Carpio's speech to FPL
1984 1984-03Read it in the scan (PDF at ETOL), page 13 →
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(April 1983—excerpts)
We were already called sectarian during our struggle in the old organization [the Salvadoran Communist Party] because we thought that the working class had to be in the forefront of the revolutionary struggle; because we felt that class alliances should not serve to assure a place in power for the bourgeoisie; because the FPL had a new approach to the problem of alliances and held the opinion that the role of leadership in popular alliances does not belong to the bourgeoisie, who would impose compromises running against the interests of the great majority of the population....
It is necessary, therefore, to forge an alliance with a great force, loyal and as decisive as the working class itself. This force is the peasantry. The poor peasantry is the semi-proletariat of the country. If we can accomplish the organization and alliance of the workers, the agricultural workers, and the poor peasants in a country where, together, they make up more than 70 percent of the population, that would mean the working class could play the role of leadership in a class alliance where sectors of the bourgeoisie are also present....
On negotiations In El Salvador, where a heroic war is being waged by the people, negotiations can only be conceived of as a weapon in the arsenal of the strategic struggle. They must serve as an aid to advance the fight of our combatants. In this context we can sit down at the negotiating table, but on the condition that we are clear about waging an intransigent defense of the interests of the people...
In this way we can dialogue and negotiate for months, even years, thus helping our armies advance to the point where they will deal the final blow to the enemy. At that point they will put an end ...Philippines (continued from page 1: “Labor's turning U.S. OUT OF EL SALVADOR!”)
inhabitants of the southern Philippines.
Although retaining the perspective of rural guerrilla warfare, the NDF has responded to the rapid urbanization of the society by organizing its network among city workers, students, and slum-dwellers. Its program calls for the armed overthrow of the dictatorship, the expropriation of imperialist property, and radical land reform. The extent of the NDF's success has been reflected in the predominance in recent demonstrations of its openly anti-imperialist slogan of "Down With the U.S.-Marcos Dictatorship." The NDF has clearly become the key political force in these demonstrations. According to some, the NDF's mass worker-peasant base is roughly 10 million people, including 4 million in urban areas.
Paralleling and overlapping the illegal NDF, and responding to the 30% slash in the standard of living that accompanied the imposition of martial law has been the expansion of trade-union organizations particularly the umbrella federations, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU/May Ist Movement) and the Pagkakaisang Pilipino (PMP/United Filipino Workers), each with roughly a half million members and both formed after 1980. With the deterioration of the economy, the resistance of the workers stiffened, culminating in the 1982 general stike in the key Bataan Export Processing Zone. This action was repeated in October 1983 in the wake of the Aquino assassination.
In addition, a large proportion of the clergy in this predominantly Catholic country openly or surreptitiously oppose the dictatorship.
The opposition bourgeoisie has two wings. Its left wing is the Nationalist Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Equality, whose first public rally in November 1983 drew 35,000 people. Headed by to the genocide of our people, and negotiations will result in our victory, with the enemy signing its surrender...
As far as our weapons, one thing must be perfectly clear: We will not surrender them. On the contrary, we must at all times seize more arms from the enemy. Moreover, we will not accept any ceasefire as a precondition to sit down at the negotiating table... A ceasefire can only help the enemy-who has been terribly weakened—to recover and prepare a counterattack against the revolutionary forces....
On the unity of the FMLN At the meeting of our Central Command in 1981, the historic agreements we reached were based on the fundamental and dialectical elements of our strategy— on the need for unity in the revolutionary movement. We affirmed that in order to attain unity in a realistic manner, it was necessary to promote cooperation and coordination of our forces...+ When we put forward this line last year, it was not properly understood by everyone. It was said that there existed two different political lines in the FMLN, one for unity and the other for coordination. It was said that the proponents of coordination were against unity....
The truth of the matter is that in El Salvador today there is not any coordination at the political level among the different military organizations. On the military front, relations are bad. There is no coordination... and there is no friendship either....
Accord ingly, the FPL declared that coordination was necessary. This was an urgent matter and our Central Command proposed ten norms to regulate the process of coordination. At present, we are putting this into practice. We are witnessing greater cooperation among the AVeM-WE eXTeND A WARAN WELCOMe TO OUR GREAT FRIEND AND ALLY, AND DEMOCRATIC FORCE FOR STABILITY IN THE FAR EAST! former Senators Lorenzo Tanada and Jose Diokno, the Nationalist Alliance calls for dismantling the dictatorship and replacing it with a caretaker coalition government, boycotting the May 1984 presidential elections, implementing land reform, ending foreign economic control, and closing the U.S. bases. The Nationalist Alliance hopes to draw the mass movement under its umbrella. At present it includes unions; peasant organizations; and student, civil liberties, and church groups, many of which are close to the NDF.
The bourgeois "elite opposition" to Marcos was initially demoralized by the Aquino assassination. Immediately after the murder, Salvador Laurel, a prominent leader, advised the crowd awaiting Aquino at the Manila airport to go home and pray. The upsurge that followed, however, breathed spirit into this sector, even galvanizing the big capitalists of the Makati district of Manila (the Philippine Wall Street) to act against Marcos" policies. The Makati demonstrations led by these forces, which have been widely covered by the Western media, have Grieving women with samn members of it d organization. different fronts, each of which maintains its zone of control and its command over its own troops....
We can be confident that we are in the process of overcoming some of the more difficult situations. We are convinced that the unity of the entire people is a strategic necessity to win the war. Our organization will do everything in its power to move the FMLN and the FDR in a realistic direction. It will be necessary to develop a correct idelogical struggle against the incorrect tendencies which exist in these organizations....
[Our organization] has permitted to bring together greater forces, and to promote their unity, even though deep ideoMARCOS SORRY - ONE OF MY POLAND INDEX CARDS THATS ALL RIGHT, SUPPED IN... MR. PRESIDENTIT COULD HAPPEN TO ANYONE.
MARCOS stopped short of calling for the dismantlement of the dictatorship, fearing the possible consequences—on the one hand open military rule, and on the other the probability that Marcos" successor will be unable to control the mass movement.
The main organization of the elite opposition is at present the United Nationalist Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), a coalition of 12 political parties headed by Laurel. While calling for Marcos to step aside, UNIDO and other groups are not only opposed to closing the U.S. bases but are actively currying favor with Washington.
In formally ending martial law last year and calling presidential elections for May of this year, Marcos sought to legitimize his rule. The brutal murder of his main contender for the presidency was meant to ensure Marcos" incumbency and present the U.S. with no viable option but continued support to the president. And indeed, the U.S. has no other DOCUMENTS logical, strategic and tactical differences remain among the different organizations...
On the discussion within the FPL We must avoid making the mistake Lenin warned against where we begin to characterize as sectarian everything that has led to the growth of the FPL and everything that is valid....
The war is not yet well defined. The hegemony of one class is not yet defined. Why should we now begin to beat our breasts and say that we have behaved improperly and that we are sectarian because we have spoken about the need of the worker-peasant alliance? Should we not advocate such an alliance? And if not, why shouldn't we? Because it might frighten certain allies? Well, it is true that for a certain period of time we might distance ourselves from certain allies. But it is also possible that this is the only way to win other allies-which does not imply any pretentions on our part for total power....
It would be very serious if one were to say that to defend the interests of the working class is sectarian, or that we want to go too far. The FPL emerged from the working class. It is really incredible that in a country which has fought so hard and participated in a revolutionary struggle, there does not yet exist a Marxist-Leninist party. Our aspiration of becoming the Marxist-Leninist party is therefore not sectarian, it is a fundamental task of the revolution....
We must not begin to say that it is sectarian to want to transform the FPL into a Marxist-Leninist party, or that it is sectarian to affirm that the base all alliances is the workers-peasant alliance, or to think that the motor force of our revolution remain the working class....
Speech to FPL, April 1, 1983 choice in the short run but to bite the bullet and demand cosmetic changes.
But the assassination of Benigno Aquino threw a wild card into Marcos" plan by sparking the beginnings of a mass popular mobilization. At the core of this upsurge, the main slogans of which are an end to the dictatorship and to the economic, political, and military presence of U I.S. imperialism, are the urban working class and displaced peasants.
For the moment, Marcos may be able to weather the storm. The elite opposition lacks the organization and the will to contest political power, while the NDF is presently committed to gradually building its military and political strength. Another crisis will occur within the elite opposition over whether to boycott the May election.
Whether the regime will be able to survive in the long run, and whether the bourgeois opposition can co-opt the mass movement, are open questions that depend in large measure on the leadership of the mass movement of workers and peasants, in particular, on the National Democratic Front led by the Communist Party.
Although founded in 1968 on Maoist principles and continuing to advocate "people's war," the CPP has been forced to look on the cities with new eyes and to question its old schemas. The Central American revolution has had its impact. By virtue of its history of struggle and sacrifice, and in the absence of a mass revolutionary Marxist party, the NDF/ CPP alone are presently capable of coordinating the anti-Marcos struggle and giving the movement a perspective for the future-that of the armed overthrow of the dictatorship. But the necessary mobilization of the workers and peasants that this would entail would draw the revolution in an anticapitalist direction. This is the specter that haunts Washington as it attempts to resolve in its favor the dilemma of who, or what will follow Ferdinand Marcos.
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It involved the denial of Palestinian