Can Jackson reform the Democratic Party?

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"Jackson made his attitude toward the (white) candidates clear: 'We need each other? "

SOCIALIST ACTION JULY 1984 A3 The Democratic primaries are over. The three candidates, Walter Mondale, Gary Hart, and Jesse Jackson, who survived the initially crowded field, are busily preparing for the San Francisco Democratic Party convention on July 16.

Of the three candidates, only Jesse Jackson has presented a campaign substantially different from the typical Democratic Party primary campaign. It was preceded by an impressive voter registration drive which focused on unregistered Blacks, and consistently drew large, mostly Black, audiences to its events.

The Jackson campaign arose in the context of a decade-long retreat by all sections of the Democratic Party from New Deal/Great Society liberalism, which had been characterized by the granting of concessions to the working class to maintain social peace. Gary Hart, the "Atari Democrat," has become one spokesperson of that retreat, denouncing Walter Mondale's ties to the labor bureaucracy.

And Walter Mondale, of course, was vice president under Carter. The Carter presidency, which at times enjoyed a Democratic majority in both the House and the Senate, not only failed to enact the AFL-CIO's minimum program, but actually invoked the hated Taft-Hartley Act against the United Mine Workers of America during its 1977-78 strike. Furthermore, the Carter administration was responsible for initiating cutbacks in the majority of social service programs (cuts which Reagan has accelerated since 1980) and for raising the level of aid to the Salvadoran junta.

So the Jesse Jackson campaign, which has proposed military cutbacks, increases in social service spending, an end to U.S. intervention in Central America, normalization of relations with Cuba, and the strengthening of civil rights measures, has elicited substantial support.

This support comes from several groups, including (1) Blacks who see in the campaign a voice to express their interests as an oppressed minority, (2) liberals or left-liberals who are unhappy with the retreat of the Democratic Party from what they perceive to be its historic ideals, and (3) radicals and antiwar activists who see the campaign as an opportunity to force the Democratic Party to the left on the issue of U.S. intervention in Central America. A section of this group also views the Jackson candidacy as leading to an eventual break with the Democratic Party by millions of Blacks and others who will find their efforts frustrated within the Democratic Party.

The actual outcome of the Jackson campaign, however, will not be tangible benefits for Black workers, or a return to the previous "ideals" of the Democratic Party, or, much less, a break with the Democratic Party. Rather, the campaign represents a coherent attempt to reform the Democratic Party.

The rise of Black electoral hopes While Jesse Jackson had a certain status as a civil rights leader, since he had worked with Martin Luther King Jr., he was also saddled with the reputation as a maverick. Despite being mistrusted by established Black leaders and elected officials, Jackson nonetheless rose to national prominence.

Jackson's presidential candidacy, announced after months of speculation about his intentions, followed the election of Black or Chicano mayors in several important cities. In particular, it followed the victorious election campaign of Harold Washington in Chicago, in which Jesse Jackson was centrally involved.

The rise of Black electoral hopes nationally, which led to the election of Black mayors in Chicago and Philadelphia, and which impelled the campaign of Mel King in Boston, was partially the result of the inability of Blacks to see another means of fighting for their interests. In particular, the inability of the labor movement to effectively respond to the social service cutbacks or to defend itself against the concessionary demands of the employers led Blacks to look to electoral solutions.

Despite the failure of capitalist electoral politics to provide a means for Blacks to defend the social conquests of the 50s and 60s—which were won through mobilizations for civil rights— the elections appeared to be the only avenue for pursuing the defense of Black rights. This situation was due, in part, to the unwillingness of the Black leadership to consistently organize mass mobilizations, despite the clear success of several demonstrations, especially the August 27, 1983, march for Jobs, Peace, and Justice which commemorated the historic 1963 civil rights march led by Martin Luther King Jr.

A split over strategy From 1964 to 1980, Black participation in elections declined in relative terms. Voter turnout among Blacks, for example, had slipped from 58 percent to 51 percent during that period. While all sections of the national Black leadership identified with the Black mayoral campaigns and the voter registration drives, there was serious division over whether a Black should run in the Democratic primaries and, if so, whether Jesse Jackson should be the candidate.

Andrew Young, former U.N. ambassador under Carter and currently mayor of Atlanta, initially refused to support Jackson. Other prominent Blacks, including most of the Black mayors, Coretta Scott King, and Benjamin Hooks of the NAACP, shared that opposition. In their view, a Black candidate would divide the Black vote in the primaries and possibly help to elect a more conservative Democrat, such as John Glenn or Gary Hart.

Professor Ronald Walters, in an opinion column in the June 12, 1983, Los Angeles Times supported the idea of a Black candidacy: "The threat to Blacks, severely buffeted by the policies of the Reagan administration, is that any reasonable-looking Democratic nominee brought forward by traditional politics would take a Black vote and then, once elected, implement Reaganlike policies.... In effect, the question is whether to check and reverse the rightward drift of the party with a seriously organized campaign behind a Black presidential candidate.

"The legacy of unresponsiveness continues today as former Carter-Mondale operatives move to intensify the rightward shift of the Democratic Party in response to what they perceive as the conservative mood of the American electorate.... At the very least a Black presidential candidacy would sharpen Black political mobilization to the ultimate benefit of the Democrats. ...

The split over strategy among the Black Democrats in fact represented more than simply a debate over the effects of a Black primary campaign in the Democratic Party. It also represented the concern of a section of the Black leadership that Jackson's candidacy, fueling raised expectations among Blacks, would add to discontent in ways that could spill over beyond election contests. This objection was cloaked mostly in attacks on Jackson's flamboyant personality, or accusations that his speeches ("hands that once picked cotton will pick presidents") were demagogic.

However, the evident success of the campaign (21 percent of the primary vote and 80 percent of the Black vote) quieted most of the critics. As the Wall Street Journal stated June 1, 1984, "Nearly all Black leaders, many of whom initially were antagonistic toward the candidacy, acknowledge the effectiveness of the Jackson effort." The success of the campaign in terms of Black voter turnout, indicated that there would be substantial benefits for the eventual Democratic candidate in the November presidential election. And Jackson, who has rejected running as an independent, made his attitude towards the other candidates clear when he stated bluntly, "We need each other."

Delegate fights and party unity At the San Francisco convention, Jesse Jackson delegates may engage in a fight over delegate selêction rules. These rules, which deny delegates to candidates with less than 20 percent of the vote in a given district in most states, and which grant all of the delegates in a district to a candidate with an absolute majority in a district, have led to a wide disparity between Jackson's popular vote (21 percent) and the number of delegates pledged to him (9 percent).

At various times, Jackson has threatened not to support any Democratic candidate who does not agree to changes in the delegate selection rules. It is that implicit threat that Jackson must wield to gain influence within the Democratic Party.

The points in Jackson's platform which aroused the hopes of millions of Blacks and others will probably be downplayed to focus on the convention fight over delegate selection rules. It is likely that Jackson will not even try to get the Democratic Party to incorporate recognition of the PLO, normalization of relations with Cuba, immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Central America, cutbacks in military spending, or increases in social service spending into its platform.

Rather, the main objective of the Jackson campaign is to translate its popular support into a permanent voice within the Democratic Party for the Black leadership. As Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young noted: "Blacks will never again be taken for granted. That's probably the legacy of the Jesse Jackson campaign."

However, just as the incorporation of the labor bureaucracy into the Democratic Party failed to achieve even the most minimal objectives of the labor movement, Jesse Jackson's strategy will fail to produce any important gains for the millions of Blacks who place their confidence in him.

The campaign may, however, result in important gains for a layer of the Black leadership, just as the incorporation of the labor bureaucracy into the top rungs of the Democratic Party produced tangible benefits to a layer of labor bureaucrats. Some labor leaders used those positions to obtain special privileges ranging from escaping prosecution on corruption charges to acquiring a diplomatic post.

Despite the hopes of some activists that the Jackson campaign will lead Blacks toward a break with the Democratic Party, it is clear that its real dynamic is toward greater incorporation of the disaffected into the Democratic Party. To accomplish that it has successfully sought to overcome the alienation of many Blacks from the Democratic Party.

It is true that Jesse Jackson has succeeded in arousing hopes. However, the dashing of those hopes will not automatically produce a break with the Democratic Party. Without an authoritative leadership that points in the direction of independent political action, any disillusionment that does result from the campaign will most likely lead to demoralization.

The most likely result of the campaign is that it will lead to a renewed effort by Blacks to influence the course of the Democratic Party, even after the November elections. Just like the AFLCIO's sad record in the Democratic Party, this would mean a prolonged and futile effort to reform a party that serves interests antagonistic to those of the vast majority of Blacks.