International VIEWPOINT

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private progovernment armed organizations to halt the land reform--none of this could be found in The Militant.

The consequence was that a newspaper that had once had the reputation " of being among the most accurate and truthful on the Left was transformed into a propaganda organ that withheld basic information in order to create desired impression. We could put this delicately, but in effect it meant that you could not tell what what going on in places Iran, Poland, Afghanistan, North Korea, Vietnam, Ethiopia from reading the manipulated accounts in the Militant • Many party members began to subscribe to other left-wing publications simply because they no longer believed what their own press told them.

We understand the problem of playing into the hands of the many reactionary propaganda campaigns orchestrated by the Reagan governnent and its agents in the press. We saw the anti-Iranian hysteria, the hue and cry the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the meetings where the unspeakable General Haig declared his "Solidarity with Solidarity." But we are also convinced, only through a deep erosion of internal democratic rights. This was done by declaring the leadership to be completely correct; by definition, all of its critics were "enemies of the party" (this cliche from old Stalinist pamphlets was actually used in caklgett California, characterize Mackler, of the main leaders of Socialist Action). This kind of attitude could not help but spill over into SWP's approach to organizations outside its own ranks.

In the last several years the SWP. has tended to view everyone else engaged in the struggle against the evils of capitalism as a "petty bourgeois." The exceptions are leaders of faraway revolutions whom the party does not have to work with anyway. Ths wodes ena t ioe swal lowed up the SWP's work the women's movement, then the antinuclear power movement, later the antinuclear weapons movement. Finally the trade unions, where the membership had all gone escape "petty also became nothing "petty bourgeois bureaucrats."

Party members in the unions confine their activity largely to general „a e SOTo subscribe, fill out the following coupon and mail to:

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Grenadian revolution(continued from page 1: “U.S. invasion- Lessons of Grenada revolution”)advisers. The rest were airport construction workers, medical personnel, technicians, diplomatic staff, and children.

Were U.S.Students in Danger?

The claimed military objective of the U.S. action, to ensure the satety oi 500-600 medical students at •St. George's University School of Medicine, was exposed as a fraud even prior to the invasion. Medical school classes had been in session the day before the invasion, with transportation between the two campuses provided by Grenadian officials. A week prior to the invasion, the Reagan administration had been informed by Dr. Charles Modica, the chancellor of the school, and Geoffrey Bourne, the dean, that the students were in no danger.

Despite the efforts of Geoffrey Bourne to head off the invasion (Bourne was responsible for arranging the onsite visits to the medical school by Ken Kurze and Linda Flohr, two U.S. embassy representatives in Grenada who thereafter stated that the students were in no danger), Reagan gave ine ¡inal order for the invasion early Monday morning, October 24. This action was taken despite a telegram to Reagan, signed by 500 parents of the students, pleading with him not to invade, and even though a number of students had already shown it possible to leave the island on resumed charter flights.

Reagan's Legal Pretext Exposed The U.S. president's "legal" pretext for the invasion was equally shattered in a matter of days. The so-called invitation to "intervene" issued by four members of the Organization of East Caribbean States (OFCS) was, according to Bernard Gwertzman writing in the New York Times, "drafted in Washington and conveyed to the Caribbean leaders by special American emissaries." The invasion request, wrote Gwertzman, was made in response to U.S. urgings, which cited Article 8 of the 1973 OECS treaty. This article concerns "arrangements for collective security against external aggression" and requires a "unanimous" decision by the seven member states. Only four OBCS members "requested" assistance, and there was no assertion of "external aggression. "ho assertion A token force of 300, mostly policemen from the East Caribbean states of Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, and St. Christopher-Nevis, was flown in after ne invasion to give the appearance oi a "multinationali force. They were assigned no combat role.

An Army of Occupation Within minutes of the marine landing, a U.S. radio station was hooked up to broadcast warnings to the Grenadian people to "remain in your home until advised it is safe to go outside."

Socialist Action December 1983 Grenadians were told to cooperate with "friendly forces it it should • become necessary to enter your home."

Since the invasion, these "friendly forces" have imposed a reign of terror on the Grenadian people. Roadblocks have been set up at key intersections and all vehicles are regularly searched. Mass arrests have resulted in the imprisonment of trade unionists, NJM members, leaders and activists in the mass organizations, and army and militia members. Hundreds have been detained in special camps set up by the U.S. military. House-to-house searches are part of the daily routine of the U.S. invasion force. Prisoners have been beaten and terrorized.

The U.S. government and its appointees in Grenada today decide all policy questions and administer all major government operations. Purge lists have appeared and are used to eliminate "unfriendly" Grenadians from government posts. The United States has appointed Sir Paul Scoon, who was the British queen's representative under the Gairy dictatorship, to be the new head state. Scoon is charged with setting up an interim government and holding elections. While the Reagan administration originally claimed that its troops would be withdrawn in a matter of weeks and that elections would be held shortly, it is now clear that neither assertion is true.

While 5,000 U.S. troops remain indefinitely on the island, the State Department has earmarked $15 million to train and maintain a regular military occupation force, a key indication that Washington understands that the Grenadian people have no desire to return to their former colonial status.

Why the U.S. Invaded The real reason for the U.S. invasion has nothing to do with the presence of Cubans in Grenada, the safety of medical students, or other lies about Grenada's supposed aggressive international military intentions. From day one of the revolution, when the Grenadian people ousted the Gairy dictatorship, the United States set out to reverse the process of social change that had begun. Under the leadership of the NJM, Grenada had made major gains in improving the standard of living oi its people. Included were the following:

•Reducing unemployment from 49 14 percent. •Eliminating all discriminatory laws against women and guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. •Reducing illiteracy to 2 percent through a mass • literacy campaign and providing free education for all. •Establishing a system medical and dental care. •Unionizing 90 percent of the work force. •Developing a national fishing industry that, for the first time in Grenada's history, enabled it to export fish.

•Distributing unused land to farmers, with low interest loans, to form cooperatives. •Transforming 40 percent of the farms and plantations in Grenada, previously owned by Gairy and his supporters, into collective farms, which began to utilize modern agricultural techniques. Achieving a 1982 national economie growth rate of 5.5 percent, one of the highest in the world. Increasing real wages in 1982 by 3 percent (after adjustment for inflation).

Similar gains had been registered in housing, in regularizing and increasing the supply of water and electricity, in diversification of agriculture, and in construction of a new international airport.

Bishop's Murder Opens the Door The October 13 arrest of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, and his murder six days later, provided Washington the opportunity it had been waiting for to end the process of SOcial transformation that had begun in Grenada, process that had inspired oppressed people throughout the world.

On October 19, a demonstration of some 4,000 Bishop supporters, led by Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman, marched to Bishop's house to release him from the detention ordered by the NJM Central Committee on October 13. A crowd estimated at 10,000-15,000, led by Bishop and other government ministers, then proceeded to the Fort Kupert army headquarters, where weapons for to eyewitnesses, the crowd was unarmed with the exception of a few weapons taken earlier from the guards at Bishop's house.

There are several versions as to what happened at Fort Rupert. General Hudson Austin, one of the coup's leaders, stated in a broadcast that the Grenadian army fired in self-defense after it was attacked by Bishop and his supporters. Bishop, along with Foreign Minister Whiteman, Education Minister Jacqueline Creft, Housing Minister Norris Bain, and trade union leaders Vincent Noel and Fitzroy Bain were allegedly killed in the cross fire.

Several eyewitnesses, including Bishop's mother and the wife of Norris Bain, dispute this account. Both assert that the army fired on the crowd, leading : Bishop and the others to raise their hands immediately and surrender. They were taken into the fort and summarily executed. Seventeen people were killed on the spot and another 59 were wounded.

Regardless of which version of the events at Fort Rupert proves to be true, certain facts cannot be refuted:

•According to all accounts, including those of surviving Bishop supporters such as former Agriculture Minister George Louison and Bishop's press secretary Don Rojas, the differences between Bishop and the supporters of the apparent majority faction, led by Continued on page 10

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Grenadian revolution Continued from page 9 Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and General Austin, did not involve any substantial political question. The central debate was over power and authority in the party apparatus and government.

•While Bishop was out of the country and prior to his arrest, the Coard-Austin faction began to demobilize and disarm 1 sections oi the army and militia.

•Following Bishop's murder, arms were collected from the various military posts where they had been previously stored for use by the militia.

•Austin declared an immediate round-the-clock curfew. Violators were to be "shot on sight."

These actions effectively disarmed and demoralized the Grenadian population in the face of an imminent U.S. invasion.

The October 20 statement released jointly by the Cuban government and Cuban Communist Party underlined the gravity of the situation: "No doctrine, principle or proclaimed revolutionary position, nor any internal division can justily methods as atrocious as Bishop's physical elimination and the death of the group of outstanding, honest and honorable leaders who were killed yesterday. Now imperialism will try to use this tragedy and the grave errors committed by the Grenadian revolutionaries to sweep away the revolutionary process in Grenada and subject it to imperial and neocolonial power."

This is precisely what happened. The invasion plans drawn up and rehearsed by Washington as far back as October 1981 were activated and implemented.

Washington Iwo years ago, the U.s. government, together with 14 of its capitalist allies,. organized the largest amphibious military maneuvers since World War 11. Code-named "Ocean Venture," the maneuvers involved 250 ships, 120,000 troops, and 1,000 aircraft. The Caribbean component of these maneuvers was a dry-run mock invasion of Grenada. It was code-named "Operation Amber and the Amberdines," a thinly disguised reference to Grenada and its sister Grenadine islands, Petit Martinique and Carriacou. Using the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, the United States developed and practiced the entire invasion scenario down to the last political and military detail. "Amber," a client state of "Big Red" (Cuba) had taken U.S. "hostages" and was said to be exporting subversion and refusing to conduct "free elections."

A new set of Ocean Venture exercises was held in 1982. In March 1983 NATO forces again conducted maneuvers in the Caribbean. explained ation was field in planes."

U.S. Admiral Robert Watkins hat one reason for the oper"the construction of an airGrenada for use by Soviet Lessons of the Coard-Austin Coup At least for the moment, the social progress achieved in Grenada has been brought to a dead halt. "Elections" supervised by the guns of U.S. troops and organized by an occupying power will have no meaning for the Grenadian people, who will undoubtedly continue under the most difficult circumstances to struggle for their sovereignty. Defending this right is a major responsibility of the antiwar movement in the United States.

At the same : time a rigorous study of the events leading up to the U.S. invasion is essential in order to learn from Grenada's experience. It is now clear that key institutions of the Grenadian revolutionary process--the New Jewel Movement, the mass organizations, and the armed forces--require a thorough evaluation.

The New Jewel Movement The NJM in 1983 was a party of 700800 members. Most if not all of the differences among its central leaders were unknown to the rank and file.This contributed greatly to distancing the party trom the people in a time of crisi not to mention during "ordinary" periods. The NJM lacked real democracy. This is an essential element in a revolutionary party for discussing, evaluating, and resolving internal differences without resort to threats and power struggles, which elevate personal differences and bureaucratic control over collective decision-making and teamwork.

The right to form tendencies and factions for the purpose of participating in an organized way in the internal lite of the party was not fostered. The NJM as a political party had not evaluated its relationship to the government, often acting as if the two were the same. The fact that Prime Minister Maurice Bishop could be arrested by a political party, the NJM, and not by the government, indicates grave confusion on the part of NJM leaders. This implies that in their view political power could be exercised by a small party minority rather than by a government based on mass institutions of the workers and farmers. While many individual leaders of the party like Maurice Bishop were close to the Grenadian masses and frequently expressed • their deepest desires for progressive change, the masses themselves apparently had little control over the party.

The Mass Organizations Grenada's mass organizations including the six parish or zonal councils and • their various subdivisions, the National Women's Organization, the youth organization, the trade-union federations and others, tially mass bodies organized for discussion and exchange of ideas. While they provided a forum for the NJM to test and affirm the popularity of its programs and a mechanism for the people to express their opinions, these bodies still had little or no real power. They lacked virtually all administralive, executive, and legislative funetions. Grenadian leaders often referred to the mass organizations as vehicles through which the masses would participate in government, but they were not yet conceived of as governmental institutions themselves.

The Army and Militia The people of Grenada were not armed. The militia, which at times grew to sizable proportion of the population, had no immediate access to weapons. These were under the control of the army and were distributed only on those occasions when practice drills and maneuvers were conducted. An armed peoole governings themselves, deciding their tuture • Inrougn the construction of genuinely mass and popular institutions of rule, is essential for the consolidation of the gains of a revolu(continued on page 11, in “[Continued from page 10 tionary process. Had the…]”)