Letters to editor on FMLN/FDR peace plan

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..."The people's power organs that have developed in certain areas in the country during ... "Dissolution of the special security forces, the Death Squadrons, and their political arm, ... "Laying the bases for reforming the system of foreign trade by extending control over the export of the country's main products—coffee, cotton, sugar, fish, and meat'... 'the government will join the Movement of Nonaligned States, and in line with this reinforce the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination and apartheid'... 'will pledge not to permit the installation of foreign military bases or missiles on its territory'... 'will not allow the national territory to be used for destabilization operations against the governments of neighboring countries'... 'this process will culminate in the organization of a single national army incorporating the FMLN forces and the purged governmental armed forces. Until such a time, both "Too early to pass judgment" Dear editor, In January 1984, the Salvadoran FMLN and FDR presented a proposal for a "Government of Broad Participation. "

[See International Viewpoint, No. 50, April 9, 1984, for English-language version of the document.] This new proposal has been largely interpreted in the international solidarity movement as a shift in the position of the FMLN/FDR. For some people the shift was welcome. For instance, the editorial board of Estudios Centroamericanos, the journal of the Jesuitrun Central American University, stated that the FMLN/FDR's proposal "seems to reflect a decision to abandon revolutionary idealism in favor of a political realism. "

Others, like the majority of the Political Committee of Socialist Action, saw reason for worry: 'The structure of the provisional government, then, would at best postpone final resolution of the civil war in El Salvador. At worst, it would lead to the defeat of the revolution (Socialist Action, June 1984)."

In my opinion, it is impossible for outsiders to pass judgment on tactical decisions made by the FMLN/FDR concerning negotiations. Our task is to explain the new situation that confronts the FMLN/FDR and to demand "U.S. Out of Central America Now!" The international solidarity movement cannot have a position on the negotiations.

The Nicaraguan revolution, five years ago, opened a new period in Central America, showing that the United States could be defeated in its own back yard and breaking Cuba's isolation on the continent. It gave a new burst of hope to all revolutionists in the region, particularly in El Salvador, which everybody expected would be next.

The United States, surprised in Nicaragua, intended not to be caught off guard in El Salvador and, if possible, to turn back the wheel of history in Nicaragua itself.

The major aspects of U.S. intervention are all too well known: the invasion of Grenada, support to the contras on Nicaragua's borders, large-scale maneuvers in Honduras and at sea, and supply and training for the Salvadoran army. The scope of U.S. intervention in El Salvador has created specific problems for the FMLN/FDR. Moreover, U.S. intervention is far from being only military. It is also political and diplomatic.

Military aid has meant: (a) more than $300 million of direct aid since the beginning of the civil war; (b) the training of the Salvadoran army by U.S. instructors; (c) participation in the day-to-day conduct of the war through the U.S. 'instructors'; and (d) direct tactical help with immediate intelligence information provided by U.S. planes to the Salvadoran ground forces. The United States also took the initiative of reviving CONDECA, the Central American Defense Council. This military alliance could play an important role if an external military intervention was decided upon.

The political offensive has been primarily centered around the elections to provide the Salvadoran government with some legitimacy and to counter the demand for democracy raised by the FMLN/FDR. Far from showing progress in self-determination for the Salvadoran people, the recent elections were obviously manipulated by the United States. It has been publicly admitted before Congress that the CIA provided millions of dollars to ensure Duarte's election over d'Aubuisson.

The diplomatic offensive was designed to isolate the FMLN/FDR from its international support and to calm the fears of the U.S. Congress, the SOCIALIST ACTION United States' European allies, and most of the Latin American governments, including the Contadora group. In this situation, the Reagan administration had to display some willingness to consider negotiations. That was the purpose of Reagan's personal envoy, Richard Stone, when he met with representatives of the FMLN/FDR or, more recently, the reason for Secretary of State George Schultz' trip to Managua.

In this situation, the FMLN/FDR was confronted with the following problems:

1) Faced with an escalating U.S. military intervention that changes the character of the civil war and makes it more a war of national liberation, the FMLN/FDR had to try to unify all those willing to defend national indeiatemala Chalatenango Anuacr apar Cabanus Sarila Ana Sunsorae Vicenle Miguer La Liberta 1 Ocean La Par pendence and to give them a program dealing with this new situation. The FMLN/FDR also had to try to win over those sections of the masses who are currently supporting neither side;

2) At the beginning of 1984, the FMLN/FDR had to counter the project of elections for March, presenting its own solution for the government of El Salvador;

3) On the diplomatic front, the FMLN/FDR had to try to make it as difficult as possible for the United States to unify the divided forces of imperialism and its allies in the region.

It is important to remember that the FMLN and FDR include several political and mass organizations whose origins range from the Communist Party, to social democracy, to radical Christian democracy. Though unity has generally increased among the different groups, unanimity has not been completely achieved between or within the organizations.

Marcial's and Ana Maria's deaths were tragic evidence of this situation, showing once again that the methods of AUGUST 1984 Some major points of the FMLN/FDR proposal of January 1984 based provisional government will not be dominated by any one sion of broad participation by the political and social forces regime... "

"It is understood that it is to serve only for a limited period. "

war will be given legal status.

ARENA party..."

armies retain their weapons. "

democratic discussion in revolutionary movements are not a luxury-even in wartime. The differences of opinion are not only over the way to handle negotiations and alliances, but also over how to advance unity among the different groups and over the balance between military actions and political work among the masses.

For these reasons it is not possible to analyze the recent document of the FMLN/FDR—obviously resulting from many compromises among the different tendencies-as one would analyze programmatic documents of a political party with a long tradition.

There is no doubt that the tendencies close to social democracy, which are mainly interested in establishing a bourgeois democracy with some social reforms and a well-managed market economy, will interpret the program in a very restrictive sense. But the future of the Salvadoran revolution will not be determined so much by this or that formulation written in the proposal for a broad-based government as by the various tendencies' ability to develop themselves in the coming months.

One should also add that the FMLN/ FDR is very careful not to present the MIN Moraran Sa! Cuscal'an Unior Salvadir Sar San.

Usulalan Dear editor, The discussion that is taking place in the pages of Socialist Action on the FMLN/FDR peace plan is important. My own thoughts might seem contradictory but in fact reflect the complexities of the issue.

On the one hand, I support the right of the FMLN/FDR to call for negotiations. This position can be used to help expose the goals of the U.S. government and thus isolate it internationally. I believe that it is premature for us in this country to point out the potential problems in the peace plan's formulations.

In spite of the goals of the reformist elements within the FMLN/FDR, Reagan and the Salvadoran military today are not willing to negotiate with the revolutionary forces in El Salvador. The workers and peasants continue to struggle and moreover, today: no wing of the FMLN/FDR is proposing to put are the following: "The brr adforce but rather be the exp resready to scrap the oligar :hic proposal for a broad-based government as the definitive solution to the problems of the Salvadoran workers and peasants. The transitional and short-term character of the proposed government is underlined. Its tasks are only to prepare the conditions for radical reforms such as the agrarian reform. A decisive victory of the workers will obviously require much deeper struggles.

The best reason for confidence in the future of the Salvadoran revolution is the current policy of the FMLN/FDR which, far from having illusions about the negotiations, is actively pursuing the armed struggle.

In the current circumstances, whatever internal struggle occurs in the FMLN, it is extremely important for the international solidarity movement to continue supporting the FMLN/FDR as a whole and to avoid duplicating their internal differences here.

It is not the task of the U.S. antiwar movement to ask the U.S. government to open negotiations. Our demand can only be "U.S. Out Now. "

It is a principle shared by the entire movement that the United States should respect the right of self-determination of the Central American people and not interfere with their destiny. Dropping the principle of "U.S. Out" in favor of a call for negotiations will not make us more effective. On the contrary.

Yet, although I agree that 'U.S. Out Now" has to be the central demand of the antiwar movement, that, does not mean that I am for avoiding talking about negotiations. First, the FMLN proposals have to be publicized to show that there is a serious political alternative to the Duarte government and the prolongation of the war. Second, we can stress that it is not the FMLN/FDR that refuses to negotiate but the Duarte government and the Reagan administration, for whom the only road to "peace" is a military victory over the FMLN. Such a victory would only be possible now with the introduction of foreign troops—most likely from the United States.

Leo Rivlin New York City down its arms as a pre-condition for negotiations.

On the other hand, the peace plan currently endorsed by the FMLN/FDR, if actually implemented, could mean an accord with Duarte on terms that would set back the struggle of the Salvadoran workers and peasants. If at some point in the future an unprincipled accord is reached, it would be our duty to point this out. However, this is not the situation today.

Our primary task in the "belly of the beast" is to help build the broadest based mass-action movement to demand "U.S. Out of Central America, " not to win support for a negotiated "settlement' to the war in El Salvador, as many leaders of the solidarity movement propose.

Lita Blanc San Francisco

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"Outsiders cannot pass judgment on tactical decisions by FMLN/FDR"