduard Bernstein, a leading party intellectual who had been a close associate of Friedrich Engels, published a series of articles that sharply challenged the Marxist basis of the party's Erfurt Program.

In essence, Bernstein held that Marx's negative prognosis for the capitalist system had not come to pass; capitalism seemed, after all, to be capable of producing lasting peace and prosperity.

The workers' movement, according to Bernstein, should therefore drop its aim of overthrowing capitalism and instead should work to improve the lives of workers within the capitalist system. In his most famous statement, Bernstein asserted: "The final goal, no matter what it is, is nothing; the movement is everything."

This message was in harmony with the outlook of the trade-union officials and other conservatizing elements in the party. It was disturbing, however, to the vast majority of rank-and-file members and to those party leaders who understood that the SPD's raison d'etre was its goal— socialism.

Rosa Luxemburg was the first to challege Bernstein. Before long, however, August Bebel, Karl Kautsky, and others joined the battle. When votes were taken, Bernstein seemed to be an isolated figure. But beneath the surface, Bernstein's natural allies were simply keeping mum for the time being.

"Not a revolution-making party"

Between the outright opportunists and the revolutionary faction known as the "Rosa group" was a large center tendency best exemplified by the long-time numberone leader of the SPD, August Bebel.

Bebel was certainly no mean-spirited bureaucrat, but his concept of the socialist revolution was not one that required the party to take revolutionary action. The socialist revolution, he believed, would not be made, it would happen. Capitalism's internal contradictions would inexorably lead it to self-destruct; then the socialists could pick up the pieces and reconstruct society on a new basis.

Karl Kautsky summed up this view most succinctly when he described the SPD as a "revolutionary but not revolution-making party."

The main task for the party, then, was to exist—to survive the capitalist crash intact. Whenever spontaneous mass actions began to break out, the Bebel leadership would seek to channel them into indoor rallies and away from street demonstrations that might come into conflict with the police.

In the crucial period leading up to August 1914; this tradition of self-restraint at all costs served to demobilize the SPD ranks and to frustrate all attempts at actions against the government's war moves. If there were to be a fight, the mighty SPD would enter it with its hands tied behind its back.

The "Rosa group" was a relatively small but influential revolutionary faction in the SPD led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the son of SPD founder As the war approached, Luxemburg and Liebknecht attempted to rouse the party into action. They led an uphill fight against the government's moves toward war. The central SPD leadership, however, resisted. On the other hand, it did not attempt to resist the rising tide of chauvinism in German society.

The triumph of German nationalism among the German workers at the outset of the war was not a foregone conclusion. Had the SPD waged a serious campaign against the saber-rattling government, it would have undoubtedly suffered a temporary loss in popularity. But that it ultimately would have been successful is indicated by how quickly the nationalistic fervor evaporated during the course of the war.

In 1913, the government presented a record-breaking military expansion bill to the Reichstag. SPD tradition demanded "not a penny, not a man" be approved. But this bill included a new twist: The money was to be raised by direct rather than indirect taxation.

Since the SPD had long demanded direct taxation as more equitable for the working class, a majority of the party's parliamentary fraction wanted to vote for the bill. Their rationale was that if they voted against the bill, the military appropriations part would pass anyway, but the money would be raised by indirect taxation.

Rosa Luxemburg charged, prophetically, that "you will get yourself into the situation where, if war breaks out...you will then logically support the approval of war credits." Nevertheless, the SPD delegation voted to support the bill. For the (continued 15) on

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Karl Liebknecht speaks at the gravesite of revolutionary workers killed in the fighting. Two weeks later, he and Rosa Luxemburg would be brutally murdered. German soldiers and sailors, back from the front, fly Gate in Berlin in November 1918.

(continued from page 14) first time, the SPD was on record as supporter of government arms spending.

The SPD votes for war Thus, the stage was set for the final act. In late July 1914, with the outbreak of war imminent, Social Democratic trade-union leaders paid a secret visit to the Reich Office of the Interior.

They proclaimed their loyalty to the government, and in return were reassured that the government would not outlaw them during the war; on the contrary, it would welcome their cooperation banning strikes for the duration of the war.

On Aug. 4, the entire SPD fractionincluding Karl Liebknecht-cast its votes in the Reichstag in support of war credits. The pressure on SPD delegates to vote as a unified bloc was enormous; any delegate who dared to "break discipline" would risk personal ostracism and political isolation.

Later, however, on Dec. 3, 1914, Liebknecht cast his historic lone vote against war credits. Twice more, in March and August 1915, Liebknecht would stand alone. His lone votes made him a rallying point for the antiwar forces that ultimately would rise up and put an end to the war.

With the vote on Aug. 4, 1914, the career of the SPD as a revolutionary party definitely ended. The extent to which this came as a surprise can be gauged by Lenin's initial reaction. He thought the reports of the Reichstag vote were "disinformation" spread by the German general staff.

Rosa Luxemburg gave voice to the opinion of revolutionaries everywhere in her assessment of the SPD from that moment as "a stinking corpse." She and Liebknecht initiated an organized faction within the SPD that would evolve first into the Spartacus group and later into the KPD, the Communist Party of Germany.

When the anticipated quick German military triumph failed to materialize, patriotic enthusiasm rapidly turned into disillusionment. War weariness was most strongly felt among supporters of the SPD.

A section of the SPD leadership— including Hugo Haase, George Ledebour, Karl Kautsky, and Eduard Bernstein-began the red flag at Brandenburg Germany, country Oct. 26, 1918.

On Oct. 28, naval commanders ordered a last-ditch, all-out naval battle in the North Sea. But the sailors mutinied and joined the workers of Kiel in a revolutionary uprising.

On Nov. 4, the governor of Kiel resigned, and the Workers' and Soldiers' Council took power in the town. The German revolution had arrived and it began to spread like wildfire. The Free Republic of Bavaria was proclaimed in Munich on Nov. 7.

On Nov. 9, the revolution reached Berlin. Hundreds of thousands of workers downed their tools and joined huge throngs of demonstrators who had poured into the city from the suburbs.

The Kaiser fled over the border to Holland. The Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, resigned, announced the Kaiser's abdication, and handed the government over to Friedrich Ebert as head of the largest Reichstag party, the SPD.

Von Baden, however, was giving away power he had already lost. The real political basis of Ebert's authority was to come from the revolution itself. Workers councils were elected in the factories and soldiers' councils in the barracks. An Executive Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils claimed full power throughout Germany, as the workers occupied all the government buildings.

On Nov. 10, the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council made Ebert head of the government. Although the SPD's influence over the workers had declined during the war, the revolutionary upsurge had refurbished its image as "the party of August Bebel," who had died in 1913.

Thus did the reformist SPD leaders find themselves—against their will—in sole possession of state power in Germany. Party leader Philipp Scheidemann had wanted to maintain the monarchy, but realized that it was no longer possible. Instead, he proclaimed the birth of the German Republic and became its prime minister.

Free Socialist Republic!"

Meanwhile, Karl Liebknecht led a massive demonstration to the Hohenzollern but in a new socialist disguise. On Nov. 10, Ebert concluded a pact with General Groener, restoring, for all practical purposes, the authority of the old military leadership. The old state bureaucracy was also retained virtually unchanged.

Birth of the KPD These events caused a crisis in the USPD. In December, the USPD members resigned from the government. Left oppositionists called a national conference in Berlin on Dec. 29, 1918, out of which the Communist Party (KPD) was born with a program written by Rosa Luxemburg. ..Two weeks later, Gustav Noske's Free Corps arrested and assassinated Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

Barabara Sukowa, who plays the Luxemburg role in the film, explains that "Rosa was the first victim of National Socialism; her murderers later rallied around Hitler." While that is true, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the criminals were not simply "rightists" but were reformist socialists. The murders were ordered by SPD leaders.

The USPD rank and file began to see "Social Democrat" as synonymous with "cop" and started looking to revolutionary Russia for inspiration. The great majority of the ranks joined the KPD in June 1920, transforming it into a mass Communist Party. Most of the abandoned USPD leaders later—in 1922—returned to the SPD.

The KPD, in its early years, seemed to offer a revolutionary alternative to the SPD. As the Third International (formed at the initiative of the Soviet Bolshevik Party) succumbed to Stalinism, however, the KPD followed suit. Stalin's popularfront policies, ironically, required the KPD to do what it had condemned the SPD for doing-collaborate with capitalist parties.

In spite of the fact that in Weimar Germany both the KPD and the SPD would collaborate with nonsocialist forces, they would not collaborate with each other. It was this sectarian refusal to unite in self-defense against the Nazi onslaught that made Hitler's rise appear so easy.

In summary, out of the First World War a workers' revolution emerged in Germany-placing power in the hands of the workers' representatives, the SPD. But the SPD gave it back to the capitalists. No social transformation took place.

A similar attempt had been made by the Menshevik Party and other reformist socialists in Russia. A revolution had given power to the workers' and soldiers' councils ("soviets"), in which the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionary Party held a majority. They insisted, however, on sharing power with ministers representing liberal capitalist parties in a provisional government.

When the provisional government betrayed its pacifistic promises, the warweary Russian people turned to the revolutionary antiwar faction. The Bolsheviks took power, but did not give it back, and withdrew Russia from the war as promised.

The key factor that determined the different outcomes of the German and Russian revolutions was that in Germany there was no disciplined revolutionary party of the Bolshevik type that could concentrate and coordinate the revolutionary forces.

That is not to say, however, that Luxemburg and Liebknecht should be faulted for not doing in Germany what Lenin did in Russia. The Bolsheviks' reformist opponents were nowhere near as powerfully organized as the SPD apparatus that the German revolutionists faced.

For revolutionists today, the lessons to be learned from our predecessors' defeats are no less valuable than those learned from the victories. Von Trotta's film "Rosa Luxemburg" brings to life a revolutionary defeat second to none in importance.