Liberal Democrats eager to join anti-Sandinista chorus

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In late April President Reagan suffered a rare defeat in Congress. Every proposal aimed at securing some form of aid for the contras-even "humanitarian" aid or funding for "non-lethal" military hardware-failed to gain a majority in the Democratic Party-controlled House of Representatives.

Immediately, the big-business media and the Reagan administration raised a hue and cry-as they had in the past— that Nicaragua was going Communist and the House Democrats were succumbing to Sandinista propaganda.

Immediately following the House votes on contra aid, The New York Times Sunday magazine (April 28, 1985) published a cover story by Mario Vargas Llosa, a prominent Peruvian author and human rights activist, who gave a behind-the-scenes account of Nicaragua.

Vargas Llosa explains that he does not support aid to the contras. With that for an introduction and with his impressive credentials as an opponent of repression, he paints—in thousands of words—a collage of individual anecdotes which amount to a political condemnation of the Sandinistas and an endorsement of the fundamental objectives of the political opposition.

The Vargas Llosa piece, as well as articles such as "The Sins of the Sandinistas" by Robert Leiken, published in The New Republic (Oct. 8, 1984), represent a waning of enthusiasm for the Nicaraguan revolution on the part of liberals.

As the pressure continues to mount from the Reagan administration and as the Sandinistas are forced to appeal to the Soviet Union for increased aid, Democratic Party liberals are fast retreating from their opposition to stiff measures against Nicaragua.

Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) said that economic sanctions were "appropriate" and, linking Nicaragua to South Africa, called for embargoes against all "repressive" regimes!

"In both instances", Solarz said, "you have governments deeply committed to policies we are opposed to. In South Africa it is apartheid and in Nicaragua it is repression at home and revolution abroad."

House Speaker Tip O'Neill, joining the anti-Sandinista chorus, sent a congressional envoy to Nicaragua to convey House Democratic disapproval of Daniel Ortega's visit to the Soviet Union.

While O'Neill claims to continue to oppose contra aid, the retreat of many Democrats on that issue means that a new proposal for $14 million in aid will be revived in the House and probably Conservative echo There has been no shift in American opinion on the issue of aid to the contras. To the contrary, recent polls demonstrate a growing mood against the Reagan administration's policies. Yet, there is growing bipartisan support for policies of increased intervention in Central America.

There is nothing new in right-wing Republicans or newspapers and magazines with a conservative political orientation decrying a supposed lack of freedom in Nicaragua.

Reagan administration supporters such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, openly speak at "private" fundraising gatherings where the very wealthy give hundreds of thousands of dollars to prop up and beef up the counterrevolutionary war against the Sandinistas.

Increasingly, conservative ganda campaign has found its echo in more liberal circles, both here in the United States and internationally. The support given to the candidacy of Arturo Cruz by the Socialist prime minister of Spain is just one example.

On March 21 a paid advertisement signed by nine prominent liberal or exliberal personalities appeared in the French daily Le Monde calling on the U.S. Congress to approve contra aid The signers ranged from historian Hugh Thomas, who wrote classical accounts on both the Spanish Civil War and the Cuban Revolution, to playwright Eugene Ionesco. The text of the advertisement explained:

"The renewal of this aid is necessary from a strategic point of view. The Sandinista junta has never concealed that its goal is the integration of the Central American region into one Marxist-Leninist whole. In this eventuality, the United States would be compelled to retreat from one of its main overseas commitments.

"This is precisely the objective of Soviet strategy-to force the United States to withdraw from the areas that represent a vital importance to it and to the free world. In this respect, the issue of Central America, Europe's fifth frontier, is also a problem."

One of the main pillars of the propaganda offensive against the Sandinistas is that they have turned Nicaragua into a beachhead for Soviet intervention or subversion in Central America.

Without the shadow of the Soviets lurking behind the Sandinistas, it is difficult to convince anyone that the Sandinistas pose a strategic threat to the United States.

The Sandinistas do receive aid from the Soviet Union. Their policy is to receive aid from anyone who will help them safeguard their revolution. Given the vast damage inflicted upon the country by CIA and contra sabotage, there is a critical need for all aid, whether it is economic or military.

Already, 40 percent of the Nicaraguan government's budget has to be devoted to defense. These defense needs have placed a tremendous drain on the economy and partially reversed some of the significant strides made in the living standards of Nicaragua's poor during the first four years of the revolution. It has created critical shortages in many areas and forced the Sandinistas to divert important resources toward the military.

Furthermore, the United States has used its veto to prevent the International Monetary Fund from giving any loans to the Nicaraguan government. And U.S. policy is to try to pressure its Western European allies into stopping the flow of aid to Nicaragua from those countries.

In this context, and given the new trade embargo imposed by the United States, the Nicaraguan government has every right and, indeed, has no other choice than to ask for aid from Moscow. As in the case of the Vietnam War, the amount of aid coming from the Soviet Union has not been nearly enough to counter the damage inflicted upon Nicaraguan society by the U.S. government.

In fact, the Reagan administration knows full well that the Soviet Union has placed limits on the amount and kind of aid sent to the Sandinistas. An article in the Nov. 10, 1984, New York Times was quite revealing in this respect. It quoted an "experienced American official in Managua":

"The Soviet Union has an important bilateral agenda with the United States that includes things like arms control, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact. Compared to those matters Nicaragua is not that important to them lour emphasis]. They are not going to sacrifice the possibility of progress in those other areas in order to get some planes to the Sandinistas."

Nonetheless, any increase in aid from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua would be a positive step forward. Given the inability of the Soviet Union to make any progress with the U.S. government in arms talks, it is likely that some increase in economic collaboration, whether in the form of increased trade or increased aid, will be forthcoming.

At a news conference in Managua the day the embargo was declared, Sergio Ramirez, Nicaragua's vice president, stated bluntly that the Nicaraguans will "become closer to all countries that support the revolution, and, he added, "this includes the Soviet Union."

Bipartisan objectives

The reason the Democrats are falling into line on the issue of aid to the contras is that they have the same fear of the Sandinista revolution as the Republicans. Republican Senator Dave Durenberger, in a Washington Post opinion piece on the Congressional debate on the $14 million aid package, points out:

"In subsequent negotiations between the administration and a number of senators, it became clear that there existed a strong consensus on the nature of the Sandinista government and the potential threat it represents to U.S. interests."

Durenberger revealed that, in these ised meetings, "a large number of senators and representatives, like the president, were interested in using at least some of the $14 million for leverage with the Sandinistas.

Because leverage can take many forms, both positive and negative, it was impossible for more than 500 tacticians to agree on the most appropriate use of the money."

The only way to convince Congress not to intervene in Central America is to convince them that such a policy risks provoking a huge response from the American people. The April 20 mobilizations were an important first step toward that objective. Reliance on the tactical differences between Democrats and Republicans, by contrast, is a dead end.

This point is best illustrated by the remarks made by William V. Alexander Jr. (D-Ark.), who is the Democrats' chief deputy whip:

"There's a movement on our side to accommodate the lust members feel to strike out against Communism. Ortega's trip to Moscow triggered a reaction in the House and provides overwhelming support for the need to show the flag."

NOI.

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Now that Israeli troops have made a partial withdrawal from Lebanon, the Reagan administration considers this a good time to unfreeze stalled negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy have been touring Arab capitals during the last month to pressure Egypt and Jordan to open diplomatic discussions with Israel.

Whatever other points may be on the proposed agenda, the fate of the Palestinians would be the overriding issue.

Washington's efforts to get negotiations going have foundered on several rocks. King Hussein of Jordan will not deal with Israel unless he has the support of the other Arab states. This encouragement has not been forthcoming.

Even with such support Hussein insists that Palestinians sit with Jordanians on the negotiating committee. The Israelis refuse to deal with PLO members. No Palestinians acceptable to the Israelis have been found.

In the story below, the last of a series of three on the crisis in the Mideast, Ralph Schoenman analyzes the peace overtures made by Jordan's King Hussein and Yasir Arafat earlier this year and describes the opposition in Israel to these latest proposals. -The editors King Hussein is described by Wolf Blitzer in The Jerusalem Post as a traditional favorite among State Department Middle Eastern diplomatic figures. Over the past decade he has met secretly with several Israeli leaders, including many serving in the current Israeli cabinet.

Hussein is putting pressure upon Yasir Arafat to join in proposing acceptance of the Israeli State. This coincides with the policy goal of both the United States and Mubarak to facilitate Egypt's reentry into the Arab world on its own terms following the boycott of Cairo after the Camp David talks.

Hussein has been advised that the 60 percent of his population which is Palestinian is increasingly affected by the rise of resistance in the West Bank. This presents the danger of a challenge to his rule in Jordan. The Jerusalem Post reported on Feb. 8 that Rabin had warned King Hussein of the consequences of unrest in the West Bank for which he holds Hussein responsible.

No one seriously believes that Hussein has any relation to Palestinian unrest in the West Bank but he does, in the minds of the Americans and Israelis, have the capacity to defuse it by his maneuvers.

The Post is very clear about the message sent by Rabin to Hussein: "Any illusion that the Israeli Defense Force withdrawal from Lebanon might serve as a precedent for the West Bank must be blown to smithereens."

Buying time

Hussein and Mubarak are out to buy time for the Israelis and the Americans. Meanwhile the Rabin government keeps Hussein on the mark. Rabin declared in the Knesset, "Amman [Jordan] has become the center for the planning and ordering of PLO attacks in Israel."

The Saudis, who subsidize Hussein as they do Yasir Arafat embraces King Hussein of Jordan.

tions with Israel if he wished to receive the nearly $1 billion he requested. Calling for Israel to respond to the call for negotiations, he declared that the Israelis would commit a "historic mistake" if they held fast.

« Peace camp" rejects proposal The agreements signed by Yasir Arafat and King Hussein, apart from calling for a federation between a Palestinian state and the Hashemite kingdom, are vague on the treatment of Resolution 242. This U.N. resolution not only requires recognition of the Israeli state but denies the Palestinian people status as a national group with the right of self-determination.

But all the gyrations and formulations of words avoid the crucial issue for the Palestinian people: No political grouping in the spectrum of Zionist opinion is prepared to permit a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Mordechai Bar-On, Knesset member for the "left" Citizens Rights Movement made clear in The Jerusalem Post that for any Israeli government to accept the Palestinians, they must renounce all rights to national sovereignty.

Bar-On stated, "We in the Israeli peace camp must conclude that there is no substantial change and that it is difficult to see how the Amman formulation may contribute to the advancement of the peace process."

Bar-On's reasons are brutally clear. There is no explicit acceptance of the Israeli state in the Hussein-Arafat peace proposal. There is no open acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242. There is no "clear rejection of the use of violence."

And there is "no clear statement that the peace will be final and determinate, bringing about a historical reconciliation."

Bar-On tells us that the "peace camp" insists that "there is no possibility of turning the wheel back on the question of Jerusalem.," where Palestinians outnumber Jews in East Jerusalem by 11-to-one.

Bar-On also tells us that the Peace Camp rejects the term "occupied Arab lands" because it could apply to Jaffa or Nazareth. And he writes, "As long as the Palestinians refuse to renounce the 'right of repatriation' as an option, there will be no peace in the Middle East."

No sentiment for Palestinian state The Jerusalem Post is equally clear. Even the formula "territories for peace" it tells us in its editorial of Feb. 15, means the establishment of a Palestinian state on all the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.

The Post continues, "This is a formula that, as King Hussein knows full well, will not be endorsed by any conceivable Israeli government in any circumstances, even as a basis for negotiations."

Lest anyone retain any illusions to the contrary, Yediot Aharanot canvassed all the political groupings in Israel and reported on Feb. 1:

"If any of our neighbors think that the present government differs from its predecessors in that it would be prepared to give up any parts of Greater Israel, they are deluding themselves and must get rid of that misconception as quickly as possible. The State of Israel and the people of Israel will not foresake any territory within Greater Israel."

Five days later Prime Minister Shimon Peres appointed two ministers, Nehemkin and Yacoby, to increase the share of settlement budget allocated to the Jordan Valley settlements—most of which were established by Labor after 1967—and promised to double the budget for new settlements in the Jordan Valley.

United against Palestinians

It is not that Israel and Washington are unwilling to talk. It is that they will talk about the liquidation of the Palestinian movement, whether in stages, over time, or all at one go.

Writing in The New York Times on March 17, Abba Eban, the former foreign minister and longtime "Zionist socialist, wrote that the Palestinian community cannot insist on being represented by those who do not accept the "basic norms of international civility."

Eban warns that if the Palestinians do not qualify for U.S. acceptance, they will never be congenial for Israeli discourse. It is up to President Mubarak and King Hussein, he writes, to find a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with which Washington and Jerusalem will find it possible to hold a dialogue.

For years the Palestinians have been pressured to recognize the Israeli state. Much of this pressure emanates from Washington and its clients in the Arab East. Much, however, has come from liberal Zionists and advocates of "peace," who have contended that such a step would free Israeli opinion to pursue negotiations with the PLO.

But any such recognition removes the basis for the Palestinian struggle and enables the Zionists to assert that 37 years of intransigent refusal to accept the right of the Israeli state to exist as an exclusive Jewish state in Palestine now disqualifies these latecomers from "dialogue."

Why not talk to the Palestinians who collaborated from the start?

Palestinians under the "Iron Fist" do not share these illusions. Reporting that Yitzhak Rabin had begun to prepare new settlements and ruled out any Council elections for Palestinian towns, alHa'mishmar observed on Feb. 4, 1985:

"The West Bank itself is beginning to rise.

The people reflect a genuine desire for a Palestinian national struggle. The 'popular revolution' is beginning to take off just as Arafat is trying to reach a political agreement, at least partly because of his disappointment with the popular struggle and armed resistance. This is the real crossroad we are facing at Dheisheh camp."

It is an expression of despair and a lack of strategic conception that drives the PLO leadership to look to the likes of Reagan, Hussein, King Fahd, and Mubarak as a source of support in "talks" with the Israeli state.

The crisis of Zionism to which all commentators allude is also a time of crisis for the leadership of the Palestinian revolution. The struggle will not abate. It is time to respond to it.

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"Recent polls show a growing mood against Reagan's war pollcles."

"No Zionist group is willing to permit a Palestinian state on the West Bank."