Commander Omar Cabezas speaks: 'Our revolution will not be destroyed'

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Special: The Nicaraguan Revolution responsibilities other revolutionists America.

But some 20 years went by and the geo-political situation globally underwent sweeping changes. The revolutionary movement worldwide was also affected.

The United States under John Kennedy, immediately after the Cuban Revolution, launched the Alliance for Progress and a terrible anti-Communist campaign.

But the model of development proposed by the Alliance for Progress as an alternative to the Cuban Revolution soon entered into a deep crisis, both economically and politically. This gave rise to an upsurge of important revolutionary movements in all of Latin America.

These are heroic pages of our revolutionary history. But the people of the continent after the failures of the guerrilla movements of Che and others began seeking other options. The most important of these was Chile, where the movement used bourgeois legality to come to government-not to power.

The situation in Latin America continued to evolve. And Central America became one of the weakest links in the chain.

We in Nicaragua, of a series "The 'mixed' economy...can last whatever amount o time is necessary."

economic, political and historic circumstances, succeeded in the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship.

Now to get to your question, I think our revolution has survived because of our political maturity, because of our essentially correct political strategy and course.

We have needed to triumph, survive, and consolidate a revolutionary power—a popular power.

Chile was destroyed six years before our revolution. But we will not allow ourselves to be destroyed. If we allow ourselves to be destroyed after taking political power arms in hand—unlike Allende—we would permit the revolution to be postponed in the rest of Central America for as much as 50 years.

We are not going to let this occur-particularly at a time of bright perspectives for revolutionary developments in the rest of Central and South America.

So we began to develop a political project that would permit us to attain our strategic objectives without sacrificing the Central American and Latin American revolutionary movements. And this hasn't been easy—particularly given the current stage of development of our revolution.

When the Reagan administration came to power in the United States and began implementing its program, our revolution was barely a year and a half old. We didn't have a regular organized army that could defend the revolution. Our actions to defend the revolution and avert a U.S. invasion at that time had to be fundamentally political and diplomatic. • So we started to maneuver in order to survive. We took account of the entire world and national political situation and realized that our desires and hopes were one thing, but reality and what was objectively possible was quite another thing. We realized it was not enough to want to move ahead rapidly. Wanting to attain an objective doesn't mean being able to attain it.

So then we started to buy time and to give time to our brothers and sisters in the rest of Central America to deepen and advance their revolutionary movements.

And we have succeeded in this objective thanks to a correct tactical political line of internal and international class alliances that have served us as an umbrella against foreign intervention.

And, I repeat, this policy has worked. For instance, the United States before intervening has to think twice about the European Economic Community and the response of the Latin America governments, who support the Contadora process.

The U.S. government has differences with its allies. Even large numbers of the North American people don't support the Reagan administration's policies.

All of these are the elements of the umbrella that protected our revolution against U.S. intervention from 1980 to 1985. The U.S. imperialists have never lacked the desire to invade us. But they haven't been able to bring together the necessary internal and external conditions to do so.

The political relationship of forces which we consciously generated internally and externally have not permitted the United States to invade us.

This finally is what explains why we have carried out a policy of "mixed economy" and political pluralism. We have declared that we don't want to be Communists like the Soviets, nor capitalists like the United States. We want to be Sandinistas.

But the real power is in our hands. We decide when to go forward and when to retreat.

The transformations of the socio-economic structures go beyond the desires and wills of individuals. They are objective processes and are determined by objective laws of social development.

Our social development toward other economic structures passes through geo-politics and through the economic structures of the rest of Latin America. So political pluralism and the "mixed economy" is not a question of mere conjuncture. It obeys new laws determining how the transition toward new socio-economic structures will be attained in the future.

The most important thing here is to preserve power so that those socio-economic structures can be overturned at an appropriate time in the future; at a time the objective and subjective conditions in Nicaragua and Central America are gathered.

The overturn of these socio-economic property relations and structures cannot be carried out by decree. It cannot be done as it was done in Cuba or Indochina.

This is particularly so when the socialist camp is not in the position of entering a Third World War on account of us. And when we don't have borders with other friendly countries.

So we have laid out a political project of "mixed economy" and political pluralism that can last whatever amount of time is necessary.

But as I said before the three fundamental conditions for the success of this project are the people, the people's army, and the FSLN.

S.A.: In our view, in every country where the economic power of the ruling class has been (continued on page 11)

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Over the past few years, the U.S. government has increased its offensive against the Nicaraguan Revolution, demonstrating its clear intention to overthrow the Sandinista government.

The Reagan administration, with the support of the Democratic Party, has placed an economic embargo on Nicaragua and is now seeking additional economic and military aid to the contras.

The contras, despite the enormous aid they receive from their supporters in the United States, have demonstrated their inability to seriously challenge the FSLN government. But the contra war is an essential component of U.S. imperialist policy.

The contra war is aimed at wearing down the revolution and undermining popular support for the government by forcing the FSLN to allocate 50 percent of the federal budget to defense; money which has been diverted from essential economic and social programs. The war has also caused serious material and human losses.

Through the contra war, the United States also hopes to force the Sandinistas to grant major concessions to the imperialists; concessions that would disfigure and ultimately divide a revolution that has been an example for working people everywhere.

At this point, the U.S. government has preferred support to the contras and other destabilization tactics to direct U.S. military intervention. It is fully aware that a U.S. invasion would be met with a massive mobilization of armed workers and peasants in Nicaragua and would lead to a prolonged war that would be extremely unpopular at home.

A U.S. invasion of Nicaragua would also lead to an explosive situation throughout Latin America, a region already devastated by the burden of foreign debt. The Latin American capitalists see a major confrontation in Central America as a threat to their own stability. This is why they support a negotiated settlement of the conflict through the Contadora process.

In addition, other pressures are now being exerted against the Nicaraguan Revolution. The U.S. government and the Soviet bureaucracy made it known that one point of their discussions and negotiations at the Geneva disarmament summit was Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguans have been forced to turn to the Eastern bloc countries for necessary military and economic aid. Twenty-five percent of their trade is with these countries. But by providing aid with an eyedropper, the Soviet bureaucracy is in a position to attempt to contain the Nicaraguan Revolution within the limits of its policy of peaceful coexistence.

Capitalists control economy

Despite all the efforts of the enemies of the Nicaraguan Revolution, the Sandinista government has not been toppled.

The revolution, led by the FSLN, has taken many important steps forward: The year after the overthrow of the dictatorship, the FSLN leadership broke with the capitalists at the governmental level, thereby establishing a workers' and farmers' government.

This government has armed the workers and peasants, begun the land reform, favored the organization of the masses, satisfied a basic democratic demand by orga -nizing free elections, carried out a literacy campaign, and—after its initial mistakes—moved to resolve the Atlantic Coast problems by offering autonomy to the minority inhabitants of this region.

Yet, while the capitalists lost their political power, they retained the essential reins of the means of production and the economy. A highly contradictory situation had developed in Nicaragua.

Any serious study of Nicaragua must first examine the major problems related to the economy. The first factor to look at is the effects of the contra war and the burden of the U.S. blockade: Over 50 percent of the budget goes to defense, and the effects of an economic blockade on this dependent economy are very great.

But the deterioration of the economy is not due solely to these factors. Political choices have been made by the FSLN government that have contributed to this situation.

There is the issue of the foreign debt, for example, and the burden of its repayment. Somoza left behind a debt of $1.2 billion. Since that time the total debt has climbed to $3.9 billion.

In 1979, the capitalist coalition government [the Government of National Reconstruction] renegotiated payment of the debt under somewhat more "favorable" conditions. But even after the departure of the capitalists from the government, the FSLN pledged to honor this commitment to the imperialist banks and has religiously paid the interest on the debt.

In 1980 the interest payments represented 13.3 percent of the country's export earnings; in 1981 the figure climbed to 34.8 percent; in 1982 it was 47.3 percent, and in 1983 it was 49.6 percent. In 1984 and 1985, payment of the interest on the debt represented over double the 8 SOCIALIST ACTION APRIL 1986 value of export earnings. (Source: Jorge Buarque, Inprecor, No. 198.)

Maintaining Nicaragua in a state of dependency and bondage to the imperialist banks is without doubt one of the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of the U.S. government.

Indeed, two contradictory phenomena mark evolution of the situation in Nicaragua.

One the one hand, there is a continuing imperialist mobilization by the Nicaraguan masses.

Last July 19, over 500,000 people gathered at the Plaza de la Revolucion on the sixth anniversary of the revolution, one of the largest demonstrations ever. The youth are massively mobilized on the war front to drive back the contras. In 1985, the Sandinista Army was able to deal tremendous blows to the contras.

Despite the permanent war tensions and the tremendous sacrifices imposed by the war and the catastrophic economic conditions, the imperialist aggression has fueled exceptional anti-imperialist mobilizations. The Nicaraguan people are conscious of being at the forefront of the struggles in Latin America. This has given them the courage to endure and fight on.

But, on the other hand, a series of negative factors are accumulating under the impact of the war and the drastic economic situation.

Many of the material gains won by the workers and peasants during the first years of the revolution have been reversed. The average standard of living has declined considerably, and there has been a halt in the improvements in health and education.

Signs of fatigue and apathy have surfaced among layers of the population who had initially supported the revolution. This sector of the population does not support the contras but has taken a neutral stance toward the government and is searching for individual solutions to the economic crisis.

President Daniel Ortega stated his concern over the rising dissatisfaction with the conditions of life in Nicaragua in a statement quoted by The New York Times (March 16, 1985). Ortega noted the 328 percent inflation rate, the cutbacks in education and health care programs, and the "errors and deficiencies" of the government. "We are not doing too well," he concluded. "We are having problems.' Capitalist property relations In order to confront the imperialist aggression, the revolution must reinforce its support among Nicaragua's workers ar d peasants, nd for this it must carry the democratic tasks of the revolution: a thorough agrarian reform, national liberation, and the improvement in the standard of living of the population.

The commitment of the masses to the revolution has not been won once and for all. This commitment depends not on ideological preferences, but on the consolidation of tangible material gains.

The FSLN government has made a conscious strategic choice to maintain a "mixed economy," which means maintaining capitalist property relations in the principal means of production.

The Sandinista leaders have justified this choice on the grounds that both "national unity" and a "people's war" are necessary to confront the imperialist aggression. But these two goals are potentially contradictory: To carry out a "people's war" you must satisfy the needs of the people. To carry out a policy of "national unity" you must satisfy the medium and large capitalists.

Hence, the revolution cannot defend itself and advance if it does not overturn capitalist property relations.

The Agrarian Reform During the first years of the revolution, the demands of the peasants for large-scale land distribution were deferred. The Agrarian Reform Law, which was adopted in October 1981, was implemented without affecting the large land holdings-except those of Somoza and his associates.

Unlike other land reform laws in Latin America (Chile, Peru, El Salvador-not to mention the two decrees enacted in Cuba), the 1981 law did not set a ceiling on land ownership. Nor did it distribute the land April 20, 1985, demonstration of 50,000 in San Francisco. The U.S. government knows that an invasion of Nicaragua would spark mass protests. in individ The FS] in this sio populatio Second percent of family, w non-Somc Third, authority many per "producti the exproj Priority the state s of hectare peasantsthe large l The dec Sector (A peasants ti In Febi demander defiance ( followed 1 FSLN ac Nonethele Agrarian I large estat From 1! distributec state sect cultivated Historico August/Se The FSI to the sn shortage ( export inc Historic Ir "the partit occupatior private sec aggression As of cooperati cooperativ But the the allegia the state technical five perc significant In 198‹ benefited five years gone to t individual land distri state secto Soon, 1 respond t remained urgent, gi the discor propagand As of 1 individual border zor was to bei form or ar But the medium oi On Oct told an as:

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Worker at nationalized textile factory (TEXNICSA) in Managua. Factory belonged to Somoza family. Sixty-seven percent of industry, however, is still owned by capitalists. agrarian nt in the ition has depends blidation strategic h means principal ¡e on the le's war" ion. But To carry Is of the ity" you advance IS.

nands of on were adopted cting the and his America the two not set a the land ) 0 in inows ark in individual plots to the landless peasants.

The FSLN had sufficient maneuvering room to proceed in this slow manner for the following reasons: First, the population density in the rural areas was very low.

Second, the state was able to immediately control 20 percent of the lands, which had belonged to the Somoza family, without having to confiscate the lands of the non-Somoza landowners.

Third, the FSLN had earned tremendous moral authority among the masses. This enabled it to dissuade many peasants from occupying the lands of the large "productive" landowners and to hold off on breaking up the expropriated land into small, individual units.

Priority in the agrarian reform program was given to the state sector. After the insurrection, tens of thousands of hectares of land were immediately occupied by the peasants—not only the Somoza lands, but also those of the large landowners.

The decision was made to create the People's Property Sector (APP) on Somoza's lands and to persuade the peasants to return the other occupied lands.

In February 1980, a peasant march in Managua demanded the legalization of all lands occupied in defiance of Sandinista policy. In the confrontation that followed between the FSLN and the rural capitalists, the FSLN acceded to the demands of the peasants. Nonetheless, the principle that would guide the 1981 Agrarian Reform law was that the cultivated land of the large estates not be touched.

From 1979 to 1981 only 1 percent of the lands were distributed to the peasants in individual plots, while the state sector grew from 20 percent to 23 percent of all cultivated land. (Source: Envio, No. 46-47, Instituto Historico Centroamericano, Managua, French edition, August/September 1985.)

The FSLN had postponed the distribution of the land to the small peasants, fearing this would lead to a shortage of labor power at harvest time in the agro-export industry. According to the Central American Historic Institute of Managua, the FSLN also feared that "the partition of the land would provoke a wave of land occupations that would have broken the contract with the private sector, which was indispensable to confront U.S. aggression." (Ibid.)

As of 1983, emphasis was placed on developing cooperative forms of agricultural production. Today cooperatives represent 10 percent of the cultivated lands.

But the cooperative sector is far from having gained the allegiance of the peasantry. This is primarily because the state has been unable to provide the necessary technical support for cooperative production. Seventy-five percent of the cooperatives have received no significant aid from the state.

In 1984, 22 percent of the peasant families had benefited from the cooperative or state sector. But after five years of revolution, only 17 percent of the land had gone to the poor peasants, either in collective or individual forms of tenancy. Moreover, nearly half the land distributed to the peasants had been taken from the state sector-not from the large capitalist estates.

Soon, however, the FSLN found itself having to respond to the immense demand for land that still remained largely unaddressed. This was all the more urgent, given that the contras had begun to find among the discontented peasants a favorable terrain for their propaganda and recruitment.

As of 1984, the FSLN accelerated the distribution of individual plots to the poor peasants. This began in the border zones where the contras were attacking. The goal was to benefit 50 percent of the rural population in one form or another by the end of 1985.

But the principle of not confiscating lands from the medium or large landowners remained unaltered.

On Oct. 21, 1984, FSLN Commander Victor Tirado told an assembly of middle peasants: "In the framework of the 'mixed economy,' we proclaim once more our respect for rural property ownership. The era of the large land confiscations came to an end with the expropriation of Somoza's lands."

The FSLN's agrarian policy, which has sought to preserve "national unity" with the big landlords while strengthening its support among the rural poor, has been fraught with contradictions. The best example of this is the peasant mobilization in Masaya in May-June 1985.

The case of Masaya Masaya is a very impoverished department. Large numbers of rural dwellers, who can't make a living off the land, work in nearby Managua throughout the year in a number of commercial activities.

Masaya was a bastion of the FSLN during the last years of the anti-Somoza struggle. But already in 1980, in defiance of FSLN policy, the peasants were marching on Managua to demand the legalization of the nonSomoza lands they had occupied.

In 1982 and 1983, the people of Masaya stood out for their exemplary role in the militias and the reserve battalions of the Sandinista Army.

But the non-resolution of the historic demand of land to the peasants, coupled with the general deterioration of the standard of living, led to a sort of "political strike" by the people of Masaya. This included widespread refusal to serve in the army, extremely low participation at the FSLN meetings, and low voter support for the FSLN in the elections of November 1984 (the FSLN obtained only 55 percent of the vote, way below the national average).

Discontent in Masaya grew with the steep rise in the inflation rate resulting from the February 1985 economic program. This provoked new mobilizations in May 1985: Hundreds of peasants occupied the state-owned lands and the lands of three big private estates. They demanded that these lands be distributed to them.

The FSLN responded by turning over the state-owned lands to the peasants and by negotiating with the 18 landowners whose lands had been occupied. The state offered to buy their lands at full market value and to give them fertile state-owned lands in other regions of the country where peasant pressure for the land was not as strong.

Only one of the big landlords, Enrique Bolanos, president of the Supreme Council of the Private Sector (COSEP), refused this exchange and had his land expropriated. Bolanos then raised a hue and cry about the "collectivist threat." But he still owns 300 hectares of coffee-growing land in Masaya.

Before June 1985, 7400 rural families had not received any land in Masaya. After the FSLN measures of mid1985, there were still 6100 families without land.

A real step forward On Jan. 11, 1986, the Nicaraguan government amended the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law. The new legislation will make access to the land easier for the rural poor. It is a real step forward.

The first targets of the decree are abandoned and unused land, as well as the property of landlords openly collaborating with the contras.

Two principles of the FSLN's agrarian policy still guide the new decree: "Productive" lands of the big landlords will not be affected, and all confiscated lands will be compensated at declared value in the form of state bonds.

But, for the first time, the big capitalists who are using their land productively can also be affected under the law. A clause stipulates that "public necessity or the interests of society" can be grounds for taking over the land.

The new amendment permits the government to deepen the land reform and to modify the structure of property ownership in the countryside.

Industry: Impossibility of planning Sixty-seven percent of industry in Nicaragua is still controlled by the private sector. The Nicaraguan capitalists waver between a policy of short-term survival (refusing to invest their capital for the medium or long term) and a policy of open sabotage of the economy (capital flight, speculation).

Paradoxically, the U.S. economic blockade has hurt the more developed sector of the Nicaraguan capitalist class the most. The export-oriented sector depends on U.S. machinery and spare parts.

Obviously the Reagan administration has consciously sought to push the Nicaraguan bosses who were willing to go along with the Sandinista "national unity" program into the arms of the contras. The blockade essentially prevents them from turning a profit, FSLN policy notwithstanding.

The mechanisms of industrial control and regulation implemented by the Sandinistas have proven ineffective: The notion that the state sector could reactivate the Wendy economy has proven to be illusory, given the weakness of the state sector. So long as the capitalists retain the essential reins of production and distribution, the laws of commodity production and exchange continuously regenerate the economic power of the capitalists.

All attempts at planning have proven impossible, to the point that the Ministry of Planning was actually disbanded in early 1985. Since the nationalization of the 168 Somoza-owned factories and the expropriation of the capitalists who left the country or openly "decapitalized" in 1980 and 1981, the structure of property ownership has not changed.

The state has not deepened its inroads into capitalist property, as has often been claimed. The laws of capitalist economics prevail and will continue to impose their will so long as the state does not control the principal means of producton.

Speculation and sabotage

The continued primacy of capitalist property relations has also made it impossible to carry out an effective struggle against the economic sabotage of the capitalists (continued on page 10)

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...Way forward (continued from page 9) and the speculators. At the same time, it has made it impossible to orient the economy toward the defense of the gains of the revolution.

In an economy primarily oriented toward the production and export of agricultural commodities, control of the intermediate goods sector is key to providing necessary assistance to agricultural production. Nicaragua does not produce tractors—it imports them—but it produces fertilizers, insecticides, tools, and spare parts for buses. Yet, 73 percent of this strategic sector is in private hands.

Claes Brundenius put it this way in his comprehensive study, "Strategy of Industrial Development in Nicaragua from 1979 to 1984 (Instituto de Investigaciones Eco -nomicas y Sociales, Managua, January 1985):

"If the capitalists refuse to accept the rules of the game and their role as partners in the plans of national development as outlined in the ideological project of the Sandinista Revolution, and if, on the contrary, they continue to decapitalize and even send their capital abroad, there can only be one result: The increase of confiscations of their properties and the increased role of the state in the economy.

"This would surely create a more solid base for socialist planning, but it would also create a vicious circle, with the capitalists losing more and more confidence in the long-term objectives of the Sandinista Revolution. This would in turn lead to further confiscations, and so on."

Brundenius puts his finger on impossible for the FSLN to CUNA NORNSE Nicaragua's cities Over 50 percent merce and street vending.

decapitalization and to effectively reactivate the economy without confronting the Nicaraguan capitalist class. But once this is done, it will inevitably set off a chain reaction among the capitalists. You cannot roast a live lamb on a low flame without the lamb realizing it is being roasted.

Moving effectively to control industrial development will necessitate a confrontation with the capitalists, and this confrontation must be prepared. This, however, has not been the policy of the Sandinistas to date.

The distribution system The economic situation continues to worsen and to even take on a dramatic character: The war and the blockade have aggravated the shortages, but the measures of the government to halt speculation have proven ineffective.

In this context, a parallel or informal commercial sector of the economy has mushroomed-the street vendors or petty merchants. Managua has been flooded by poor peasants in search of a better livelihood. Even the workers in the productive sector have turned to small retail selling because it pays better.

Over 50 percent of the economically in Managua lives off of commerce, vending—all non-productive labor.

an important point: It is prevent sabotage and continue to be flooded by of the economically active active population retail, and street 10 SOCIALIST ACTION APRIL 1986 At the same time, an informal capitalist sector is developing that is making super-profits from commercial speculation. These are the 300 large wholesalers who control 180,000 small businessmen and shopkeepers. (Source: William Robinson, Panorama, March 1985.)

This parallel market is a privileged terrain for all the hoarders, saboteurs, and other conscious agents of economic destablilization. This unproductive sector also attracts the money of the capitalists at the expense of productive investment.

The FSLN government, conscious of this danger, attempted to regulate prices and distribution by insti -tuting the Consumer Defense Law in May 1984.

Basic staples were subsidized by the government, and a low fixed price was guaranteed to the consumer. The state, together with the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS), took responsiblilty for part of the distribution system. The CDS's were also assigned to exercise forms of price controls and to turn the speculators over to the Ministry of Commerce.

In February 1985, however, this policy was abandoned and another approach taken. Price controls were removed. Subsidies for basic staples were removed. A tax on the super-profits of the wholesalers was established, and new measures to stimulate production in the private capitalist sector were adopted.

The consequences of this shift were immediately felt. Far from putting a brake on inflation, these measures sharply fueled an escalating inflationary spiral. From January to May 1985, the price of basic staples rose between 300 percent and 500 percent, while wages only increased between 120 percent and 180 percent (Envio, August/September 1985).

Those most hurt by these measures were the industrial and agricultural workers and the poor peasants, i.e., the Tony Ryan poor peasants in search of a better livelihood. population in Managua lives off of small comsocial base of the revolution. The well-to-do capitalists, however, were able to take full advantage of the incentives and price deregulation.

Another consequence of these measures was that the CDS's had their control over prices and distribution removed. This didn't occur without provoking some discontent, however. The role of the CDS's was reduced to helping the municipal administrations resolve the problems of the neighborhood, such as vaccinations, water, electricity, and anti-alcohol campaigns.

The road to resolving the problems of prices and distribution does not lie in outlawing the small vendors or in removing them from the streets-as is done in many South American countries. It is necessary for the state to take charge of the commercialization system. This means making inroads into the large merchant capitalist class which owns all the transport vehicles.

February 1985: A shift The economic measures of February 1985 were not accompanied by measures against the speculators. The new tax will provide the state with an additional source of revenue, but it does not attack the deeper underlying problem.

The February measures don't signify a change in the FSLN's policy of the "mixed economy." On the contrary, they are designed to reactivate the economy through the capitalist sector, while buying "neutrality" from the middle class and demanding that all the sacrifices come from the popular sectors.

The majority of the state credits, for example, have gone to the private sector (53 percent on the average since 1979). And now, after February 1985, the state will provide the private sector with U.S. dollars to buy supplies and spare parts. It is hoped this will reactivate the economy. In fact, this is an incredible gift to the capitalists to further their speculation!

The contra war has devastated the economy. But the FSLN could have-and still can—make other policy choices. There is no alternative but to overturn the remaining power of the capitalist class—to transform the Broad forward is the Cuba took."

property relations.

Such a course would represent a major str for ward in the defense of the revolution. It would r nfo rce the FSLN's social base and reactivate the mass organizations.

The example of Cuba Six years after the the only victorious insurrection, the only road forward for the Nicaragua Revolution is the road Cuba took in 1960.

In January 1959 in Cuba, the offensive of the Castroists and a mass insurrection toppled the Batista dictatorship. The instruments of repression of the old regime were destroyed. In the fall of that year, the stimulated the mobilization of the workers and peasants.

Confronted with an imperialist blockade and direct threats against the revolution, this government armed the workers and peasants. It carried through to completion the anti-imperialist struggle by expropriating the property of imperialism as well as that of the Cuban capitalists.

This occurred in the fall of 1960. A workers' state arose based on central planning and the collective ownership of the means of production.

This is how the Cuban leadership, in the mid-1970s, explained the lessons of their own revolution:

"Yet, in the conditions of a country like Cuba, could the revolution limit itself simply to national liberation while maintaining a regime of capitalist exploitation? Or was it not necessary to move forward toward full social liberation as well?

"Imperialism could not even tolerate a revolution of national liberation in Cuba. From the time of the first Agrarian Reform Law, the United States began to organize a military operation against Cuba. They were even less disposed to tolerate socialism in our country.

"The simple idea that a victorious revolution in Cuba could provide an example for all Latin America, frightened the Yankee ruling circles. But the Cuban nation had no other alternative. The people could not be stopped.

"Our national and our social liberation were inextricably bound up. Moving forward became a historic necessity. Standing still would have been an act of treason and cowardice that would have transformed us once again into a Yankee colony and wage slaves." (Fidel Castro, Speech to the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, December 1975)

What the Cuban leadership did in 1960, the FSLN can and must do in Nicaragua today.

Many in the workers' movement say this is not possible, however. The Stalinist Communist parties, for example, explain that the objective conditions in all Latin America do not exist for a "socialist transformation." They say a "democratic stage" is necessary to develop the productive forces of society and to pave the road for later socialist transformations.

This well-known Stalinist. argument has been used to justify. one betrayal after another. It is a policy that justifies class collaborationism to preserve the status quo.

In Nicaragua itself, this thesis is put forward by the two Stalinist parties: the PSN and the PCN. They call for a policy of national unity with the right-wing parties in the parliament and have recently urged the FSLN to accept the new Contadora "peace" plan, which demands that the FSLN lay down its arms and negotiate with the contras.

In fact, political commission member Domingo (continued on page 11)

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Sanchez has gone so far as to condemn the FSLN government for not freeing numerous ex-Somoza national guardsmen who had taken up arms against the revolution!

The Sandinistas in general have nothing but scorn for these Stalinist parties.

Likewise, Julio Lopez, director of international relations for the Sandinista government, has expressed the FSLN's concern over the Soviet bureaucracy's possible willingness to strike a deal with imperialism at the expense of Nicaragua. Speaking two days bęfore the Reagan-Gorbachev summit talks in Geneva, he said, "Nicaragua will not allow its destiny to be determined by negotiations between the super-powers.' For the Social Democrats, on the other hand, the "mixed economy" is an original model—a third road between "savage capitalism" and "communist totali -tarianism." They say explicitly that Nicaragua must avoid becoming another Cuba.

Debate over "mixed economy"

In Nicaragua a real debate is going on over the desirability of pursuing the policy of the "mixed economy."

Proof of this discussion is found in a declaration by Roberto Pizarro, an economic adviser to the Sandinista government, concerning the February 1985 economic 'Thus, for certain people, a more appropriate course of action to resolve the distortion of our economy would have been to deal a blow to those who have benefited from these distortions and to favor a rapid transformation of the country-a 'radicalization' of the process.

"By this they mean a profound program of expropriations of land, industry, and commerce, which would place the totality of the material means of the economy in the hands of the state.

"This alternative, which is possible in the abstract and which is very real in other societies, would not only be naive but also deeply irresponsible in the case of Nicaragua. This is due to the regional geo-political situation and to the fact that the economic results would be disastrous in a country whose economic structure is marked by the important weight of agricultural production and by an atomization of property in the countryside, in industry, and in commerce" (quoted in Inprecor No. 185).

FSLN Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega defended the continued commitment to the "mixed economy" in a similar manner:

"We cannot resolve at the same time the problems of national liberation and those of social liberation. We must first complete the stage of national independence and national liberation" (quoted in F. Pisani, "Le Volcan Nicaraguayen").

One of the arguments often put forward to justify the FSLN's policy of a "mixed economy" is that a large period of time is needed to help advance the consciousness of the masses. But this argument incorrectly assesses the real mood and sentiments of the Nicaraguan workers and peasants.

For some of the leaders of the Nicaraguan Revolution who are conscious of the problems created by the "mixed economy," things are not so simple. Tomas Borge, for example, had this to say in an interview in July 1985 with the Nicaraguan magazine, Pensamiento Propio:

"The geo-political context [in which our revolution developed] compelled us, independently of our own will, to develop political pluralism and a mixed economy. This tactic became transformed into a strategy, and today knows, too, that direct U.S. intervention would be strongly resisted by working people in the United States.

The concessions made to the capitalists through the "mixed economy" did provide the revolution with a certain room to maneuver in its relations with the Latin American ruling classes. But this policy has run its course.

The Contadora "peace process" has proven to be a failure. It has been incapable of formulating an independent policy. Under pressure from U.S. im -perialism, the Contadora nations modified their proposal to now demand that the FSLN disarm and negotiate with the contras. The FSLN has rejected this proposal.

The Sandinistas have everything to gain from the consolidation and deepening of the revolution and its extension to Central and South America. There is no stabilization possible, in the backyard of U.S. imperialism, for the Nicaraguan workers' and farmers' government. The Sandinista Revolution, moreover, has everything to gain from repudiating the $3.9 billion foreign debt to the imperialist banks.

Some say that credits from Western Europe would be suspended if Nicaragua were to cancel the debt. But much more is to be gained from breaking the debt noose around the revolution than is currently gained from the Western European loans, which are progressively drying up.

A repudiation of the foreign debt, which has more than tripled in the last five years, would represent a tremendous step forward for the entire Latin American workers' movement. It would provide a magnificent example throughout the continent and demonstrate that a consistent fight against imperialism—a consistent fight for national liberation-requires that the chains of dependency be severed.

Nicaragua must follow the Cuban road and establish a workers' state, the second free territory in the Americas! I ...Cabezas (continued from page 7) maintained-as was the case in Chile under Allende or Guatemala under Arbenz-the revolutionary struggle is led to defeat. Experience has demonstrated that when the revolutionary movements try to share economic power-not to mention the political power-with the capitalists, defeat is sure to follow.

Cabezas: But Allende was a petty-bourgeois careerist. He was an opportunist.

S.A.: Yet virtually everyone in the workers' movement at the time told us to have confidence in Allende.

Cabezas: Wę never had confidence in Allende, never. I was in Chile in 1972 and I spoke to Allende. I was only 22 years old. I said, "Mr. President, they are going to overthrow your government." I said this to Corvalan [leader of the Chilean Communist Party] and to the people of MAPU [Movement of the United People.] Those who understood things more clearly and who had read Lenin knew that Chile couldn't last more than two years in this situation. Only the most ignorant—or corrupt-thought that Allende was the road to power. We never thought this.

S.A.: But the Communist which represented 90 percent of the workers' movement, supported Allende, didn't they?

Cabezas: Yes, because it appeared to be an option, a step forward, at that moment. You have to support everything that is a step forward.

S.A.: Do the Nicaraguan people understand the policies of the Sandinistas when a sector of those who oppressed and exploited them in the past-the so-called national capitalists—still have a significant amount of the wealth, the land, and the means of production? What is their attitude? Do they question it?

Cabezas: We couldn't have done what we've done in Nicaragua if the people hadn't understood our policies every step of the way.

The Nicaraguan Revolution is a giant collective conspiracy, shared by everyone there-except for the contras. We couldn't have gone forward without the people.

Lenin, in 1917, said that politics was an art. But we in Nicaragua have had to use more than art to move ahead. We have had to use magic, and by that I mean the ability to do the impossible in the most difficult conditions with audacity and imagination.

S.A.: We understand the difficulties faced by the revolution and the power of the imperialists to crush it. We ask these questions in order to better support the revolution. We know that in the long and the short run, the power of the revolution comes from the support of the people. But in Nicaragua, can a peasant understand these issues if the non-Somoza capitalists still have large portions of the land.

Cabezas: The peasant doesn't understand this. And that is why we have distributed 2 million hectares of land and why we are going to distribute 1 million hectares more this year.

Our alliance with the workers and hesitant. We have given out 2 million and 400,000 rifles. We did both. This between us and Grenada.

If the United States invades Nicarag fighting against the army alone. If the Nicaragua, they are not going to defeat The people will defend the gains of the will defend the land that has been them-land that never belonged to them MAYBE I SHOULD DECLARE MYSELF AN ANTI-COMMUNIST FREEDOM FICHIER!

The Pape For Contras peasants is not hectares of land is the difference ua, it will not be Marines land in us in eight days. revolution; they distributed to before.

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