Ferdinand Marcos falls

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(continued from page of power in the revolutionary sense. You see a transfer of power from one group of elites to another" (San Francisco Exa -miner, Feb. 26).

Marcos' rule depended on three factors: his skill in demobilizing the Filipino people (to a large degree due to the support of the Catholic Church), the support of the United States, and the loyalty of the armed forces.

Protracted dictatorship and the decline of the economy had already alienated the majority of the Filipino people by the early 1980s, setting the stage for the explosion which followed the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August 1983.

A powerful mass movement arose-crystalized in the reformist BANDILA coalition of Agapito "Butz" Aquino and the nationalist BAYAN coalition, which is influenced by the underground and Communist Party-led National Democratic Front. This move -ment began questioning the relationship between the United States and the Marcos dictatorship, and increasingly relied on mass mobilizations to confront the regime and its U.S. backers.

The formation of BAYAN in May 1985 was particularly significant, since that coalition called for the expulsion from the country of U.S. bases key to maintaining U.S. power in the region. BAYAN also called for genuine land reform and the overthrow of Marcos by the Filipino people by means of nationwide "people's strikes." BAYAN is a federation of labor unions, peasant organizations, slumdweller groups, and students, numbering up to 2 million people.

The last two Philippine elections were called by Marcos in part to deflect the independent thrust of the mass movement. BAYAN'thus called a boycott of the elections to expose them as fraudulent, to combat the electoralist illusions encouraged by the elite opposition, and to signify BAYAN's opposition to the limited program of the anti-Marcos capitalist politicians.

In contrast to the action orientation of the mass coalitions, the elite capitalist opposition sought to remove Marcos via U.S.-guaranteed elections. It sought to replace the dictator with the least amount of mass involvement, so as to avoid disturbing the economic and political power of the ruling class as a whole. It saw Marcos' economic policies and "cronyism" as threatening its own political and economic interests, particularly since the regime was unable to defuse the mass movement or defeat the peasant insurrection led by the Communist Party's New People's Army.

For its part, the Catholic Church, disgruntled with Marcos for the same reasons as the elite opposition, began distancing itself from the regime. Cardinal Jaime Sin brokered the Cory AquinoSalvador Laurel slate, and priests and nuns formed the backbone of the independent election monitors.

The mass movement did not bypass the elite opposition because of the lingering electoralist illusions of the people, coupled with the absence of a political alternative TOMORROW SLIPPINES Supporters of BAYAN rally in Manila representing the workers and neighborhood organizations and allied to the peasant movement. Nevertheless, these illusions were dealt a sharp blow by the Feb. 7 experience, shown by the demonstration of half-a-million people within 12 hours of the announcement that Marcos had been reelected president.

Marcos' refusal to comply with Washington's demand for "credible elections," coupled with Ronald Reagan's apparent acceptance of Marcos' reelection, threw the elite opposition into confusion. They were forced to turn to that which they fear most—mass mobilizations—if they were to gain anything from the election.

With the help of the Catholic Church and its emphasis on nonviolent action within legal bounds, the elite opposition gingerly announced a program of mass demon -strations (masked as "people's prayer rallies"), economic boycotts, and a general strike (labeled a "national day of prayer and nonviolent protest"). The split in the army hierarchy and the sudden disintegration of the dictatorship forestalled the need to carry out these "dangerous" tactics.

The view from Washington The United States had demanded "credible elections" to stabilize the regime in Manila and enable it to turn its full attention to combatting the Communist-led rural insurgency. The open theft of the election robbed Marcos of any credibility, and posed a major dilemma for the United States, leading to a vacillating policy.

For the United States as much as for the elite opposition, the mutiny of a pro-U.S. wing of the army (hardly a coincidence) was a godsend, destroying Marcos' last base of support while preserving a 250,000 strong capitalist army. This force immediately transferred its loyalties to Cory Aquino and the elite opposition. In the words of Lt. Col. Don Brown, an Asian specialist in the Pentagon, "It was the best we could have hoped for" (San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 25).

Aquino and the elite opposition Cory Aquino proved the ideal candidate for the capitalist opposition. Aquino was untainted by the opportunism and sordid history of virtually all other capitalist opposition leaders. Hence, in many Filipinos' eyes, her candidacy converted the Available Now! election into a plebiscite on the regime. As a result, the anti-Marcos sentiment of the Filipino people was galvanized behind a capitalist program with few answers for the worker and peasant majority of the country.

The working people bear the brunt of the $26-billion foreign debt, of 30-percent unemployment, of galloping inflation, of 70-percent poverty, and of rent gouging and lack of land for the poor peasants. The struggle against these conditions will deepen, particularly when present euphoria and illusions in Aquino die down.

Paralleling Haiti, the democratic struggle against the holdovers from the old regime will resurface, especially since Aquino has retained many Marcos officials, including Defense Minister Enrile, Chief of Staff Ramos, and Fernandez.

Aquino has agreed to maintain the U.S. bases until 1991. She will now have to take a stand on the presence of the bases after that time. But the masses may not be so patient because the bases are a symbol of foreign domination.

One of Aquino's close advisers, Ramon Mitra, now agriculture minister, has already explained that Aquino's vague stand during the campaign ("keeping our options open") really means holding out for better terms. As Mitra put it, "If we say now that we are for the continuation of the...bases [after 1991],...then what is there left to nego - and socialism will continue, free of the constraints caused by the dictatorship's repression, and with the elite opposition unable to hide its reactionary program behind struggle against Marcos.

The election boycott In this light, the fact that an important sector of the anti-Marcos opposition called for boycotting the February election was significant. The programmatic basis for the boycott was Aquino's failure to call for the dismantlement of the bases, genuine land reform, an unconditional amnesty, and the nationalization of basic industry (Malaya, feb. 2, 1986). As Leto Villar, a labor delegate to BAYAN's executive council stated, "We want to raise the level of Philippine politics from that of personalities to basic people's issues."

Given the groundswell of support for Aquino, the boycott movement represented a groping step toward an understanding that no section of Philippine capital can truly lead a struggle for national and social liberation. Recognizing this logic, many of BAYAN's leaders, including Chairman Lorenzo Tanada, left the coalition to support Aquino. Rogaciano Mercado, a proBAYAN assemblyman, has joined the new Aquino cabinet as minister of public works.

Mass support for Aquino had its effect on BAYAN. As the election drew closer, the emphasis of the boycott shifted more toward exposing the probability of election fraud. It became a passive boycott, which failed to point out the ommissions in Aquino's program. As a result, the influence of the boycotters was minimized, to the point that bourgeois commentators now falsely crow that the left had no part in the fall of Marcos.

Some U.S. leftists now lament that the boycotters should have endorsed Aquino so as to be in a position to influence her today. But endorsement would have fed mass illusions in Aquino and her electoral road, disorienting the workers and peasants from being ready for future betrayals by the elite opposition. Anti-Marcos unity should not come at the cost of obscuring the fundamental class interests of the masses.

Indeed, if the left was isolated, it was partially due to its inability to project itself as a political alternative to both Marcos and the elite opposition. As the Aquino regime reveals its capitalist face, the workers and peasants will seek a leadership independent of the ruling class.

A new stage has opened in which the

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